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THE NATURE OF DEITY

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A SEQUEL TO
"PERSONALITY AND REALITY"

BY

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IN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AN INDEBTEDNESS

THAT CAN NEVER BE FULLY

DISCHARGED

PREFACE

THE present volume forms a sequel to *Personality and Reality*. I have maintained the same general standpoint and applied the same method of argument. Making no appeal to any presuppositions nor philosophic postulates, I have based my conclusions on what appear to me to be the broad facts of the situation; and although my final position, taken as a whole, presents little that is in any sense new, still the manner in which it is arrived at marks a departure (in my own opinion) from the course hitherto adopted.

The comments upon *Personality and Reality* that have come to my notice have been almost uniformly appreciative; and in expressing my thanks to the writers, I cannot avoid feeling some slight regret that so little adverse criticism has been advanced, particularly from the self-styled "rationalist" supporters of the opposed point of view. Again, however, my detailed argument must speak for itself. But since I have made such extensive use (both in this and the former volume) of the principle of evolution, it may assist any readers who desire a closer acquaintance with the generally accepted facts underlying this principle to refer to the admirable survey of the entire field contained in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge* (Blackie). This volume, written throughout by experts upon their respective subjects, leaves little room for doubt as to the facts whose philosophical implications I have endeavoured in the following chapters to interpret.

As on previous occasions, my thanks are due to Miss G. Baddeley and to my son for their valuable assistance in press preparations ; also to the publishers for their kind interest in my work as a whole, in addition to the efficiency which always characterises their participation in the enterprise.

J. E. TURNER.:

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THE NATURE OF DEITY

I

SELFHOOD AND ENVIRONMENT. DEITY AND UNIVERSE

I. I HAVE argued in an earlier volume¹ that the real existence of the Supreme Self or Deity can be logically established from the *data* presented by those outstanding characteristics of the universe which have been discovered by modern science. It will here be sufficient to repeat that for that argument three principles are essential: first, the real existence of the material or physical world *as such*, (that is as not in any sense nor degree mental or psychical);² secondly, the intricate and perfectly automatic mechanism of its constitution or structure; and finally the actuality of the entire evolutionary process, both organic and inorganic—both material and vital. In the following chapters I shall endeavour to carry the enquiry still farther, and consider whether any more detailed results can be attained with regard to, not the existence, but the character, of the Supreme Self. x

It is important to observe that the *method* of argument must remain the same as hitherto—must consist, that is, in the consideration of the known features of real being rather than in any purely theoretical suggestions or

¹ *Personality and Reality* (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.).

² Cf. my *Theory of Direct Realism* (issued by the same publishers in "The Library of Philosophy").

hypothetical suppositions. The latter undoubtedly have their proper place and value; but in the present connection they must remain subordinate except in so far as they are the logical outcome of ascertained facts. It may of course be said that every writer adopts this method; in my own opinion, however, abstract theory and speculation have occupied somewhat too prominent a place in previous analyses of the present problem; and this has seriously but inevitably detracted from the appeal made by their conclusions to the intellect, as distinguishable from the emotions, of mankind. The Earl of Balfour is by no means alone in emphasising the force of the *argumentum ad hominem*.¹

On the other hand it is too little recognised that what is positively known at once provides a firm basis for a yet wider content which may—or indeed must—be believed. This conclusion follows from the very nature of knowledge as such, and from the conditions of its entire development; which means that any uncompromising and absolute agnosticism contradicts the essential tendency of intellectual evolution. For the certainty of what is known in itself always indicates a smaller or larger number of logical implications relevant to the specific subject-matter; and the extent and validity of these implications increase quite naturally in accordance with both the volume and the definiteness of the already ascertained facts. In this way all knowledge without exception inevitably expands into belief—facts into theory and hypothesis—certainty into probability; the only necessary intellectual condition for this advance being the due observance of the principles

¹ *Theism and Thought*, p. 37. On the existence of God as a postulate of thought cf. *Personality and Reality*, Preface.

of logic or the "laws of thought." Thus both the objective content and the subjective attitude of belief are equally as imperative and justifiable as those of knowledge itself. Not only, then, *should* beliefs be adopted, but they *must* be adopted; they are (in other words) not merely expedient but inescapable. The sole intellectual criterion, in knowledge and in belief alike, is rational validity. What must be avoided, therefore, is not belief as such, but simply illogical belief, which thus stands on exactly the same footing as positive falsity and error.

Accepted beliefs, then, can be criticised or discarded not merely (as is so often maintained) because they are beliefs, but only because they can be shown to rest on too narrow or insecure a foundation. It is therefore never belief, as such, that requires to apologise for its existence and deliverances but only credulity—that is the adoption of a position which lacks an adequate logical basis. This is always indefensible, easy and attractive though it may appear to be. In the opposite direction the "will to believe," taken purely in itself as will, is quite as unjustifiable as the "will to assert," unless the assertion can be substantiated by sufficient evidence. No one has the right to claim for himself, or to demand from his fellows, anything more than the "will to believe *logically*"—and logically, still further, not as it seems to himself alone in any arbitrary way (except of course so far as he himself is concerned, which is much less frequently the case than is usually imagined) but always as it seems to each person in the light of his own rational judgment.¹ Everything beyond this is

¹ Contrast William James's well known passage—"Our right to adopt a believing attitude in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced." *The Will to Believe*, p. 1.

nothing but intellectual despotism on the one side, with its inevitable response in intellectual shallowness or hypocrisy on the other. It should be needless to add that this is no defence either of obscurantism or of dogmatism in its bad sense ; I have just pointed out, on the contrary, that only to the degree that knowledge advances does the logical basis of belief become firmer and more substantial.

This does not mean, however, that the situation which demands enquiry becomes simplified, so far at least as its essential factors are concerned. Rather is it steadily increasing in its complexity, necessitating ever more adequate and therefore more difficult methods of investigation, more precise and comprehensive syntheses, keener intellectual equipment and insight ; but yielding in return, like a gold mine which becomes richer as it sinks in depth, truths of higher value and principles of deeper significance. All this I take to be perfectly obvious in the light of the continuous advance of human knowledge ; and knowledge again, despite its incompleteness and inadequacy, must be regarded as in essence and so far as it goes *direct knowledge of the real universe*, not as any mere reflection nor construction of man's mind, which while indispensable in practice remains none the less subjective in its nature.¹ Thus we are justified in applying the epitaph of the creator of St. Paul's to the architecture of the universe—" If you seek his monument, look around you."

2. It may be objected that such an " intellectualist " standpoint accords far too little value to the deliverances of those greatest leaders of the race who have founded their doctrines upon the inner experience of themselves

¹ The more technical issue turns not on the element of construction in knowledge (which I fully accept), but on its subjectivity, which I repudiate ; the content or object of knowledge, in other words, is throughout objective. Cf. further p. 45 below.

and their fellows—on mystic intuition or moral insight, on direct intercourse with Deity or the content of divine revelation. But even if we accept these principles at their own valuation—and I have no desire whatever to criticise them adversely—it still remains true not only that they have made no literally universal appeal (whatever may be the causes of their limitation) but still further that they arouse a certain degree of suspicion and distrust in types of mind which cannot be charged with any serious mental or moral deficiency, to which they seem lacking in evidence weighty enough to command sincere assent. Their sources and sanctions appear altogether too personal, too individualist and dogmatic, never sufficiently rational or logical. To ignore these patent aspects of current controversy is in my opinion unwise, if not impossible.✓ For the uninterrupted advance of knowledge which I have already emphasised both exhibits and sustains the steady expansion of the kind of mentality in question here—that is of the non-mystical and extrospective type which is perhaps best described as “intellectual.” It is unnecessary to assess the value of these individualities; it may indeed be admitted that our age is *over*-intellectualised, and that a healthy mental balance demands a much profounder emotional culture. All this in no way affects the fact that the acceptance of what may be called “intuitional” principles need not exclude recourse to purely logical considerations; while to fear the destructive effect of rational criticism is plainly to confess in advance the essential weakness of the “intuitional” point of view.¹

¹ It is almost superfluous to refer to the position of Schleiermacher and Ritschl in this connection.

But a still more important point arises here. For the reliance upon inner experience itself means that all great reformers and teachers do in fact base their position upon some kind of survey of their universe. They plainly appeal to certain outstanding characteristics of human nature and human experience, to the course of national or racial history, to the operation of the moral law or to the intuitive dictates of conscience, even to the objects and changes of the natural environment—to flowers and seeds and birds, to sun and stars and seasons—interpreting these each in his own distinctive way and enforcing what he takes to be their patent implications. In all these instances alike we find, not the absence of rationality, but rather a direct appeal to what is regarded as the most forcible of all reasons—that is the convergence of nature and history and experience towards some quite definite body of truths; and this is plainly the application of the principle of “look around you.” The sole essential change in the situation therefore, so far as our own day is concerned, arises from the already unprecedented, yet soon to be eclipsed, expansion of the results of scientific investigation, which have descended upon the ordered fields of earlier culture with the devastating suddenness of a Nile flood.

But even such an irruption as this need not necessarily be permanently destructive; it may on the contrary, like the actual river, prove to be a most effective fertilising agency on the largest conceivable scale; while to ignore it would be as fatal in the one case as in the other. It is perfectly natural, of course, that it should be regarded with dislike and hostility by all whom it has disturbed, and with some suspicion by those whom they influence. But the evidence that these moods have had their day

is too patent to require detailed reference. Whether they are welcome or not, the new methods and principles must be impartially considered ; and it is only necessary to recognise that science is but one form of the systematic development of man's inherent intellectual capacity to perceive that there can be no absolute conflict between its content, provided always that this is taken in its entirety, and the highest of human interests.¹ In its general spirit and tendency, indeed, science itself is as old as thought ; and all that is new or " modern " lies in its specific method of attacking its problems—that is in its technicality, detail and precision, combined as these are with its wealth and intricacy of apparatus. But apart from these secondary features of the situation, the first intelligent savage who built a raft or poisoned his arrows was just as " scientific " in tendency as the twentieth-century investigator ; and most probably, too, the object of equally stupid criticism. " We see the savage," asserts Malinowski, " endowed with an attitude of mind wholly akin to that of a modern man of science " ; and he instances " empirical knowledge of material, of technology, and of certain principles of stability and hydrodynamics . . . a whole system of principles of sailing, embodied in a complex and rich terminology, traditionally handed down and obeyed as rationally and consistently as is modern science by modern sailors." ²

Not only, then, is science throughout its entire development one indestructible aspect of man's spiritual activity, but it also shares that essential attribute of knowledge to which I have already referred—its maintenance of a

¹ Cf. note 2, p. 156 below.

² *Science, Religion and Reality*, pp. 28, 31, 32.

direct contact between mind and universe ; and this principle must further be associated with the truth that the mind itself has originated from and within the universe, of which it therefore constitutes an integral and always dynamic element. The term "universe" of course (as I have elsewhere insisted) denotes far more than the material or physical universe, to which its meaning is unfortunately too often restricted ; how much more than this, indeed, is itself one of the most fascinating yet baffling problems of the future. Knowledge, then, may be regarded from two points of view—either as the discovery by mind of its own originating and sustaining environment, or as the self-revelation of the universe to self-conscious mind ; these two view-points being in fact essentially complementary. To discredit in advance the results of their interaction is thus plainly to postulate a deeply rooted and eternal severance, or indeed an active hostility, between universe and mind ; and the significance of such a conclusion needs no elaboration.

It should be equally plain that nothing I have said debars the most vigorous criticism of any principles whatever, even those commonly accounted most sacred and inviolable. Such criticism, on the contrary, is one of the most efficient of all intellectual instruments—one of the keenest weapons, provided that it is skilfully and sympathetically wielded, in the mind's armament. Its function, and also its results, are simply those of the pruning-knife ; it is one of the principal methods whereby the intellect corrects its own distortions of vision, harmonises the erratic course of its expansion and so rids itself of error. In more technical terms, criticism is that introspective examination by knowledge of its own content, which proceeds *pari passu* with its further

exploration of the environing world. It is the more or less deliberate and systematic interaction between the innumerable categories of thought which may quite legitimately be compared to chemical reactions, or still more truly to the vital coordinations between all the organs of a healthy body. Like these again, criticism is a natural activity of the healthy intellect, which in its highest forms is never merely destructive but rather constructive, so that the anabolic and katabolic processes of the body have their analogues in the sphere of mind. Fear of criticism, on the other hand, is simply an expression of that secret suspicion of the universe to which I have just referred.

3. The standpoint and the method of enquiry here adopted require, therefore, no further defence. They are indeed identical with the attitude of philosophical thought alike in Greek and Scholastic speculation, the only difference (once again) consisting in the enormous mass of absolutely new *data* which demand consideration. I shall begin, then, with the problem of the nature of the relation between the Supreme Self and the remainder of the universe with which He coexists; and in the first place it is essential to guard against that ever-present tendency to regard such coexistence as being predominantly passive which may be due, at bottom, to the prominence of space and time within all human experience. The time aspect must undeniably figure in all our concepts, since even the idea of timelessness or eternity derives part of its meaning from the nature of time. But both space and time, taken in themselves, are none the less abstractions from the complete content of reality—abstractions, however, not in the sense of being subjective forms or contents of mind (in any Kantian

sense), but as being elements or factors of the universe which, while they can certainly be distinguished, must never be isolated from all other reals. In physics they are of course always supplemented by motion, energy and allied dynamic agencies whose intensity has been shown by recent research to attain an almost inconceivable degree alike in every atom and in every star.¹

This incalculable dynamic character, permeating as it does the whole of reality, must be borne in mind throughout our enquiry, for otherwise our perspectives will be unduly minimised and distorted. It is at once obvious that it possesses implications of the first importance with reference to the nature and activities of the Supreme Self, which will ere long receive more detailed consideration. Here it is sufficient to regard it as enabling us to regard this Self as "the personal factor of the psychophysical universe, within which it is omnipotent."²

The more precise meaning of "omnipotent" must also be deferred for the moment. At this stage it is intended to imply dynamic activity and literal supremacy, as opposed to merely passive coexistence; and when this interpretation is accepted as fully as it demands to be it removes the difficulties which inevitably attend the inclusion of the Supreme Being *within* the universe. The issue here is of course largely one of definition. But all definition, again, as a really logical and not merely nominal matter, is of vital importance, since it is the attempt to express the exact content of thought in terms whose sufficiency and accuracy are beyond dispute. This is no impossible ideal, but rather one that is being in-

¹ Cf. Dr. Jeans in *Evolution* (Blackie), p. 13, or indeed the whole chapter; and further p. 82 below.

² *Personality and Reality*, p. 158.

creasingly achieved in mathematics and its allied sciences ; and if it is objected that even here absolute finality can never be attained, this is after all no fault of definition itself, but only the result of that infinite complexity of real being which the mathematician's specific forms of thought endeavour to analyse and to express. Such adequate expression, however, is plainly dependent on the prior formation of accurate ideas or concepts, although at the same time expression and conception materially influence each other's development. Thus regarded, definition can never be unimportant, since it presupposes the existence of adequate concepts and their expression in exact terms. All that is permissible, therefore, in the present instance is the adoption of some clearly marked standpoint ; and with this proviso it is undoubtedly quite legitimate to employ " universe " to denote all that exists *other than* and exclusive of the Supreme Self. This procedure possesses undeniable merits, especially from the specifically religious point of view. For it indicates an almost absolute distinction between the Supreme Self and all else, thus conferring on Him that quite unique status which accords with one of the main tendencies of worship. It implies His possession of peculiar attributes—even though these may be regarded as in themselves inconceivable—which can be shared by no other real whatever, and so expresses His transcendence of all existents besides Himself ; while the value of an attitude that has been naturally and unhesitatingly adopted throughout almost the entire development of religion can easily be gauged if we consider the potent influence of the status enjoyed by the sovereigns of even so constitutional a monarchy as our own. Undoubtedly, therefore, there is much to be said in support

of some such restricted definition of "universe" as this.¹ Philosophically, nevertheless, it leaves much to be desired; and its theoretical inadequacy is paralleled by the gross abuses to which the political principle of personal sovereignty—of the "divine right of kings"—must from its very nature always remain susceptible.

It must then be admitted from the outset that the essence of what is implied by this expression of the religious attitude must be conserved by philosophy; and that is why I emphasise the literalness of the term "Supreme." But once this necessity is adequately recognised, it must further be pointed out that all theistic types of religious experience necessarily imply a direct relation of some kind between man and Deity. This is so even in the most extreme case of the wholly transcendent God of Aristotelian speculation, in so far as He is the cause or source of the world and at the same time an object of human thought. Still further, reality is plainly a fundamental attribute of Deity, compared with which the reality of all else may be regarded as derivative and subordinate. Now just as religion inevitably emphasises the transcendence of Deity, so philosophy requires some term which denotes *all* reality without any omission, whatever may be the nature of the interrelations between its different elements. It is indeed one of philosophy's principal tasks to estimate the true value of these elements according to their place and function within the Whole; and one of the most serious difficulties which faces this attempt is the insuppressible tendency of all absolute distinctions between God and world to expand into their severance or opposition, and this to such a degree that in the end all reality becomes transposed

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 20, on "physical universe."

to Deity, while everything else sinks into insignificance or even illusion.¹ Since we may at least begin then by accepting both the Supreme Self and all other existents as in some way or other real, I shall myself employ "universe" to mean all-inclusive real being, within which this Self is the irresistibly dominating factor; using as alternatives having the same significance the terms "Whole" or "Absolute"—the latter, however, principally for purposes of critical discussion rather than constructive theory.²

4. Thus the problem narrows itself down to that of harmonising the inclusion of the Supreme Self in the Whole with His sovereign position and function therein. This question often occasions much difficulty, probably because such inclusion is felt directly to contradict the religious sense of divine transcendence and infinity. It seems to degrade Deity to a rank only slightly higher than our own as being one real among countless others; His status at best, therefore, can be no more than *primus inter pares*. But this conclusion, in my opinion, by no means follows; certainly it is what I wish definitely to exclude. For if, while adhering to the theistic standpoint, we avoid ascribing reality solely to Deity, then plainly He *is* one real coexisting with all others, although this bare initial statement must immediately be qualified in some way or other. To this principle the only alternative is some form of pantheism, which regards the divine reality as shared by all other existents without exception.

¹ Cf. Professor Otto's description of mysticism, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 21.

² At the same time the adjective "absolute" will retain its ordinary meaning of complete—unlimited—perfect. Cf. *Personality and Reality*, p. 170, on Professor Webb's identification of God with the Absolute; and p. 119, n. 1, below.

Rejecting this, it becomes sufficient to say that He is *primus*, altogether dispensing with *inter pares*; and then the only remaining point becomes the expression of this literal primacy or absolute supremacy as being that of a Self or Personality within the Whole; obviously, too, this materially deepens the significance of the term "reality."

However inadequate it may ultimately prove to be, our best starting-point here is to be found in the nature of human personality, considered always in its relatedness to its environment, whence it originates and to which it continues to be ever reactive, so that it can never be severed therefrom without at once ceasing to function as a self. With one vitally important aspect of this interconnection—that is with the truth that the self's responsiveness develops into an increasing dominance as it advances to ever higher levels—I have already dealt in *Personality and Reality*.¹ Here we must consider the distinctive characteristics of selfhood, which acquires and exercises such dominance, rather than the general principle of dominance as such.

For two types of dominance fundamentally different in their nature must now be distinguished. The first is that which manifests itself throughout the physical world as exemplified in the control of the sun over the solar system, of the atomic nucleus over the revolving electrons, or generally of any focus of energy over the surrounding field; ² and here, just as in the case of the self, there plainly exist varying degrees of effectiveness and range. With reference to our present problem,

¹ *Cc.* v, vi, "The Self as a Dominant Real"; "The Advancing Dominance of Selfhood."

² This principle is not affected by any relativist interpretation of "control."

however, the essential point which must be noted in all these instances is the complete *unconsciousness* of the dominant element whatever it may be ; and from this condition the transition can readily be traced to the sphere of life, where the mastery of the animal organism over its surroundings is at first accompanied by feeling, and still later manifested in the evolving forms of instinctive and volitional control.¹ Finally, the effective supersession of instinct by the will constitutes the second distinct type of dominance to be considered—that namely which is exercised by fully developed human personality *as conscious* alike of itself and of its environment.²

From the enormous mass of psychological details concerning this general connection between selfhood and environment, it is sufficient for our present purpose to select the increasingly definite *knowledge* which the finite self acquires of the entire situation—its ever clearer and deeper insight into both its own nature and the character of its world. This does not imply, however, that such knowledge and insight can at any time be more than partial ; rather must they always remain inadequate in face of the infinite complexity of the universe. But in spite of all these qualifications, this relation between developing personality and its environment always conforms to one and the same general type : the self remains conscious at once both of itself and of its environment as distinct from each other ; which means, in effect, that its knowledge of itself must find expression to a

¹ Cf. in fuller detail *The Monist*, vol. xxxv, pp. 555-560, "Nature and Ultra-Nature."

² This conclusion again is not invalidated by the activity of the "Unconscious" mind, nor again by panpsychism, since the elementary forms of any universal consciousness are not rational.

large degree in terms of the nature of the environment and its own relations thereto. I do not mean that this state of affairs always actually exists. It is, on the contrary, often so extremely imperfect as to approach that more primitive level of purely animal awareness which has just been seen to be intermediate between selfhood proper and unconscious materiality. But this plainly implies that such low forms of personality have attained only the most rudimentary of its potential levels; while even at much higher stages consciousness of self alternates with, and is too frequently overwhelmed by, consciousness of environment. None the less does the increasingly clear comprehension of the *distinction* between self and environment remain the ideal, towards which the evolution of personality more and more closely approaches as reason and will develop. Thus the completer knowledge of ourselves always demands a better knowledge of our entire physical and social surroundings; only in the light of this can we control at one and the same time our own inner development and our external reactions to nature and to society. This, as has been repeatedly pointed out by other writers, is the true meaning of "self-consciousness," which should denote not merely that entire absorption in our own individuality which can lead only to narrowness and stultification, but rather the fullest understanding of our "station and its duties."¹

But again it is unnecessary to elaborate this point in any detail. All that concerns my present argument is the truth that this distinction between self and environment must always be present in consciousness, not

¹ Cf. Dr. Bosanquet's *Principle of Individuality and Value* pp. 235 sqq.

however explicitly only, but rather in the main subconsciously, as underlying or permeating the entire course of experience. We have here, of course, nothing more than the expansion of the familiar principle of the inseparability of self from not-self, of *ego* from *non-ego* or of subject from object. Unfortunately this is too often regarded as being purely formal and abstract, instead of as the constitutive element of all the highest types of personality; and it need be added only that "distinction" must not be taken to imply opposition nor even contrast and nothing more. This is never the case even on the low level of animal life, much less in developed personal experience. For even if we emphasise the intensity of the "struggle for existence," still its final result is an intimate adaptation of the species to its particular environment; so that for biological theory, as in actual nature, species and environment together form a real unity.¹ Only, as I have already insisted, this fact can be actually realised neither by the animal mind nor, in any explicit way, by the simplest types of personality such as the child or savage. Not until thought and knowledge attain a fairly high level can the situation be definitely apprehended as it really exists, in such a way that (consciously or subconsciously) we interpret ourselves largely in terms of our environment and this, again, in terms of ourselves.

Some degree of opposition between them, of course, there must always be; it is the inevitable outcome of the finitude of the human mind. But that expanding dominance, which I have already maintained to be an

¹ "Every organism is a bundle of fitnesses." Prof. J. A. Thomson, *Contemporary British Philosophy* (Second Series), p. 328; cf. p. 310, on "The Organism as a Historic Being."

element inseparable from the evolution of personality as such, plainly implies the gradual reduction of this finitude and mutual opposition ; and our question thus becomes—what influence has this progressive change upon the distinction between self and environment now under consideration ? There are plainly two alternatives ; we must ask (a) does this distinction at any stage completely disappear ? or (b) does it ever become absolute ? and when thus stated it becomes obvious that in its bearing upon the nature of Deity, the affirmative answer in the first instance at once commits us to some form of pantheism, and in the second to an absolute transcendence.

5. But if we pursue still further the clue that we have thus discovered in the advancing development of human personality, we perceive that the distinction in question remains throughout what I have already called it—that is an ever more influential and more clearly apprehended element in self-consciousness—an always indispensable condition of that knowledge of self upon which the ancient Greek insisted. Only, once again, not necessarily as indicating opposition, but on the contrary as the means towards the attainment and exercise of more effective dominance. For amid the changes in the universe, individuality can be maintained only by regulating both subjective responses and volitional activities in the light of our knowledge of the principles underlying these changes ; while, still further, this very maintenance of individuality constitutes the basis for its incessant advance. In principle, and apart from the effect of contingent limitations, selfhood is never static but always strives onwards. In the case of the race this is obvious, and equally so in those outstanding individuals to whom, however, average persons may approximate in some slight

degree whenever they care sufficiently to do so ; and as I have argued in my previous volume, there are no grounds for positing any limits to this expansion.¹

What now, we must further ask, is the *ultimate* effect of this continuous advance in the level of personality upon that distinction between ourselves and the material and social world, of which the ordinary human being is so continuously and sometimes painfully aware ? As I have just suggested, it becomes ever more explicitly recognised, and this under four specific aspects. In the first place, the self realises more and more clearly the essential differences between its own nature and that of all other reals—physical, vital and psychical alike—which occupy a level lower than its own in the scale of being, and which, even though they share to their degree in the universal evolution, nevertheless lack its own rich potentialities ; a subject brilliantly discussed in Mr. Chesterton's *Everlasting Man*. Secondly, it discovers that these lower types of existence may be brought increasingly within the sphere of its own governing influence, so as to become its instruments and means. This of course is simply one form of my general principle of the advancing dominance of selfhood, abundantly evidenced as it plainly is in the practical results of the growth of scientific knowledge. Thirdly, this rapidly expanding power of control uninterruptedly facilitates the development of wider purposes, of higher ideals and nobler ends, previously unattainable owing to poverty of resources combined with narrowness of vision ; and this continued success contributes to heighten still

¹ *Personality and Reality*, p. 94. Of course the striving is not always directed to the highest ends ; but in that case it tends to become self-defeating. I consider this point at greater length at a later stage in my argument.

further the original contrast between the self and all its subordinate instruments.¹ Finally, each individual realises more definitely the marked differences which must persist between his own aims and those of his fellows; everyone finds his specific sphere of activity, within which he is at his best and therefore most himself, to be limited and specialised. On the other hand, this sharp sense of distinction is still further heightened by the discovery that his own success depends on co-operation with his fellows in endlessly different ways, whose efficiency depends on the delicacy and exactitude of mutual adjustment. To a large extent these relations still remain a matter of instrumentality and subordination; each of us is in some respects master, in others servant; none the less does mere subordination as such give place to reciprocity and furtherance among individuals all of whom enjoy some measure of equality and independence—that is, once more, of self-distinction.

Thus in all these important respects the advance of personality necessarily implies the *intensifying* of the sense of its distinction from—or still better within—the environment. The self, that is, always remains conscious of some wider totality of events and conditions which includes itself as an active factor. Its constant aim is to subdue and eliminate what is hostile, or to convert this into something instrumental or cooperant; and its success in so doing always depends on the clarity with which it apprehends its own dynamic status within the whole. What is called the expansion of knowledge, when interpreted (as it should be) objectively and not in

¹ In practical life this is often carried to an absurd degree in the attitude adopted towards their fellows by stupid autocrats.

merely subjective terms,¹ becomes the widening range of intellectual vision, which in its turn is inseverably associated with profounder emotional reactions and more efficient dominating control. If we compare any outstanding individuals whatever—great statesmen or generals, scientists or artists—with average persons, all these features become obvious. Nor is the principle of self-distinction affected by that increasing unity between personality and environment which naturally arises as its advancing dominance transforms the original hostility into subordination and cooperation. Here, however, as so often elsewhere, unity must not be confused with unrelieved uniformity. It is perfectly true that self and environment come to form in this way an increasingly harmonious combination; but the expansion of thought and action which has just been emphasised inevitably brings with it a rapidly multiplying diversity. Thus William James's well-known identification of the self with its most intimate environment must not be carried too far, but must always be coordinated with the individual's persistent consciousness that he forms the constant centre or principal focus of his widening world, as is indeed implied by James's own analysis; their unity, in more technical terms, is not existential but functional.²

If now we consider all these conclusions in their reference to the Supreme Self, we readily perceive that the essential conditions remain unaffected except by being infinitely intensified. To interpret the term "Self" literally and seriously, as of course it must be, means

¹ Cf. *ante*, sect. I, end.

² *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, pp. 291 *sqq.* Cf. further p. 70 below.

therefore distinction from, or rather within, an inclusive totality comprising both conscious and unconscious existents of all grades of reality, together with an explicit knowledge of this distinction ; while " Supreme " implies that this totality of reals is all-comprehensive, the knowledge unlimited and complete, the dominance absolute, and the unity perfect despite its infinite diversity.

Thus we finally attain the concept of the Universe or Whole which (in the first place) satisfies the philosophic demand for singleness combined with all-inclusiveness,¹ and (in the second) lays due insistence on the absolute supremacy, and therefore on the distinction from all else, of personal Deity. If all the terms in which this concept is here expressed are interpreted in their full significance—if " Universe," far transcending the material realm, is envisaged as current science is beginning to reveal it—if " absolute supremacy " is taken literally, and " personality " as being infinitely above any human level—then this presentation cannot be charged with any undue simplicity. In the succeeding chapters it will be still further amplified ; and at this point I may recur to the two alternative positions already indicated.² The standpoint here adopted avoids alike those two extremes of speculation—pantheism on the one hand and absolute transcendence on the other. The first is excluded by the *distinction* between the Supreme Self and what may be termed its " environment," which not merely exists but is known to exist.³ But although the Supreme

¹ As opposed, that is, to any extreme Pluralism.

² *Ante*, p. 30.

³ In the highest types of theism this distinction becomes fundamental, being expressed in the perfection of the attributes claimed by Deity ; a feature rightly emphasised in Professor Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*.

Self apprehends this distinction with perfect insight, the "environment" remains both the object of His knowledge and the sphere wherein His dominance is exercised; and thus, while the principle of His transcendence is undeniable, it cannot be carried to the deistic or Aristotelian extreme; it is not in that sense absolute. At the same time no just estimate of the problem is possible unless it is recognised that each of these historic systems expresses a profound spiritual need which philosophy must satisfy—but always, of course, on its own terms; which means not simply because it is a human need, but only if reason can discover a logical solution of the problem. Pantheism, then, endeavours to express the unity of all existence, and this in the highest of all possible forms as being the universal manifestation of Deity; for, as Professor Pringle-Pattison has warned us, we must distinguish between "the lower and the higher pantheism."¹ But against that ultimate and unrelieved identity of all existents with Deity, towards which pantheistic systems inevitably tend, I have insisted on the insuppressible *distinction* between the Supreme Self, and all else, which finds its ground in the very nature and activity of this Self. On the other hand, His infinite knowledge of the Whole and His absolute dominance therein maintain the unity of all existents equally with respect to one another and to Himself; the principle of divine personality therefore in no degree negates that of the unity of being. In the opposite direction, the belief in divine transcendence has its natural roots in man's keen sense of his finitude alike in power, thought and goodness; and if of his own finitude, then still more of that below him in the scale of being. Hence it is that

¹ *The Idea of God*, Lecture XI.

all human concepts alike, including that of selfhood, have been judged unworthy to express the divine nature, just as all existence becomes severed from the being of God. But while, as will be seen in the sequel, the principle of transcendence must in one way be uncompromisingly maintained, again the personality, knowledge and dominance of the Supreme Self all combine to exclude the suggestion of *absolute* transcendence in any Aristotelian sense. The personal aspect of His nature is shared, no matter in how tenuous and fragmentary a degree, by all true selves, just as the nature of light is common to the flickering taper and the midday sun ; although this truth must not be straightway interpreted to mean that all finite minds are but parts of His in any purely quantitative sense, even though this may be the case in some other respects still to be considered. Thus the whole of being is the object of His perfect knowledge, just as certain of its infinitely various aspects are directly known by the human mind ; and His absolute control, under endlessly diverse modes, governs all reals alike. Such is the relation between Deity and universe which now calls for further consideration.

II

INFINITY AND PERFECTION. THE INTELLECTUAL ATTRIBUTES OF DEITY

1. IN the foregoing discussion of the contrast between the nature of the Supreme Self and all forms of finite personality the term "infinite" has repeatedly been employed; and in this connection infinity is usually taken to imply that the attributes of Deity are either wholly or in the main beyond the powers of human comprehension. This, of course, is one of the most familiar aspects of the principle of transcendence; Spinoza *e.g.* distinguished only two divine attributes as manifested within human experience—extension and thought—all others being absolutely incognisable. In my own opinion, however, no logical necessity restricts speculation to these two attributes alone. Their acceptance constitutes as it were a breach in the dyke of absolute transcendence which may indefinitely be enlarged, and cannot be repaired simply by describing the thought and extension which pertain to Deity as themselves infinite, if at the same time they remain continuous with or analogous to what they actually are within our own experience. But "what they actually are" is plainly an extremely difficult question; for obviously each is one thing to the man in the street, and a totally different entity to the mathematician or the logician and psychologist. This patent contrast, however, itself yields the clue to the solution of the problem of the nature of infinity. For it is usually supposed that the crude ideas

of the plain man are contradicted and totally subverted by the concepts of the scientist and philosopher. But this is true only in the sense that the former must be continuously corrected and expanded, thus becoming finally transformed to such a degree that only the highly expert mind can recognise and employ them; and nowhere in the entire lengthy process of investigation does there occur any complete break, revolutionary though the mature conclusions often are as *e.g.* in the Theory of Relativity. This becomes obvious when it is recalled that the expert, both individually and racially, invariably begins with ordinary ideas, as is plain from the history of every science. All scientific progress, in fact, consists in the uninterrupted discovery of the deeper meanings and wider significance of the contents of everyday experience; and it is gradually becoming clearer that there exists no limitation to its advance—no final stage at which it must cease.¹ Thus the complete nature of thought and space, as of every other real entity, will never be understood exhaustively; and this means, though perhaps in another sense than Spinoza's, that their nature—which when combined with that of all else plainly becomes the nature of the universe—is "infinite" not as being incomprehensible, but rather as ever more fully apprehended by the continued expansion of the highest logical processes and categories discoverable by the human intellect.

These considerations possess a still profounder significance. For while (as I have just observed) no finite mind

¹ Cf. Hegel's treatment of Experience, cited in my *Theory of Direct Realism*, pp. 40, 266. Also Professor Julian Huxley, *Essays of a Biologist*, p. 55: "There is no theoretical obstacle to be seen at present to an increase of human powers in range of comprehension, intensity of feeling, or brilliance of intuition."

can ever exhaustively comprehend the nature of things, still we are thus enabled to discern, however dimly, both the existence and the direction of a thread of connection which links together the human mind and the Supreme Self, whose knowledge I have already asserted to be complete and therefore (in that sense) "infinite." It is, in other words, quite possible to conceive or to imagine—what will of course never actually occur—a finite mind unceasingly expanding its intellectual capacities until it understands all that exists ; and to this unrealisable ideal the actual expansion of human knowledge is a growing approximation, no matter how infinitesimal it must always remain. Thus the entire problem now assumes a totally different aspect. "Infinite" loses its usual suggestion of absolute mystery, and acquires instead some degree of concrete meaning as equivalent to "complete" or "perfect" ; and so infinity ceases to present an impregnable barrier between Deity and humanity and constitutes instead a faint indication of a quality which they share in common ; while man's finitude or imperfection conversely, inescapable though it must always remain, nevertheless shows itself to contain its own means of elevation and release alike in knowledge, emotion, conduct and religion.

2. Infinity thus becomes closely linked, or indeed identical, with perfection, wholeness, completeness, as has, of course, been repeatedly pointed out by Hegel and his successors ; and in this respect again our ordinary experience yields many instructive analogies. For in the diverse products of human activity there is undoubtedly attained some actual degree or level of perfection, most obviously in the sphere of art. There is, on innumerable occasions, a stage at which everything has been done that

requires to be done so far as that particular task is concerned. The poem or picture, the building or statue, is finished ; and the artist, even though he may still desire to do so, realises quite definitely that he can do nothing more except begin a further attempt to equal or transcend his previous level of attainment. If he is a really great artist mankind confirms this verdict by recognising that the work is finished, not in its merely temporal aspects, but in the much deeper sense that nothing further remains to be done ; it is a creation, complete, perfect, unique, in the literal sense that the highest possible ideal has been attained ; the very word " finish," in fact, has come to mean the final touches to which nothing needs to be added. In all art, happily, this is a familiar experience that can be discounted only by some such puerile objection as that art, after all, is not life nor knowledge nor even useful ; a standpoint which merely betrays, of course, gross ignorance of the distinctive nature of art and its compeers.

But at the same time the artistic type is not the only form of perfection ; something which (to say the least) closely approaches it occurs repeatedly in the intellectual sphere whenever *e.g.* a difficulty is fully explained, a problem finally solved or a principle completely demonstrated. Here, again, the mind attains finality, completeness, intellectual wholeness or unity, which in that specific connection leaves nothing more to be done and so provides, as it were, a goal or resting-place in the mind's advance. It is true that there is lacking here (except perhaps on rare occasions) that deep emotional response—that keen sensuous satisfaction—which characterises the enjoyment of all aesthetic perfection ; inevitably therefore the total intellectual experience seems

poorer—barer—thinner ; nevertheless it possesses its own type of satisfactoriness, as every thinker knows. It is further true that the cognitive situation exhausts itself much more rapidly than the aesthetic ; it is impossible to repeat it continually—to enjoy a given proof again and again as we can enjoy the same poem or the same picture on countless occasions. But this, again, yields no absolute contrast between knowledge and art ; it is only the result of the difference between their respective natures as diverse modes of response to the one universe. For it is of the very essence of thought to urge the mind ever onwards, since each of its constituent ideas points beyond itself ; the specific content of every concept possesses an inherent meaning or significance which indicates the direction in which the mind must continue to journey. Hence it is that every proof or solution at once suggests wider possibilities and raises, as is so often said, new and still more difficult problems ; hence, too, the rapid advance of knowledge as compared with the other main forms of experience. But these conditions are plainly not peculiar to cognition. Variety is the spice of art as well as of life ; contrast (in other words) is essential to aesthetic pleasure, so that the enjoyment of any one object alone not only exhausts itself but, if too prolonged, gives place to satiety and repugnance. Thus *absolute* perfection pertains only to the entire sphere of art which again, exactly as in the case of knowledge, is inexhaustible.

To apply this conclusion in detail to Nature and to conduct would be tedious. The incomparable perfection of natural beauty is too familiar to require comment ; and it is equally clear that we frequently perceive an unquestionable degree of moral excellence in actions which, of their own specific kind, cannot be surpassed ;

these again, in their own way, are final and complete—the innumerable martyrdoms and heroisms that relieve the dark history of the race.¹ In all these contrasted respects alike, then, the term “perfection” acquires a definite and concrete meaning which, as it unceasingly expands, rapidly becomes more and more detailed and intricate. There is therefore nothing whatever illogical in conceiving this expansion carried on to its utmost capacity, with reference first to the universe and secondly to personality; and thus the universe may be apprehended as a whole or unity which, like the realm of great art, is complete and self-sustaining although at the same time dynamic and inexhaustible.² From this standpoint it may quite legitimately be described as perfect or “infinite”; it possesses no boundaries, is confined by no limits, is paralleled or opposed by nothing over against itself. Similarly, with regard to the Supreme Self, the concept of a Personality whose intellectual capacity embraces all existence and whose power dominates the universe is, I submit, in itself quite logical, and so finds a basis not merely within religious experience but equally in the nature of thought.

It follows, therefore, that these conclusions imply the abrogation of the familiar absolute antithesis between “finite” and “infinite” in all the various applications of these terms. The infinite is thus not inherently opposed and contradictory to the finite, although it certainly transcends it in the sense of being all-inclusive or comprehensive; whereas it is the very essence of finitude to fall within infinity as a part or aspect thereof, and there-

¹ Cf. again Aristotle's ideal of Excellence.

² We may recall the “substance” of Spinoza and the “subject” of Hegel.

fore to possess limits which in the case of the infinite cease to exist. It is, of course, from the very conditions of the situation, impossible for the human mind to attain any definite and final concept of infinity as such. But it is by no means impossible to perceive diverse and clear indications of its nature, and also varying approximations to its completeness such as those I have just outlined, all of which plainly imply that finite and infinite are, alike in thought and in existence,¹ indissolubly continuous one with the other.

Similarly with what may be felt to be an antinomy between completeness or perfection on the one hand, and inexhaustibility on the other. Certainly if reality were static, passive, unchanging, then it might conceivably be completely explored and finally described or understood. But in that case it would plainly possess limits of one kind or another ; there would be some boundary or stage beyond which it would not extend, some level above which it could not rise ; and whether this were spatial or temporal, intellectual or spiritual, would make no difference to the principle involved here. But when we regard the universe as dynamic, again not in any mystical sense, but in exactly the same way that matter, life, and mind are more and more revealing themselves to be, and this to a degree of which we have as yet no adequate conception, then it becomes clear that its energy² must be inexhaustible, since otherwise the resultant process of development would ultimately reach a level which, even were it always maintained, none the less once again

¹ That is in so far as we choose to distinguish these ; for obviously thought is itself existent ; these more technical points may, however, be omitted here.

² Of course not in the physical sense merely. Cf. further *Personality and Reality*, chap. i.

destroys infinity. To regard the Whole in the light of the deepest implications of knowledge, conduct, and art is therefore to understand its infinity in its essential nature though never in its full detail ; and if we prefer to interpret this quality in terms of that perfection which is most vividly revealed in aesthetic experience, then we may accept the apparent paradox that absolute perfection demands its own unceasing and always transcendent development.

3. Reverting now to the perfection of knowledge we can, I believe, proceed to still more definite conclusions as to the intellectual attributes of the Supreme Self. For both the degree and the character of the steady expansion of human knowledge yield valuable clues to the solution of this problem. It is, in other words, no longer possible to lay the same stress on human ignorance as in earlier ages when thought, possessing hardly any *data* beyond those provided by the unaided bodily organs, remained prisoned within the narrow confines of sense-perception, from which it could escape only into some region of "abstract" speculation or "pure" theory which was too often regarded as nothing more than the phantasmal creation of its own futile strivings. Under those conditions the undeniable yet mysterious certainty of mathematics and logic was quite naturally condemned as merely subjective and as having therefore no reference whatever to real being—a standpoint clearly and emphatically presented by Hume. "Nature throws a bar to all our inquiries concerning causes and reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance . . . the only objects of demonstration are quantity and number, and all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. . . .

Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought . . . though there never were a circle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.”¹

The immediate consequences of this general attitude were twofold—intellectual agnosticism, and contrasted with this, perhaps indeed accepted as a refuge from it, non-rational religion; sometimes associated together, as in the distinction between the content of human reason on the one hand and of divine revelation on the other which was maintained by many scholastics; and sometimes diametrically opposed to each other in the long conflict between mysticism and science. The latter itself fell a victim to the virus of this subjectivism, from which it is only just beginning to show signs of recovery. For many scientists still remain content to regard their conclusions as enjoying validity only in thought’s peculiar sphere wherein Nature, as the object of research, is little more than its own creation; or, alternatively, they accord to their principles only a methodological value in so far as they coordinate experiences and events which are in themselves contingent.²

Against this general standpoint it must be maintained, in accordance with the Idealism common to Plato and Hegel, that human thought and knowledge are always concerned directly with the real universe. The various subdivisions of knowledge and the different methods of thought are all alike correlative to, and are indeed determined by, the infinitely diverse aspects of reality. They constitute, as it were, the contrasted types of armament which alone enable the mind to invade and conquer—in

¹ *Human Understanding*, vii, 1; xii, 3; iv, 1; cf. v, 1.

² *E.g.*, Poincaré, Mach, Abel and Avenarius.

the sense of understanding and dominating—its environment ; while truth or certainty is the intellectual territory which it has already seized and firmly consolidated into the base for its further advance. This essentially objective character of man's knowledge can be readily appreciated as soon as it is realised in the first place that our modern wealth of scientific apparatus enormously increases the range and accuracy of what the sense-organs directly perceive, while (secondly) all theory and hypothesis, instead of soaring into some imaginary limbo of "pure thought," are really based upon the resultant observations, to whose final deliverances they must ultimately conform, although at the same time this verification confers upon them an internal coherence of their own. This conclusion is only the fuller expansion of my earlier statement that "all scientific progress consists in the discovery of the deeper meanings and wider significance of the content of experience"—a principle which must not be confined to science alone but must rather be extended to the whole of human experience, although it is within the domain of science that its truth can be most easily perceived. This, however, is only because natural science is concerned with the relatively simple aspects of the universe, while aesthetics and ethics, history and sociology, are confronted by phenomena of far higher complexity and by existents possessing much more intricate organisation. To deal with this subject adequately would demand a detailed analysis of knowledge¹ ; here it must be sufficient to indicate more definitely that "thread of connection which links together the human mind and the Supreme Self" to which I have already referred, and to show not only that "finite and infinite are (in general

¹ I may refer to my *Theory of Direct Realism*.

terms) indissolubly continuous with one another" but that the very conditions of finitude themselves reveal something of the nature of infinity.

4. Beginning, then, with the actual content of knowledge and with the different forms of thought as the various means or instruments whereby such knowledge is attained,¹ there plainly occurs an expansion or growth, a development or evolution, which (as I have just maintained) brings the human mind into an ever-widening and at the same time more intimate contact with real existence ; still further, there is no ground for asserting any final limitation of this evolution—any ultimate boundary which the mind's own nature, as distinguished from the conditions under which it must always operate, forbids it to overpass.

Precisely the same considerations apply to error, which again is the natural consequence of the method whereby ignorance is overcome and removed. Ignorance as such—that is as the absence of positive knowledge—may be described as the outer boundary or farthest limit beyond which, at any given moment or in any given individual case, the intellect cannot proceed. This boundary however—this ulterior point at which the mind is stayed—is never absolute, but only temporary ; it can therefore always be surmounted, although rarely without strenuous effort. But even when it has been passed, the mind too frequently takes the wrong direction, like a traveller in the mist. It continues on its journey but loses its proper route and destination ; and the result is error, which is not (like ignorance) entirely negative, but has always a certain positive element or factor, most plainly to be

¹ Once again the other and equally important aspects of thought pertain to technical epistemology.

discerned when someone persists in dogmatically asserting what others regard as false ; for to himself this statement, though actually erroneous, nevertheless conveys it may be a wealth of meaning. Error then, despite its stubbornness and prevalence, is again not absolute—not inherent within all experience¹—but is simply the natural outcome of the conditions under which finite experience must develop and so overcome its finitude ; and it may be removed either by a retreat within the old boundary—that is by a frank admission of ignorance—or by a new attempt to resume the journey in the desired direction which, so far as it is systematic and not merely haphazard, represents hypothesis and theory.

But once this standpoint is adopted—as soon as ignorance, illusion, and error are seen to be not inherent and absolute but always conditional—then it becomes plain that, given the proper conditions, it is of the very nature of knowledge to expand continuously without any limitation whatever ; and although, as I have already admitted, the application of this principle can never yield any detailed insight into the actual character of infinite knowledge, it does nevertheless enable us to trace a definite continuity between such knowledge and our own. For feeble though the illustration at its best must be, it is obvious that there is, in precisely the same manner, an unbroken continuity between the mind of an infant a few hours old and the mind of an Einstein in the sphere of knowledge and a Shakespeare in the realm of art ; similarly with regard to the knowledge of man compared with that of Deity.

¹ To say, as is so often done, that error is an ineradicable element in human knowledge is plainly a contradiction in terms, since knowledge itself consists in the progressive elimination of error and the gain of some degree of certainty.

But we have become so familiar with the evolutionary point of view—which is clearly only another aspect of uninterrupted continuity—that the far-reaching and profound contrast between the initial, and the final, stages of any given course of development far too seldom receives proper recognition. It is only necessary, however, to compare an ocean liner or a battleship with a savage log canoe—modern artillery with a blowgun—a Gothic cathedral with a troglodyte cave—to appreciate the severity of the intellectual shock produced by the early evolutionists' assertion of the affinity between ape and man. On the other hand, the modern acceptance of the evolutionary principle demands that this be given its full logical development. Anything short of this is simply intellectual hedging ; and then it becomes, in my opinion, perfectly reasonable to conceive of the evolutionary process being continued as far beyond the intellect of a Newton or Einstein, or the genius of a Shakespeare or Beethoven, as these transcend, not merely the infant mind, but the consciousness of an amoeba ; it is indeed extremely probable that posterity will produce a super-Newton or super-Shakespeare. Once again there is nothing whatever in the *nature* either of knowledge or of art to render such suggestions antecedently impossible or inconceivable ; they are on the contrary simply the logical implications of the theoretic analysis of these forms of experience. It is true that we cannot imagine what the mind of a super-Shakespeare would be ; but neither could Pithecanthropus form the faintest idea of the intellect of modern man.¹

In all these cases we plainly begin, then, with a finitude—a limitation—an apparent simplicity—that seems

¹ Cf. note, p. 38 *ante*.

absolute and insurmountable ; while every advance from this primitive level consists in the progressive transcendence of the original finitude, or perhaps still more truly in its transformation, always in such a way as to attain higher degrees of comprehensiveness—completeness—even in a certain literal sense perfection. For this quality must surely be accorded (as I have previously suggested) to some products at least of great artistic genius—to a sonnet of Milton or a symphony of Beethoven—in the sense that, taken in themselves, they cannot be improved, though they must be supplemented by other creations equally great.¹ All this surely constitutes, if we interpret “infinite” in its truest sense,² an uninterrupted approximation to an infinity which fully in itself remains always unattainable, in precisely the same way that the asymptotes of a curve continuously approach but never actually touch it.

5. The continuity of experience throughout all its diverse stages exhibits therefore those additional characters of transcendence and transformation which closely ally it with infinity ; these actually involve each other so intimately, however, that they may be considered together. When, therefore, we compare any highly developed level of experience whatever, whether intellectual, aesthetic or practical, with another which is considerably more primitive than itself, we find that the former not only exceeds the latter in its comprehensiveness—that is in the range it covers and the content it includes—but that this content has itself undergone a marked change in its character as its expansion has gone on—a change so far-

¹ Similarly a mathematical demonstration may be final and complete even though concerned with only a single problem.

² *Ante*, p. 39.

reaching that it can only be termed "transformation." Such an internal change, however, is by no means peculiar to consciousness. Rather does every evolving system, without exception—physical, vital and social alike—exhibit the same general characteristic; and this transformation heightens still further the transcendence which would in any case arise from a larger volume of content alone. A simple illustration from everyday life is quite sufficient to elucidate this universal principle. For as a person's wealth materially increases, so his habits, his whole mode of living, even his attitude to his fellows and his character, all alike undergo a progressive and profound alteration which, still further, is accepted as perfectly natural; which indeed it is, just as are the analogous changes in a nation, an organism, a science, a religion, as these attain their higher levels. The embryo, again, is literally transformed into the adult, the nebula into the planetary system, and the barbarian tribe into a world empire.¹

It is, in fact, this metamorphosis that forms so impenetrable a barrier between the savage and the European, between man and animal or child, between ignorant and learned, even between rich and poor. Their respective natures, despite their basal continuity, have become so diverse that mutual contact tends to produce the same results as mixing oil and water; and thus, in all such innumerable instances, transformation and transcendence are the parallel results inseparable from the entire evolutionary process.

¹ Recent investigation into the internal constitution of stars is another case in point. In the case of animals, again, the successive stages which recapitulate the evolution of the species intensify the contract between the ovum and the developed organism.

But the point which must here be emphasised is that the continuity between even the lowest and the highest stages of each and all of these diverse systems not only remains intact, but can readily be revealed by a sufficiently adequate analysis ; and the same is true with regard to the conditions which underlie the final transformation. For, as a general principle which presents endlessly different aspects in all its specific instances, this arises from the interaction which occurs between the original factors and the later as these become successively incorporated within the expanding whole. It is, in other words, the perfectly natural outcome of the influence which the later factors cannot but exert upon the earlier, always in such a way as to bring about the radical internal alteration just referred to. Once again, then, must this principle, familiar enough in its bearing on so many and various aspects of experience, be carried to its logical conclusion ; and then it implies that even the contrast between infinite and finite, provided always that the latter remains capable of progressive development, cannot be regarded as destroying the thread of continuity which links them together.

But at this point another serious difficulty arises. For the general principle of transcendence has been prominent throughout the history of speculation ; while—if only for argument's sake—my present conclusion that it need not impair continuity may here be accepted ; and then it may be objected anew that, even if this is so, the infinite must, nevertheless, always remain beyond any finite powers of apprehension—or with special reference to our specific problem, must always be incomprehensible by the human mind no matter how high a level its development may attain. Illustrative instances are to be found

(it may be added) within our own experience. For if we grant that humanity has intimate and patent affinities with the tree-shrew or even the ascidian,¹ still it is obvious that the ascidian can never understand the man; nor need the position be stated in such an extreme form as this. For not even the child can understand the man, nor the tiro the genius; and similarly, the classic contention that man, in his turn, cannot comprehend Deity may still be maintained in spite of the foregoing arguments.

6. In my own opinion, however, two further considerations are sufficient to refute this familiar objection. In the first place, it ignores the fundamental difference between the *individual* human being and the *individual* member of every lower species; and (secondly) it fails to appreciate with due adequacy the nature, function and capacity of thought and knowledge. For while no single individual animal can overcome its limitations—while it is only the species that becomes materially changed as evolution advances, its individual members either perishing or producing offspring resembling themselves²—the mind of the *individual* child itself becomes that of the adult, just as the tiro may become a genius. In more general terms this plainly means that what during the initial stages of the individual's life (as in early infancy) is in a very literal sense transcendent becomes, by a perfectly natural process, easily comprehensible by the *same individual*; the entire advance, on whose vast

¹ Cf. *The Evolution of Man* (Elliot Smith), pp. 24, 28, and *The Descent of Man*, p. 160: "at an extremely remote period a group of animals existed . . . rising to the crown and summit of the animal kingdom by giving birth to the Vertebrata."

² This refers to the frequent persistence of unchanging species throughout lengthy periods; variation and mutation of course occur incessantly.

range I have already insisted, occurs no longer within specific or racial experience but within that of one and the same person. Thus the analogy on which the objection here under consideration rests is false ; for although the infant undeniably begins on almost the same level as the ascidian he at the same time possesses—what no animal ever enjoys—the power of overcoming his original limitations, the capacity for a *self*-transformation which brings within his mind's grasp what was at first almost absolutely transcendent.

This power or capacity, still further, the individual (in principle) never loses although, as I have previously admitted, it is but rarely developed as it might be ; and just as the infant mind finally grasps quite clearly what to itself was transcendent, so the student may always advance, alike in knowledge, art and practice, to levels far outranging his original apprehension. Similarly with the race as generation succeeds generation, since in thus manifesting itself within the *individual* mind evolution does not cease to modify humanity in general. Rather does it enlarge its scope so as to include both ; and this truth must now be connected with the second feature already mentioned—"the nature, function, and capacity of knowledge." For the unique status which is thus acquired by the individual man as contrasted with the individual animal has—as might be anticipated—its natural cause or basis, which can be found only in human rationality and in knowledge as its product. Once again it must be insisted upon that reason, thought, knowledge, maintain direct contact or intercourse between mind and reality—between self and universe. In more technical terms, their content is never subjective but rather inherently objective ; so that while knowledge certainly

subsists "within the mind," it is at the same moment an actual though always partial revelation to that mind of the real universe. As reason and knowledge continuously expand therefore, the wider and deeper becomes man's insight into the nature of the universe; and with this is inseparably associated his increasing power of control equally over his environment and himself.¹

Thus it logically follows from all these considerations taken together that since we have accepted the principle of the real existence of the Supreme Self, since there is but one universe, and since the relation between this Self and the rest of the universe is in principle akin, despite its infinitude, to that between man and the same universe,² the undeniable transcendence of the Supreme Self is a matter not solely, absolutely and exclusively of transcendence *in kind* but at the same time a matter of *degree*. Thus both the human self and the Supreme Self know and understand one and the same universe. The contrast between them in this respect is in principle identical with that which holds between a Shakespeare or a Newton and a school-boy, although the *degree* of such contrast is, of course, immeasurably intensified. To this it must at once be added that this intensification itself produces a change in kind; only, never an *absolute* change as is maintained by such extreme theories of transcendence as the Aristotelian. This intimate connection between difference in degree and difference in kind, however, finds many parallels in ordinary experience, as in the already cited instances of steamship and canoe or cave and cathedral. All such cases are quite plainly matters in the first place of degree;

¹ Cf. *Personality and Reality*, chap. v: "The Self as a Dominant Real."

² Cf. chap. i, sect. 5.

but as the evolutionary advance continues the original contrast in degree gradually (but always naturally) assumes an additional aspect and so becomes a veritable change in kind. Embryo and adult, nebula and planets, *etc.*, are but additional illustrations of this general principle, which may thus be logically appealed to in its bearing upon the contrast between man and Deity.

Before proceeding to indicate a further definite characteristic which is discernible within infinite knowledge, I may summarise my earlier references to Mr. Bradley's account of the Absolute in its relation to finite experience. We find, then, that personality, in the first place, "is no doubt the highest form of experience which we have"; and similarly with regard to the specific elements of finite personality. For while these, like all other (finite) reals, are "absorbed" or "transmuted" within the Whole, still at the same time "thought would be present in a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged."¹

This standpoint must, of course, be considered in the light of the author's well-known philosophic Impersonalism, together with his destructive criticism of the concept of selfhood; and its relevance here plainly lies in the fact that if thought and will, feeling and pleasure "live on" so as to remain somehow present in the *impersonal* Whole, it is manifestly still more legitimate to regard them as characterising that Supreme Reality

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 119, 172; cf. p. 182, and in fuller detail *Personality and Reality*, pp. 72 *sqq.*, also p. 25 *ante* on the meaning of "Absolute."

which I have maintained to be a Supreme Self, even though we must always lay an equal emphasis on their literal infinity.

7. That "further definite characteristic" of divine knowledge to which I have just referred must now be considered. Its nature is plainly indicated (once again) by the highest levels of human knowledge itself, whose expansion involves not only an increasing comprehensiveness, but also that internal change which I have already described as "transformation" or "crystallisation";¹ this can now be elucidated in more detail. It presents two distinct though inseparable aspects, the first of which affects the *content* of knowledge and the second the *knowing mind*. Omitting technicalities and confining ourselves to the final results of this change, these exhibit in the first place not merely the purely negative disappearance of error and illusion but also the familiar advance from vagueness to definiteness, from disconnection to exactitude and from probability to certainty. Here it is necessary to pursue the full implications of this progressive achievement of certainty. Too frequently certainty is regarded either as attainable only within some extremely narrow spheres and to a relatively slight degree, or as being purely abstract and theoretic, with little applicability therefore to practical affairs.² This standpoint, however, is justified only with reference to the simplest forms and lowest levels of thought. To seek to apply it universally is to contradict the essential nature of knowledge, whose expansion is governed throughout by the incessant tendency towards an ever fuller certainty—towards a body of truth which becomes always more final and absolute; and although the actual realisation

¹ *Ante*, pp. 50 *sqq.* ² Cf. Hume's argument, p. 44 *ante*.

of this goal is so intensely difficult that probability must always remain the guide of daily life, nevertheless the volume of absolute truth unceasingly increases. This advance is most readily discerned in mathematics and the mathematical aspects of science and economics in general ; but it is by no means confined to these alone. It is radically erroneous, therefore, to regard such certainty as being necessarily limited or inherently abstract, and so essentially inapplicable to practical problems. This hasty conclusion is at once disproved by the increasingly intimate dependence of invention and engineering upon pure physical or mathematical theory, even in the familiar spheres of medicine and wireless communication ; and the developments here, as throughout the whole of modern civilisation, are only in their infancy.

The existing limitations of intellectual certainty are thus much too frequently over emphasised, and must not be regarded as inherent in knowledge as such. On the contrary, they are merely the natural results of the formidable difficulties of investigation ; and it requires little acquaintance with current science to perceive the steadily increasing indispensability of mathematical methods and results in every sphere alike. In general, therefore, there always exists an irresistible intellectual tendency towards absolute certainty, which may thus be regarded as slowly " crystallising out " from that magma of mere probability which constitutes the earliest forms of knowledge. This process may be more technically expressed as the uninterrupted advance from the *a posteriori* to the *a priori*. For these two kinds of Truth are never, as is usually supposed, essentially different nor even opposed to one another ; rather are they so

intimately connected that all knowledge tends to pass continuously from the *a posteriori* level to the *a priori*, so that once again the latter "crystallises out" from the former. It is true, of course, that when a comparatively simple *a posteriori* assertion is contrasted directly with a highly abstract *a priori* principle—when *e.g.* some result of observation and experiment, in itself perhaps somewhat doubtful, is compared with a purely mathematical concept or theorem—then the two forms of knowledge inevitably appear to have little in common; their source and character seem equally wide apart. But such a comparison is just as legitimate, and just as deceptive, as that between an amoeba and a mammal; and in both cases alike the apparently absolute difference is due to the omission of all the intermediate forms. The entire development of knowledge—most easily discerned, once again, in science—like that of the organism, clearly reveals the uninterrupted continuity of these two extremes; and the real nature of the *a priori* can never be properly understood until it is regarded as slowly evolving from the *a posteriori*, and this to such a degree that what is usually called the "pure *a priori*" is but the final result of a radical transformation of what was originally *a posteriori*.

So much for the transformed *content* of knowledge which the human mind progressively acquires both individually and racially. But this involves an equally radical change in the nature of knowing. Instead of remaining piecemeal, discursive, arduous and gradual, knowing—understanding—apprehending themselves irresistibly tend to become more and more rapid, comprehensive, synoptic, until they finally achieve that mysterious finality and instantaneity which mark every expert and

genius. For even if genius is occasionally inherent, this is at best extremely rare ; commonly, and always in the case of expertness, it is the gradual outcome of continuous effort. As the objective content of knowledge grows and "crystallises" the mind acquires a wider range and deeper insight ; as the knower becomes more familiar with the slowly multiplying certainties his intellectual activity functions more rapidly ; he sees at a glance what the beginner can perceive but dimly and partially. Like a great general, financier, or statesman, so the great thinker, scientist, or artist handles his enormous mass of material with facility, solves problems and attains results in ways bafflingly impossible to the student. But in this there is nothing magical ; rather is it strictly comparable to the lightning dexterity of every crack sportsman ; and it has vital implications in its bearing on the changing nature of knowledge as this evolves to ever higher levels. For it means that just as the content of knowledge becomes increasingly certain and *a priori*, so the process of knowing becomes more and more intuitional, in the sense that it ranges over a wider area and apprehends this more firmly, accurately and rapidly. "Intuition" unfortunately has several different meanings which need not, however, be considered, so far as our present problem is concerned, except to exclude its Bergsonian significance in favour of Dr. Bosanquet's interpretation, of which the foregoing remarks are only an amplification. In this sense, then, intuition becomes "looking at an object intrinsically systematic and distinct, and discerning its constitutive terms and relations. So far from being illogical, it is the essential feature of the higher form of inference" ; similarly, "for Hegel intuition was a prevision of the rational, an insight into the nature of things, which could

justify itself afterwards by criticism " ¹—this rational and critical foundation being always a factor of the first importance, since it marks off this type of intuition from all supposedly non-intellectual forms of intuitive experience.

8. Finally then it is this universal tendency, characterising the entire evolution of knowledge and presenting a dual aspect, that yields a definite clue to the infinite intellectual attributes of Deity. For I have already pointed out that the development of knowledge cannot be dissociated from the development of selfhood, since they are one and the same in the sense that knowledge is always an essential element in personality. A self that does not know—in what specific way is here immaterial—is not a self, just as knowledge cannot exist purely as such and apart from a self. And although, from the very nature of the situation, it is impossible to attain any concept of the *detailed* content of perfect knowledge, it is not impossible to form a clear idea of its *general* character. All that is required is to trace to its highest possible level the governing tendency already indicated; and then perfect knowledge must assume the form not merely of absolute comprehensiveness and absolute certainty, but at the same time of absolute intuitiveness. It must, in other words, not only apprehend the whole of existence in all its aspects, but (still further) grasp their interrelations no longer discursively but instantaneously and eternally. It is obvious that to this there can exist no adequate analogy within human experience; and yet we may obtain a distant indication of what it implies by

¹ Bosanquet, *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 94; Reburn, *The Ethical Theory of Hegel*, p. 62. Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 55; Hegel's *Logic* (Wallace), sect. 66.

considering the grasp of a highly complex situation or problem enjoyed by a great statesman or artist or thinker. For every mind of this order envisages its particular sphere not as narrower intellects do—that is partially and temporarily, perceiving now one aspect and then another, and these again in a distorted perspective—but rather as a unified whole wherein all the extremely diverse factors are present together and in their actual interrelations. Nothing fundamental has been ignored nor forgotten—all essentials have been accurately estimated and duly taken into account—so that there is instantaneously and permanently present to the mind of genius an intricate “world” which ordinary persons can apprehend only fragmentarily and obscurely. Now we need only expand this “world” until it includes the whole of reality, and regard it as being similarly apprehended by Deity, to obtain the requisite general idea of absolutely certain, all-comprehensive and intuitional knowledge.

It is therefore no fatal objection against this argument that the actual nature and precise content of such perfect or infinite knowledge can never be apprehended by the human mind. For I have already admitted in advance the degree to which such a principle must be accepted by insisting (in the first place) that the intellectual activities of all genius are to a great extent incomprehensible to simpler minds, and (secondly) that the entire detailed *content* of infinite knowledge is quite obviously unattainable. But this does not prevent our perceiving the *nature* of the intuitions of genius, so that they can be adequately described in terms of comprehensiveness, certainty and instantaneity. Mr. Bradley's well-known insistence on the “transformation” or “transmutation” of thought in “absolute experience” may thus not merely be conceded,

but is logically demanded by my own analysis of all its conditions ; since the development of genius consists precisely in that radical " transformation " of ordinary experience which makes the former so mysterious a quality. On this point it is, however, sufficient to refer to my earlier remarks. But a consideration of Spinoza's classic standpoint, as representative of many later thinkers, may further elucidate my own view. " If intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God," he maintained, " we must take these words in some significations quite different from those they usually bear " ; and with this contention I believe my own position clearly agrees. Between the intuitions of the expert and the average level of knowledge there is indisputably a profound difference, and yet more, of course, between the infinite and all finite minds. But this by no means necessitates our holding (still further) that " intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have *nothing in common* with them but the name ; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks . . . the intellect of God . . . differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree therewith *save in name*." ¹ This further conclusion appears totally unwarranted. The difference in question here is undoubtedly a profound difference in kind ; but differences in kind, as I have previously argued,² are themselves constituted by or emerge from differences of degree when

¹ *Works* (Bohn), vol. ii, pp. 61, 62 ; my italics.

² *Ante*, pp. 49-51.

these have proceeded sufficiently far, but at the same time—simply because they *are* differences of degree—without destroying the foundational continuity. This principle, however, is altogether ignored by Spinoza's argument, and goes far to vitiate his own account of intuition, which he describes as "a third kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."¹ But any such cognitive process as this is quite impossible, since it is precluded in advance by that absolute transcendence of Deity to which I have just referred. For those "attributes of God," of which man requires "an adequate idea," must include at least the divine intellect; but this (as has been seen) does not "agree" with the human intellect "save in name." Thus a fatal dilemma arises; for if this is true, then man can under no conditions whatever obtain that indispensable "adequate idea" wherefrom he proceeds to intuitive knowledge, which can therefore never be achieved. On the other hand, if this knowledge is actually attainable, then there must exist some elements common to the intellect of both man and God; and this at once involves the surrender of Spinoza's doctrine of absolute transcendence.

The knowledge possessed by Deity must thus be conceived as perfect or "infinite" in the sense of being all-comprehensive, absolutely certain and instantaneously intuitive—these three characteristics, still further, being coexistent; whence it follows that as being final and complete it is unchanging or eternal; "timeless" in the sense that time makes no difference whatever to its nature. The problem of time in this connection must

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 113.

here be deferred ; but since all human experience must be expressed in some temporal terms we are logically compelled to hold that divine knowledge, which as all-comprehensive is omniscience, is at the same time foreknowledge, again both certain and intuitive. This principle, however, involves no self-contradiction, since the knowledge of an astronomer, which enables him accurately to predict future phenomena, plainly approximates to this idea in spite of its obvious and severe limitations ; while this ability to predict, not only in astronomy but in many other sciences, is uninterruptedly increasing.¹ In so doing it becomes also more and more intuitional ; past, present and future are apprehended as necessarily related aspects of a single unified whole while, for all finite thought, their temporal character must be retained.

From the actual problems which confront modern thought, in conclusion, one further valuable criterion of the divine intellect may be obtained. For in every sphere of research, without exception, these questions present themselves as extremely and increasingly intricate. Such solutions as have hitherto been obtained concern only the relatively simplest phenomena, while all alike at once disclose a number of additional and still more complex difficulties, demanding incessantly new methods and more subtle powers of analysis. Posterity will doubtless regard current science very much as we contemplate the knowledge of the middle ages. But this only means that during the same interval knowledge will have advanced not by arithmetical but by geometrical progression ;

¹ Cf. *e.g.*, the bearing of the theory of relativity on the revolution of Mercury ; and the same tendency may be observed in abstract economics.

while in solving the problems which to ourselves are so baffling others will be revealed of whose character we can have little conception. In principle such an expansion is interminable and inexhaustible ; and this plainly implies that for Deity " problems " do not exist, nor even perhaps " solutions." For within the all-inclusive and intuitional divine certainty they are " transmuted "—transformed—transcended—to an infinitely higher degree than a child's task to the mind of a Newton.

We are thus enabled to supplement the emphasis that has been placed throughout this chapter upon transcendence by an equal emphasis on divine immanence. For the absolute knowledge of reality possessed by Deity means that the whole of being is present to (or " in ") His consciousness. This, again, may be regarded as an alternative expression of Mr. Bradley's well-known principle that reality is experience ; but this is here a subordinate issue. More important for our present interest is the converse of this conclusion—that the divine mind (or experience) comprehends the entire universe, and in that sense is immanent therein, in the same way that the mind of a thinker pervades the realm with which he is concerned ; and again the term " thinker " must be given its widest meaning, since it denotes not only the logician or scientist, but also the great artist and the able statesman in one essential aspect of their complex individuality. To this we must add those wider implications of immanence with which I have already dealt in *Personality and Reality*, in connection with the absolute dominance of the Supreme Self ; and this will form the subject of the next chapter.

III

OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE

1. WE perceive, then, that it is possible to interpret "Supreme," in its reference to the intellectual aspects of Deity, in somewhat definite terms; and further analysis of the nature of finite personality yields a still wider expansion of this attribute. For as I have argued in detail in *Personality and Reality*, it is knowledge that sustains the self's effective dominance over its environment.¹ The common view of knowledge as being essentially abstract—as the merely theoretic and subjective content of mind—is therefore radically inadequate; it is undeniably true so far as it goes, but it altogether omits the really important features of the situation. The Socratic attitude on this point is much sounder than the modern; and the Greek thinker rightly turned to the skilled craftsmen of his day to discover the true place of knowledge in life. For all practical expertness, as everyone who pursues a hobby will easily recognise, demands a complete and detailed knowledge which can be properly expressed only in those technical terms peculiar to the particular operation, which are often quite unintelligible to outsiders. This is the case even in simple instances; but as soon as any mechanical appliances are used this technicality is immeasurably increased, as is amply evidenced by the commonest instruments for wireless transmission. Precisely the same conditions hold true of art; and from these thoroughly practical

¹ Chap. v, "The Self as a Dominant Real."

spheres the transition to highly abstract scientific theory is perfectly natural, since this is just as indispensable to large scale engineering and invention as is the individual's limited knowledge to his own particular task. It is only necessary to include the statesman's knowledge of history and theoretical economics to perceive that in principle the Socratic contention is thoroughly justified. But the ancient simplicity of life has been replaced by the rapidly increasing complexity of modern civilisation, equally in its mechanical and its social adjustments; and the vast body of current abstract (or "pure") theory is only the natural outcome of this complexity, since in no other way can the requisite combination of wide generality and high precision be attained. The competent theorist is thus plainly indispensable to all modern spheres of activity, so that to restrict knowledge to abstract theory alone is obviously to contradict its essential nature.

Bearing these considerations in mind we may now turn to two further principles already emphasised in my earlier volume—first the fact that expanding knowledge manifests itself in practice in the use of increasingly automatic mechanisms, and secondly that this heightened automatism renders the dominant mind freer and more independent, in the sense that the mechanism becomes capable of controlling its own activities to an ever fuller degree.¹ Even modern appliances, much more those of the future, clearly indicate an ideal condition to which they all alike continuously approximate—that is the stage of perfect automatism at which the mechanism, immune to all injury and destruction, eternally maintains its self-adjusting changes and movements, somewhat like

¹ *Cc.* vii, viii.

a great ship travelling under its self-generated energy and pursuing a mechanically directed course, just as liners and aeroplanes are now being increasingly controlled by gyrostats instead of pilots. This ideal indeed, impossible as it must ever remain for mankind in its entirety, is actually realised in those infinitely diverse atomic and molecular mechanisms whose existence, as constituting the physical universe, has been revealed by current science. The material universe, being thus wholly independent of all detailed adjustment and control by mind, can therefore yield no direct evidence of the existence of any controlling mind, except in so far as its continuous evolution establishes the existence of the Supreme Self.¹

In more general terms, therefore, advancing knowledge is inseparably associated with increasing power—expanding dominance—growing capacity for dynamic control ; and this always in the direction of the more complete transcendence of mind beyond the mechanisms which it itself constructs and endows with automatism. Their mutual relation has thus a somewhat perplexing dual character. Regarded in the first place solely in the light of its *activity*, highly automatic mechanism is transcended by the originative mind ; while in the light of its extreme intricacy and delicacy of structure on the other hand—that is its *nature* as distinguished from its activity, or its constitution as distinct from its function—the capacity of the originative mind is revealed, expressed, and in that sense *immanent* in such mechanism. Applying this principle, which plainly governs all man's individual and social experience, to

¹ Again, the argument for this conclusion is presented in detail in *Personality and Reality*.

the Supreme Self, it implies that Deity is both immanent throughout the material universe so far as its infinitely complex *nature* is concerned, and at the same time absolutely transcendent of that universe so far as its perfectly automatic *activity* is concerned, although this activity is plainly the direct outcome of its nature. They can therefore never be dissociated; and in the same way the divine immanence and transcendence cannot be dissociated, but must always be regarded, as I have just indicated, as simultaneous aspects of Deity, thus confirming the conclusion arrived at at the end of the previous chapter.

On the other hand, such immanence, from the conditions of the situation, can never be existential, but only functional. The material universe, in other words, cannot be *existentially* identified with immaterial Deity any more than a man is thus identical with the physical products of his own activity—his machines or his works of art. This is plainly only an alternative expression of the fact that the unity of self and environment is similarly “not existential but functional”;¹ and when we enquire still further in what such functional immanence actually consists, we must turn to the essentially instrumental status of all mechanism which renders it subordinate to the dominating self. This subordination, again, is never merely formal nor nominal, like *e.g.* the different grades of modern aristocracy. The instrumentality here in question means that the mechanism fulfils some purpose, or satisfies some want, which becomes more clearly apprehended and more efficiently met as

Ante, p. 33. This existential identification of “God” and “world” is the fallacy which vitiates the cruder forms of Pantheism.

rationality continues to evolve; while advancing rationality always generates a still wider range of purposes which, despite their growing diversity, fall within an increasingly systematic unity wherein some are paramount and the others secondary. As soon as we thus distinguish between these two types of purpose it again becomes evident that, just as the self transcends the instrumental mechanism, so it transcends all its own subordinate purposes to some degree. On the other hand it is *existentially* identical with its primary purposes; it is, in other words, not merely functionally immanent therein but existentially so. For these purposes clearly express its desires or wants, and at the same time reveal the objects which command its interest—that is (in short) the entire orientation of any given personality at any given time to its environment. The achievement of purpose, further, constitutes the development of personality, at the same moment that such wider expansion renders it capable of perceiving some yet higher goal whose pursuit becomes, in its turn, identical with the self's entire activity and life.

2. Nevertheless the fact that all these various ends form a "systematic unity," and that we are concerned throughout with uninterrupted development, precludes any rigid distinction being drawn between them. The principal aims of any given period sink slowly to a secondary position as new ones become more clearly apprehended and deliberately pursued; and this incessant merging of one with another reflects itself in the common relation of the self to them all. It implies, therefore, a parallel merging of transcendence and immanence one into the other, so that they are once again seen to become common aspects of a highly complex situation rather

than attributes exclusive of each other. They express that varying yet uninterrupted relation between self and environment which is perhaps best exemplified in the work of a great artist, who at one and the same time (a) transcends both the appliances and the necessary conditions of his labour, (b) is *functionally* immanent in all its delicate details, and (c) *existentially* immanent in that highest expression of his aesthetic ideal which absorbs, at the same time that it reveals, his full personality. Similarly the inventor who has perfected an automatic mechanism has obviously manifested his intellectual capacity in its structure, and is therefore functionally immanent in its nature, while in the principal purpose which it serves, so far as this is his own, he is existentially immanent. On the other hand, both the physical materials and the independent working of the machine are almost absolutely transcended by his personality as being a psychical and self-conscious real; their existential identity is thus clearly impossible.

But if this is so in the case of human selves, whose bodies occupy the same plane of reality as material mechanisms, it must be infinitely more true of Deity, whose existential transcendence, equally of the substance of the entire physical universe and of its automatism, is therefore absolute.¹ Equally absolute is His transcendence as being supreme over that universe, which constitutes (as we found in the preceding chapter) the object of His perfectly intuitional knowledge; although, through its manifestation of this perfection, He is functionally immanent therein, just as every inventor is in his mechanical constructions. Only in some infinite

¹ Cf. note p. 25 *ante*. This is true whatever may be the meaning of "substance."

purpose or end therefore, which everything that exists serves somehow to achieve, is Deity *existentially* immanent; and to this the closest parallel—closest because it forms one of the highest possible levels of human endeavour—is to be found in those far-reaching national policies or moral principles to which peoples are devoted by great leaders. For the historian, and so for posterity, these men become almost literally identified with what they wrought for; Luther with the Reformation, Lincoln with liberty, Plato with the thought of Greece and Darwin with evolution. In a very real sense each is one with the institutions and cultures he brought into being, and so existentially immanent therein; while, as against this, the individual himself is of less importance than the cause which he maintains, partly because he must always share the lower interests common to his fellows. From this point of view he becomes merely one of the many conditions necessary to the advance of that particular cause, although always an indispensable condition; and thus he may be compared to some catalytic substance which, in spite of its minute quantity, is nevertheless absolutely necessary to the continuance of a long series of large scale chemical reactions; or again to those “critical conditions” of temperature and pressure apart from which certain physical transformations can never occur. Such parallels of course must at their best be distant, for we are again comparing material and vital agencies with self-conscious personality. Still these various instances are perhaps the best clues which our experience can yield to the attributes of Deity; and poor though they are they are not, I think, wholly negligible. They do to some degree enable us to define and expand the only concepts at

our disposal, particularly when we realise that divine selfhood is free from all imperfection and limitation.

This brings before us, once again, that highest knowledge whose perfection lies in its absolutely intuitional comprehensiveness. But since the advance of human knowledge "is inseparably associated with increasing dominance,"¹ it follows that the perfect knowledge of the physical universe that is enjoyed by Deity implies an unfettered supremacy over this universe. And the degree attained by this supremacy may likewise be faintly estimated by the use of familiar analogies drawn from the conditions (already alluded to) which determine the ideal of human effort—that is a complex and delicate yet indestructible and eternally self-adjusting mechanism.² The more closely this ideal is approximated to—the longer any mechanism, either social or physical, can be left entirely to itself without repair and external control—the greater is the power of its inventor. This would be still further enhanced if such a mechanism continuously fulfilled his own purposes by passing through a long course of evolution; and although this is impossible in its full actuality it is, nevertheless, plainly being slowly realised by the unceasing improvements of modern inventions.

These illustrations, then, even rated at their lowest value, clearly show that the concepts of divine omniscience and omnipotence are not merely logical in any formal sense, but may also be given some quite definite content and meaning closely connected with our actual experience.

At this point, however, the familiar problems attending the exact significance of the prefix "omni" may be pressed. If this term is taken literally, do not these

¹ *Ante*, p. 69.

² *Ante*, p. 68.

two attributes, more particularly the second, become wholly arbitrary? Only, I think, if they are accorded very shallow significance; and towards this attitude the human mind is undoubtedly tempted by that insatiable desire for uncontrolled dominion which it finds universally thwarted. But the conditions which entail this failure plainly arise from the narrow self-centredness of every individual alike; intent only on his own personal interests and aims he remains oblivious or even defiant of the purposes of his fellows. It is unnecessary to refer to the ethical aspects of the resultant conflict; it is quite sufficient to observe its inevitable self-stultification so long as every separate force is allowed an equal freedom instead of being suppressed by Napoleonic methods; and yet mankind still maintains in social relationships a state of things which is recognised to be instantly destructive in mechanical contrivances. All this clearly shows that it is not the desire for increased power that is in itself at fault. This desire is on the contrary thoroughly natural and healthy, being indeed (as I have argued throughout) the inevitable outcome of expanding knowledge; and this consideration yields the key to the solution of the entire problem. For the nature of knowledge is throughout systematic—ordered—even (in a certain sense) definite and rigid; all its diverse aspects are connected together in an unalterable manner, and this in spite of its extreme plasticity. Here again there is nothing unfamiliar, since this combination of definiteness with pliancy must be possessed by all the higher types of vital organisation, both as a whole and in its constituent parts; upon this its efficiency of response always depends. The best example is perhaps the human nervous system, to which knowledge may be

compared as being a psychical organism whose activities and growth are unceasingly governed by its own immanent laws. But this holds true not only of the more elementary forms of knowledge, nor again of its abstract logical types alone, but to an ever increasing degree of its fullest content and latest development. Only in its outlying regions is such content tentative and unformed ; and even here it rapidly assumes an ordered structure progressively increasing in solidity as we approach that central core or basal foundation which is frequently referred to as " mathematical certainty."

All this is plainly true of human or finite knowledge ; in complete or infinite knowledge, therefore, all indefiniteness will have given place to perfectly organised structure ; and its intuitional character ¹ further implies that this structure attains the final level of systematic absoluteness. Such, then, must be the nature of divine omniscience, wherein order—structure—law—in fact all the highest possible aspects and attributes of knowledge are universally immanent ; while it is at the same time essentially objective—not, that is to say, the content of mind merely, but rather the apprehension of reality, which itself is ordered and systematic. At this stage it plainly becomes difficult to avoid an implicit self-contradiction in the statement of our principles. For such knowledge, being itself essentially real, cannot in this manner be separated from reality so as to stand over against it. Rather does it become absorbed within reality, as it were, in such a way as to become one of its aspects, but without losing its own distinctive characteristics. This is the truth expressed by Hegel in his assertion of the identity between the " Idea " and the " Absolute,"

¹ *Ante*, pp. 61 *sqq.*

and in the parallel distinction between the "Idea as such" and the "pure Idea"; and here the term "Idea" must be purged of all subjectivity and accorded its original Platonic significance of objective reality.¹ This, however, is a technical point of some difficulty; it will be sufficient to take it to mean the equivalence of divine omniscience and reality, always provided that we avoid the snare of conceiving reality to be static rather than dynamic; and thus we obtain the twofold truth of the objectivity of knowledge on the one hand and the rationality of reality on the other. As with Hegel, what is actual is rational.

3. Omniscience therefore, from its very nature, cannot be arbitrary in the sense of being free from law and subversive of system. It implies on the contrary the universal immanence of system and law, the intensifying of that absoluteness which plainly governs all logical thought. It is only necessary then to lay due emphasis on the further principle, slowly becoming more clearly recognised, that knowledge always entails power which, in its turn, gains all its increased efficiency from advancing knowledge,² to perceive that divine omnipotence must likewise possess the same attributes of order and law as the perfect knowledge from which it is inseparable. Here, indeed, we are concerned not with two separate entities, but rather with two distinct aspects of a complex

¹ Cf. my *Theory of Direct Realism*, chap. xx, particularly the concluding sections and references.

² Knowledge, once again, and as Socrates taught, in all its manifold forms from "rule of thumb" to the most abstract of theories; which of these should be employed depends in practice on the conditions of each specific instance, although the evolution of knowledge consists in the "rule of thumb" itself becoming more theoretical and so more efficient; cf. e.g. the "shop" in some of Kipling's stories.

unity, exactly as we are, though on a far lower level and more restricted scale, in the case of the allied knowledge and resources of a great statesman or able administrator of any kind. Such a man, as I have already suggested, may resent interference and defeat from external agencies; but this in itself implies his own ignorance of the means whereby such resistance could be overcome. His failure, in other words, is the result not so much of his lack of vigour or strength in itself, but rather of the improperly coordinated and wrongly directed character of his most strenuous efforts. In such instances as the conflicts between savage and civilised nations, or the struggles of financial groups on the stock exchange, this principle of the unity between knowledge and power is unmistakable; and their unity not merely continues but becomes ever more intimate as they attain their highest levels. Similarly, then, with divine omnipotence. This also can appear arbitrary only when it becomes divorced, as is unhappily too frequently the case, from that perfect knowledge of the real universe which is in truth its own obverse aspect, and so deprived of the unified tendencies and directed order which are the inevitable correlatives of immanent reason. To regard this condition as a restriction, and therefore as a contradiction, of omnipotence is thus quite illogical, just as it would be illogical to maintain that, because a scientist conducts a vitally important series of experiments in precise accordance with his theoretic knowledge, he is hindered and limited by that knowledge. The truth is, of course, the precise contrary. Certainly his knowledge altogether prevents him adopting certain methods and confines his choice of alternatives; so that in this superficial sense he is undeniably

"limited"; but all this, so far from defeating his purpose, is exactly what ensures his success. In general terms, then, the conditioning of action by an immanent reason must never be regarded as the limitation of power but rather as its foundation; and this conclusion holds equally for the relation between omnipotence and omniscience. It means, to use more familiar phraseology, that the Supreme Self cannot "do what He likes" without endangering equally His supremacy and His rationality. Quite similarly a great general or statesman cannot "do as he likes" except at a serious risk to himself and his country; and the reason is in every case the same. No one can act just "as he likes" simply because he cannot think as he likes, but always as the "laws of thought" dictate; while efficient action is inseverably dependent on coherent rationality, and this the more (as I have already argued) the more powerful personality becomes.

If, then, we conceive of personality becoming and remaining literally supreme, it at once follows that omnipotence, to be such—that is, to maintain supremacy and to justify its name as complete and absolute power—must be correlated with omniscience, in the sense of being its complete expression or manifestation; each attribute becoming thus the obverse of its fellow. In the case of finite selfhood purpose is always an indelible element; and the familiar maxim that every definite purpose prescribes its own equally definite means plainly expresses the same principle, although the legitimacy of retaining the concept of purpose in its relation to Deity has still to be considered. Here, however, the identity or equivalence between purpose and rationality implies that the inherent necessity of reason must continue to

function as the native imperativeness of purpose, of which the ethical "categorical imperative" is perhaps the most prominent type.

Omnipotence, then, must be conceived not as the subversion of these principles but rather as their most complete expression. Its manifestation in perfectly definite modes, all capable of being formulated by exact laws, is therefore in no sense a limitation of the nature of personality, but is, on the contrary, the highest possible level that its dynamic activity can assume. For only thus can the self produce instruments so intricate and perfectly automatic as to perform their functions without constant adjustment or control, and relatively to which the self becomes transcendent; and all these considerations, taken together, enable us to appreciate a somewhat unwelcome truth—that to identify omnipotence with arbitrariness really implies the use of totally inadequate criteria. This may again be illustrated by quite familiar instances; since to the child, and similarly to the criminal or even the narrow-minded citizen, the law of either home or country cannot but seem harsh—repressive—hostile. Nowhere else than in such an intellect, had it only the capacity to comprehend, would Fitzgerald's well-known quatrain find more forcible endorsement:

. . . could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!

But this attitude can be justified by neither its universality nor its intensity, since it springs at bottom merely from resentment at the defeat of limited personal aims pursued with little regard to the general good.

This wider good, it is true, almost always necessitates a sacrifice which the undeveloped self cannot but feel as painful and which it therefore instinctively avoids; nor, while it remains at so low a level, can it ever apprehend the "Scheme of Things entire"—that is, the whole situation (including, of course, itself)—in its proper light. Such is too often the ground of man's petulant criticism of fate and the universe; and we need only contrast the child's point of view with the adult's, or again that of the average citizen with the insight into the true nature of law possessed by a great statesman or philosopher, to perceive what best deserves the epithet "sorry." Nor even when the appeal is made to some high ideal, which is regarded as sufficient to condemn the actual state of affairs, is the case altered. For all such ideals are but the outcome of man's interaction with the universe whence his own mind, with all its ideals, has itself originated. He is really employing, therefore, in an extremely short-sighted way, certain products or effects of the universe wherewith to criticise their own ultimate source; and this conclusion has an important bearing upon any such theoretic analysis of the nature of things as the present. For in maintaining that certain principles (whatever they may be) must hold true, or that certain factors and attributes must exist, the ultimate ground for the conclusion can never be any merely external nor artificial logical criterion, but rather the character of the universe itself as this becomes revealed to—or still better, immanent within—finite thought. All ideals and categories alike, in other words—whether aesthetic, ethical or intellectual—emanate from and express the nature of reality; and it is only necessary to permit them to pursue their true lines of development

to find therein an increasingly definite and irrefutable manifestation of that nature.

4. But "the nature of reality" is a somewhat ambiguous term. For since reality is a continuous and unified whole, and since it includes Deity as its supreme dominating factor, it follows that the nature of all subordinate existents must reflect the supreme nature of Deity; whence it also follows—conversely—that the divine nature can to some degree be inferred from such existents; otherwise both unity and dominance would be impaired. This general principle is, of course, sufficiently familiar; it finds poetic utterance in Tennyson's "flower in the crannied wall," and philosophic expression in Spinoza's doctrine of attributes and modes. But it is a serious defect of Spinoza's pantheism that it does not carry the mind far beyond its original starting-point, since we find ourselves able to say very little except that every object or event, taken just as it exists, is a mode of divine substance. We can gather little further, except the infinity and transcendence of God and the logical conclusions which follow from the initial definition of substance. But just as we found, at the close of the previous chapter, that the profound problems confronting the human intellect yield some measure of the capacity of the divine mind, so the complexity of organisation, the delicacy of structure, the extent, and, above all, the dynamic energy and exhaustless potentialities of the material universe, afford a faint indication of what must be meant by omnipotence.¹ Once again this general idea is the theme of all ancient religious poetry; but the simplicity of earlier cosmologies inevitably affects its terminology, which has therefore, despite

¹ Cf. note 1, p. 22 *ante*.

its rich beauty and powerful emotional appeal, lost practically all its literal significance for the modern mind. What is still worse, perhaps, from being thus almost meaningless it stands in serious danger of becoming regarded as false or deceptive; and not until we more definitely relate the Supreme Self to the world as modern knowledge is beginning to apprehend it can we gain any sufficiently precise and ample conception of the omnipotently active, as distinct from the omniscient, aspects of the nature of Deity; divine immanence and transcendence then being correlated somewhat as I have just endeavoured to outline.

This general position may now constitute the basis for further consideration. For I have already suggested that, from the very nature of personality as connected with its environment, it follows that the self is always in great measure "existentially identical with its own primary purposes" or (in slightly different terms) "existentially immanent" therein.¹ If we regard the self in its real character—that is, not as some being mysteriously apart from all its psychic activities, but rather as the entire system constituted by the unity of its dominant elements²—then the ideas which gradually arise and finally persist within the mind find their ultimate expression or—what is the same thing—their realisation in purpose and its fulfilment. For to be a person, as I have maintained throughout both the present and my earlier volume, of itself implies that these ideas are, to some degree at least, freely chosen as the final result of deliberate comparison and selection, and this the more fully the further

¹ *Ante*, p. 71.

² Cf. *Personality and Reality*, chap. iii, "The Basis of the Unity of Selfhood."

rationality is developed ; only thus, indeed, can ideas ever become ideals. Reason, in other words, is at bottom identical with freedom, subject, of course, to the immanence of order and law ; and we must guard against the vitiation of this principle by its too common limitation to types of personality so low as to be little removed from animality ; here, as always, the true nature of selfhood can be gathered only from its highest possible levels of attainment. Precisely the same holds true of those purposes which, since they are the objective realisation of the subjective ideas, must be uninterruptedly continuous therewith ; and if there still remains anything obscure about such an equivalence, perhaps the familiar principle of the transformation of physical energy from one mode to another will remove some of the difficulty. For just in the same way that light tends to convert itself into heat, so the ideas or ideals dominant within a mind work themselves out into action ; while, still further, the more definite these ideas are, so much the more effective and freely determined does purpose become. Here, indeed, we are but dealing with the actual mode in which the characteristic dominance of highly developed personality always manifests itself throughout its environment.

If, then, we conceive of this evolution of selfhood proceeding to its utmost possible level, at which all ignorance and error, all weakness and imperfection, have disappeared, so that we obtain some feeble approximation to divine personality, omniscience and omnipotence must be regarded as existentially identical with divine purpose. This, of course, raises the familiar difficulty that purpose, from its very nature and conditions, implies some degree of finitude in the sense of

lack and incompleteness. But when this contention is considered with reference to the advance of selfhood, we at once perceive that this consists in the progressive overcoming of such defectiveness; and this, again, implies a profound change in the nature of both finitude and purpose themselves, since they (like all else) undergo that "transmutation" on which Mr. Bradley has always insisted. It is certainly true that every self, in virtue of its distinction from its environment, must be in that sense finite; only the Whole, or Absolute, can be *existentially* infinite. But just as we have found that there are an existential and a functional immanence, so there is a functional infinity which overrides this finitude of distinction with which it coexists. Such functional infinity is more closely approached by every step in the expansion of personality as it becomes at once less ignorant, more effectively purposive and so more absolutely dominant. But this means that the essential character of purpose must be reinterpreted. Undoubtedly in all low levels of personality it coexists with some type of imperfection. But it is radically erroneous to regard purpose, as is usually done, as *necessarily* implying such imperfection. On the contrary, as is obvious from the consideration of any given instance, no matter how trivial it may be, purpose, as such, intends and means the removal of imperfection, while its attainment results in an increased value and fullness of selfhood. As this process continues, therefore, purpose undergoes that Bradleian "transmutation" to which I have just referred. It becomes, that is to say, more definite, more effective, wider in its range and higher in its character, and thus an ever fuller manifestation, no longer of the weakness of the self, but rather of its power and capacity, so that

there arises the final existential identity between the self and its purposes.

In general terms, then, purposes and its achievement can be rightly conceived only as being the attainment and maintenance of that dominance within and over the environment which, while characteristic of all personality as such, is most clearly exhibited by its highest forms. To describe it as the manifestation of the self's inherent nature is only an alternative expression of the same principle, best exemplified (once again) in the relation of the Supreme Self to all other reals.

It is therefore in no degree contradictory to assert that Deity is both finite and infinite at one and the same time ; which, depends on what among the many aspects of His nature is referred to. As essentially personal, and therefore as so distinct from all other reals as to be transcendent, He is finite ; not (that is to say) existentially identical with the Whole. On the other hand, this distinction is fundamentally a *self*-distinction—it is fully comprehended, self-produced and self-maintained ; in other words, it constitutes, *par excellence*, that distinction between the dominant and the subordinate—between the creator and the instruments which achieve his purposes—which is obviously approximated to in the case of the highest types of even human personality, painfully limited though it always is. Thus the divine finitude which consists in self-distinction must never be severed from the infinity of absolute dominance, and so of absolute perfection. In this way every suggestion of a struggling Deity, imperilled by adverse forces which He may not succeed in finally overcoming, is altogether precluded. Certainly opposition and contradiction, as I have already insisted, are fully actual ; only they must

not be taken to impugn the omniscience and omnipotence of the Supreme Self. But this point will be more fully dealt with at a later stage ; here it will be sufficient to say that it is not in the total absence of evil, but in its ultimate destruction, that divine omnipotence manifests itself.

5. The nature of purpose in general, as distinguished from any of its instances, is thus extremely complex. Purpose changes continuously as selfhood, in advancing, becomes increasingly dominant ; but it is just this characteristic which reveals the single tendency governing the entire process, and already expressed as " the attainment and maintenance of dominance." It follows, therefore, that purpose first of all appears as the quality of a feeble self, intent only on removing its defectiveness by methods too often inadequate and unsuccessful. But the further evolution of selfhood inevitably brings with it a radical alteration in the character of its purpose, which thus approaches its ideal form as the self-expression of the sway of personality within its environment ; and although it remains true that a yet wider dominance always constitutes the end in view, still such an expansion, as the individual becomes more and more self-complete and satisfied, gives place to the maintenance of the mastery that has been already achieved. This is quite clearly what occurs in the attainment of knowledge or of political authority, or, again, of established national power or religious influence. In all such cases the ends that are systematically pursued are much more the expression of the definitely formed nature of the individual or society—of the statesman or party or church—as securely established relatively to its specific environment, than attempts to achieve more extensive influence.

This latter aim, of course, rarely disappears completely ; the question is always one of balance or emphasis, simply because we are here concerned with finite forms of personality responding to a world that is, in principle, infinite. Under such conditions it is inevitable that the varying aspects of their interrelation, in giving place one to the other, should present different degrees of prominence. But this in no degree affects the conclusion that the highest type of purpose, to which all its earlier forms are continuous approximations, is an attribute of fully developed selfhood—that is, in actuality, of Deity. Here again we must content ourselves with very distant analogies. Nevertheless, the definite policy of any unusually able statesman, the plan of campaign of a great general, the carefully prepared details of a crucial scientific experiment, all alike plainly reveal the true nature equally of purpose and of personality. In all such instances the former is clearly seen to be the expression no longer of weakness, but rather of power ; it is the manifestation of the dynamic nature of a (relatively) completely formed personality, which in virtue of its dominance incessantly modifies the environment in an increasingly definite way.

If now we expand this analogy in the direction which it itself unmistakably indicates, by dispensing with every implication of finitude, we attain the general concept, though again not the detailed content, of divine purpose as inseparable from the nature of the Supreme Self, regarded always, of course, as omniscient and omnipotent. Divine purpose thus becomes the manifestation of these attributes throughout all the phases of the dynamically evolving universe ; whence it follows that this purpose, as the eternal content or object of

divine knowledge, is itself perfect, while all the phenomena of the developing universe are moments in its fulfilment or realisation. Perhaps the best illustration of this principle is found in the design of a great building or, again, the form of a symphony, as these exist in the mind of architect or composer before the actual building or rendering has begun. Rarely even in these instances is perfection attained in advance ; nevertheless it remains the ideal governing the entire situation ; and this enables us to distinguish between such a purpose, as itself perfect, and any subsequent faulty realisation with which it must never be confused. It is, in fact, illogical to describe this as anything more than the *partial* realisation of the purpose. Realisation, plainly, is never truly such unless it is complete ; and it is merely the repeated failure of our actual achievements that prevents our explicit acceptance of this principle, which is implicitly expressed in every attempt at further improvement. Strictly, therefore, realisation and purpose are in principle equivalent to one another ; which means that perfect purpose implies and demands equally perfect realisation. This again, even in human affairs, depends on ability—power—dominance ; and thus genius sometimes actually attains its desired ideal. It is then only necessary to carry this suggestion to its obvious logical conclusion to perceive that just as divine omniscience entails perfect purpose, so omnipotence ensures the complete and perfect realisation of that purpose.

Purpose in itself, therefore, does not necessarily imply imperfection, since this arises only because the limitations of finite selfhood infect in advance, as it were, all its ideals together with its plans for their realisation. But the concept may be justified from another point of view.

For in considering the various instruments whereby man attains his ends, it is plain that they can never be fully understood and appreciated unless their distinctive purpose is known. In order to apprehend the nature of any given mechanism, in other words, two types of knowledge about it are indispensable ; or perhaps it is truer to describe these as two aspects of a single content. The first of these concerns the structure and action of the mechanism—how it is built up and how its various parts cooperate ; and in this respect, as we have found repeatedly, our acquaintance with all the details can be carried to any degree of precision we please. But even the closest intimacy with its constructive principles, merely in themselves, would still leave us ignorant of the essential nature of the machine ; and not until we had learnt both the end it was intended to fulfil and the success which it achieved could we form any adequate judgment both of its real character and its value. Frequently, of course, the aim in view and the efficiency of the mechanism can be gathered from its structure and working. But this simply confirms the truth that structure and function are at bottom inseparable, so that knowledge of the latter still remains indispensable to complete understanding ; and I need only repeat that all the highest types of mechanism, such as the products of recent invention, plainly express and achieve purposes which more and more nearly approximate to perfection, so far, that is, as their own specific activity is concerned. Once again, therefore, we perceive that to associate purpose, as such, with failure and defectiveness is really quite illogical.

These considerations thus apply to all forms and levels of selfhood regarded as dominating the respective

spheres of mechanism ; and we have seen in an earlier chapter that self-distinction from the remainder of the universe, as being subordinate to Himself, is essential to Deity. His relation to other reals is therefore strictly analogous to that between man and his own mechanisms, incalculably distant though this analogy admittedly is. It follows, therefore, that the concept of purpose is inseparable from any adequate knowledge of reality, however limited such knowledge may be ; so that to repudiate the concept is merely to diminish the value of such knowledge as we possess. It may again be urged, of course, that even granting the validity of the idea, still the actual character of divine purpose must always transcend human comprehension. But I have already dealt with this agnostic point of view, and its ultimate force must be judged in the light of the detailed course of the present argument. For finite minds, again, there arise the problems of pain and error and evil. We must now consider, therefore, in what sense their existence is compatible with the perfection of the purpose of Deity.

IV

DIVINE PURPOSE. PAIN AND EVIL

1. THE foregoing analysis of the general nature of purpose and the character of its divine manifestation is mainly formal, although this in itself need not detract from its validity. For the higher the level of intellectual ability, the more self-sufficient or self-evidential does a purely formal argument become, as is at once obvious if we consider either advanced mathematics, the decisions of great judges or any comprehensive scientific theory.¹ In all these cases, alike, instances or facts or details are largely taken for granted, not however because they are irrelevant, but merely because they are already familiar and in that sense superfluous, since the formality of the ultimate conclusion adequately covers all these *minutiae* ; so that in adopting this attitude the scholastics and their predecessors were elaborating a method which in itself is thoroughly logical. Their comparative failure was due in the main not to the formality of their procedure but to the unavoidable paucity of their material premisses ; and it is the wide command of its innumerable data which the modern legal or scientific mind enjoys that sustains the pure formality of so many of its conclusions.

It is plain that we are here concerned once again with varying degrees of finitude. To a narrow intellect, endowed with only meagre knowledge and restricted

¹ Again in its widest range, including *e.g.* economic, sociological and ethical principles.

insight, such formality must appear to be devoid of the requisite content, and therefore invalid. Either it is not directly concerned with those countless particular instances with which the primary level of mind must make itself familiar, or its precise bearing upon those instances cannot yet be clearly perceived; but in both cases alike the final result is that natural resentment or suspicion which too often finds expression in the impatient condemnation of the abstract or, at best, an over-insistence upon pragmatism.

Logical formality in itself, therefore, may not be inadequate. But at the same time the nature of divine purpose is most clearly to be discerned from its manifestation throughout the structure of the universe as this presents itself to modern knowledge. In this respect it will be sufficient to summarise the survey of "The General Attributes of Reality" attempted in the opening chapter of *Personality and Reality*, and to consider its bearing upon our present problem. In the first place then the relation between two universal characteristics, which would seem at first sight to contradict and exclude each other, must be correctly apprehended—that is between absolute *definiteness of structure* on the one hand, and on the other a wide *range of plasticity* in function and responsiveness. Here the difficulty arises from the practical impossibility of successfully combining these two features in any of our artificial contrivances, although this obstacle is gradually being overcome. In the main, however, mechanical efficiency demands the exact and unchanging adjustment of part to part, while this rigidity at once renders any high degree of plasticity impossible. Only in the most recent of modern appliances, such as the gyrostatic compass or delicate wireless contrivances,

has any marked degree of variable response as yet been attained. Nevertheless this undoubtedly indicates the next great advance in invention and construction—that is the production of machines which, while retaining the familiar precision of internal arrangement, will also be capable of automatically adjusting themselves to more and more widely varying conditions or stimuli.

The supreme difficulty of achieving this, however, has inevitably created the impression that the marked plasticity of structure and activity which occurs throughout Nature cannot be associated with any such rigidity as that of man's mechanisms. Vital and mental processes have thus been relegated to a sphere of their own, which is altogether distinct from the physical, and characterised by a freedom or contingency not only unique but inexplicable. This philosophic standpoint, whose best known exponents are probably Fouillée, Rénouvier, Bergson and Boutroux, has been appealed to by both vitalists¹ and moral theorists. Thus Professor A. E. Taylor has recently maintained that "contingency or indetermination is just as much a feature of nature and of every part of nature as determination by laws. . . . On a clear inspection contingency is found to be a universal character of whatever is temporal and mutable."²

It appears to me, on the contrary, that every increase in our knowledge of the universe discloses its thorough-going definiteness of structure or—if this term is felt to be too narrow—organisation. Alike in the atom and the star, in the living cell and in mind, there is increasingly

¹ *E.g.*, Driesch and Reinke.

² *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, p. 301.

discernible one and the same principle of precise inter-relation between the constituent elements of the various systems, although to establish this in detail would necessitate a survey of almost every branch of current science. Nor can it be objected that this standpoint results simply from the selection of only such phenomena as prove amenable to scientific formulation, and the consequent ignoring of the equally actual contingency. If the frequent discoveries in question were always confined to a few narrow spheres, this objection would be of unquestionable force. But the convergence of all the largely haphazard developments of scientific investigation in the same direction¹ tells very heavily against it; and with this there must further be allied the rapidly increasing applicability of mathematical, physical and chemical principles and methods throughout extending fields of investigation.

Thus throughout the entire physical universe—including here the material constituents of all living things—there exists the infinitely various but always definitely ordered structure (or again, organisation) of reality. When regarded, therefore, as the embodiment of the purpose of the Supreme Self, exactly as an efficient machine expresses human purpose to some degree, this universal order, in its eternity as in its absolute automatism, provides indisputable evidence of the perfection of that purpose so far, of course, as the physical universe itself is concerned. But, on the other hand, the material sphere cannot be entirely isolated from the superior levels of being. For living protoplasm must be regarded not only as the highest form of matter, but at the same

¹ Cf. my Monte Carlo illustration in *Personality and Reality*, p. 22.

time as the indispensable basis of psychical phenomena ;¹ and this further aspect, inherent as it plainly is within the very constitution of brain matter, must also be considered in its bearing upon the purpose of Deity. In itself a perfect mechanism, the material world at the same time subserves a definite end which far transcends its own level, and thus (just as in the analogous case of any familiar machine) its native embodiment of divine purpose is still further enhanced.

2. But at this point there must be considered that further characteristic of reality which I have just maintained to be inseparably associated with its definiteness of organisation—that is, the extreme complexity of its structure, everywhere concealed from direct observation by the minuteness of the constituent factors and the delicacy of their interactions. In this respect also modern mechanisms are slowly approximating ever more closely to the same combination of features that pervades Nature ; and with this advance is allied the gradual disappearance of the rigidity or lack of pliancy which is commonly associated with all mechanism as such. This defect is what is indicated in describing personal conduct or social routine as “mechanical” ; and although such an attitude is frequently justified in practical affairs, the principle on which it is based is nevertheless unsound. For the proverbial connection between rigidity and mechanism arises not from the nature of mechanism in itself, but only from the simplicity of all the mechanisms that man has yet constructed. Every *simple* mechanism (in other words)—one, that is, containing relatively few parts with proportionately few inter-

¹ Cf. *A Theory of Direct Realism*, cc. xxi, xxii, “The Ideality of the Physical World.”

connections—is thereby inevitably limited in the variety of its activities and the range of its responsiveness, as is at once evident in comparing the machines of to-day with their crude predecessors. But every departure from this low primary level brings with it not complexity only, but at the same time a rapidly increasing pliancy; and it is only necessary to expand this principle sufficiently to perceive that the highly developed plasticity of reaction which characterises the realm of life is based throughout on the extreme physico-chemical complexity of proto-plasmic structure revealed by current investigation. Even in non-living entities something of the same kind is present though on a much more limited scale:—in the more complex atoms, *e.g.*, in the unceasing alternations between continents and oceans and the accompanying movements of the earth's crust, and again in the eternal perturbations of the solar system, paralleled as this must be by many stellar groups, if not by the whole universe of stars.¹ It must also be remembered, however, that the absolute definiteness of structure which is patent in these large-scale phenomena is also present in the infinitesimal atom, the crystal and the living cell. Generalising this conclusion, therefore, the developing complexity of organisation is inseparably and always naturally associated with an expanding plasticity of action and response. As in the previous case of matter and mind, so here one is instrumental to the other; their mutual relation, in other words, is throughout purposive or teleological.

In advancing from the physical to the psychical sphere we find all the foregoing features not only retained but operating, as it were, on an intensified scale. For every

¹ Cf. Professor Eddington in *Nature*, vol. 111, p. 18.

type of mind, like every bodily organ, undoubtedly possesses its own specific mode of structural definiteness. This is true, as recent psychology has abundantly shown, even of the abnormal mind ; while what is commonly called a " marked individuality " or " developed personality " is really a more or less stable combination of habits, beliefs and many other mental factors, each of which, again, is essentially active or dynamic. But while this definiteness of organisation remains always indispensable, the nature of consciousness is such that it enables even the highest degrees of physical complexity and plasticity to become almost infinitely transcended. For the very immateriality of mental images and of ideas obviously facilitates endlessly new combinations between innumerable constituents which themselves are incessantly changing ; and thus there emerges that characteristic pliancy of mind which is too frequently misinterpreted as being due to the suspension or even the total absence of law—a conclusion which I have endeavoured to show to be altogether erroneous. To this—the strictly *psychological* aspect of intellectual activity—there must further be added the rapidly expanding significance or meaning of the majority of ideas, which constitutes their distinctively *logical* function.¹ In this way each separate idea implies or comprehends wide spheres of reality, not, however, in any isolated manner, but rather as intimately united to emotion and will ; and thus there finally evolves self-conscious personality, whose principal attributes have already been considered in my first chapter.

3. So far, then, it might quite justifiably be argued that the purpose of Deity has achieved its full realisation

¹ These two aspects are almost always confused with each other ; the subject is, however, highly technical.

throughout the age-long evolution, first of the physical universe culminating in the development of living matter, and still further in the emergence from this basis of consciousness which, finding its highest terrestrial level in selfhood, thenceforward progressively transcends its initial finiteness.¹ If, then, the entire evolution of mind had proceeded in the same way as that of matter—that is, without widespread disorder or defectiveness—it would be equally logical to regard this realisation of divine purpose as being perfect; but against any such conclusion the presence of pain and of evil in all its forms has always appeared as a fatal objection.

Without presuming to seek to

justify the ways of God to men,

it is plainly necessary to consider this serious difficulty; and I shall make no attempt, in the first place, to deny the reality of suffering and evil, or to regard them as being only illusory and so to explain them away. For they unquestionably exist and function, and in that sense at least are undeniably real. But this, after all, may prove to be only the first step in their consideration, and not any final conclusion; the whole situation must therefore be carefully analysed.

The presence of pain, then, is not something arbitrary, but is always the inevitable accompaniment of sentience as such. Its complete absence, that is to say, would involve the non-existence of feeling, and thus the

¹ For my detailed arguments on this point *cf. Personality and Reality*, pp. 76, 119, 151; and on the probability of extra-terrestrial intelligences, p. 93. To these considerations must be added the presence of beauty throughout the universe. *Cf. ibid.*, chap. xi.

restriction of being to the purely physical or unconscious level. In this connection the characteristic definiteness and delicacy of all vital organisation must be once again taken into account. For without these two attributes protoplasm (as we have just seen) could not function as it actually does ; but they necessarily limit its specific reactions to certain *optimum* combinations of the environing conditions which are almost as precisely coordinated as is its own constitution.¹ It is a familiar theory that the maintenance of this *optimum* causes pleasure ; and if this result always actually occurred it might readily be conceded that in the world of life, just as in the material sphere, divine purpose was perfectly realised—a standpoint often unthinkingly assumed so long as things go well with ourselves. But, if only as the natural accompaniment of contrast, even the diminution and cessation of pleasure must be to some degree painful, and this all the more the keener the positive enjoyment. Under any circumstances whatever, then, some degree of pain would seem to be the logical corollary of sentience itself, and to be entirely avoided only by an altogether impossible restriction of living beings within watertight compartments each marked by *optimum* conditions.

It is, however, plainly illogical thus to consider pleasure and pain purely in themselves. For they are always biologically significant, and in this way dynamic or operative, like all else that exists. Their own positive characters, in other words, quickly become recognised as the indications of their generating causes or conditions ; and thus they play an all-important part in the course of evolution which could be fulfilled, once feeling has

¹ Cf. e.g., Henderson's *Fitness of the Environment*.

arisen, in no other conceivable way. It is quite unnecessary to express this fact in terms of penalty or retribution. It is sufficient to regard it as the operation of natural causation within the realm of consciousness, most clearly realised perhaps at the level of refined aesthetic experience, to which however, in principle, all lower stages are approximations. Once again then, the more sensitive the artist or critic is to beauty, the more keenly must he feel and resent its absence or negation, simply because the first response is inseparably associated with the second. More truly perhaps there is here neither first nor second, but only two distinct aspects of one definitely conditioned situation, each of which logically—because inevitably—implies the other. Enjoyment is but the positive expression of this situation and pain its naturally correlated negative.

The real function of suffering, then (like that of every other entity), can be truly understood only when it is regarded on the widest possible scale. Thus considered as one of the predominant factors in organic evolution, it is not only the natural consequent of precisely the same totality of conditions that produces pleasure, but it is further both deterrent and remedial, although our habituation to the artificiality of modern civilisation prevents the clear recognition of this truth. As far as animal and plant life is concerned, however, the conclusions of so reliable an observer as Professor J. A. Thomson definitely support this interpretation. "The struggle for existence is often an endeavour after well-being. It is bad biology to think of the struggling organisms as necessarily like fishes in a net. . . . Animate Nature is all for health ; apart from man and parasites,

disease is almost unknown in wild life.”¹ Similarly, within human experience, the expanding control of mind over its environment results in the slow elimination of pain as such—that is apart from its connection with effort and sacrifice. Nor in this latter respect is suffering ever gratuitous or arbitrary, but once again (in principle) the logical outcome of the ruling conditions. For as I have just observed, the biological significance of pleasure consists in its association with the efficient functioning of the organism—in other words, with harmonious relation to the environment. But the complexity and definiteness of all organic structure upon which this harmony depends, incessantly increasing as it does with every rise in the level of being, must at the same time make any marked constitutional changes painful; and as is implied in Professor Thomson’s contention, the great majority of evolutionary adaptations occurs very gradually and therefore (on the whole) painlessly. When we pass from animals to humanity, however, the governing conditions become fundamentally different in two respects. In the first place the characteristic intricacy of organisation, more especially that of mind, has expanded incalculably; while still further the individual, as a self-conscious social and moral being, now becomes faced with sudden and unforeseen demands for thoroughgoing reorientations of his life or character. This frequently occurs within ordinary experience, quite apart from any specifically ethical or religious issues. The child’s entrance to school, the outbreak of war, unexpected changes in commercial relations due to new inventions or even to fashion, all alike necessitate some more or less profound alteration

¹ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, pp. 331, 333. Cf. in fuller detail the same author’s *System of Animate Nature*.

in habits or personality which, from the very nature of the case, must generally be unpleasant or positively painful.

Still more is this the case when the reaction is no longer mainly involuntary, and when the necessity for fully deliberate choice on any important matter arises which, whatever may be its specific character, always involves at bottom a moral issue. For here, in order to maintain his own ideal or gain his desired end, the individual must often recast his whole life, thus forgoing perhaps all that has hitherto conduced, often quite naturally and justifiably, to his happiness, or even voluntarily making the supreme sacrifice of all. And whenever it occurs under these conditions, suffering is obviously never motiveless nor purposeless; rather is it the means towards some higher and hitherto unattained good. As such, finally, and no matter how trivial it may appear to our short-sighted scrutiny, it must be considered in its relation to the developing Whole; whence it may be concluded that pain, in all its diversified aspects throughout animal and human experience, is at least not inconsistent with the systematic realisation of divine purpose, if indeed it is not more logical to advance to a yet more positive standpoint.

4. The problem of evil is plainly much more difficult. The term, in the first place, requires definition; for suffering and even the necessity for sacrifice are often regarded as evil, and to a less degree ugliness and ignorance and error; while to interpret it as the antithesis of good is merely to substitute one ambiguous term for another. I shall restrict my own consideration in the main to moral evil, as being the most highly developed form which includes by implication all the others; and

from this point of view the fundamental principle underlying the entire situation is identical with that already appealed to in the case of pain. For just as pain is the natural accompaniment, under certain specific conditions, of conscious sensitivity, so moral evil is the inevitable—and therefore logical—correlate of moral freedom. A being, that is to say, who was, otherwise than as the result of his own deliberate choice and volition, incapable of being attracted by evil and of performing evil actions, would not be actually and truly free. He would be nothing more than a psychic automaton, in exactly the same way that a well-made watch or skilfully adjusted compass is a physical automaton. Moral evil therefore, as such and as typical of all evil, is constituted in the first instance by personal choice and action. But it is once again plainly impossible to isolate these from their natural consequences, which, owing to the extreme complexity both of the individual agents themselves and of their environment, must be widespread and lasting, infecting the whole domain of society materially, intellectually and aesthetically. But just because the entire situation is thus highly intricate, evil must present innumerable diverse aspects; and hence the familiar ambiguity of the term itself. Although it is *primarily* a matter of individual deliberation and action, it is at the same time impossible to restrict it to this and nothing further, since to do so would be to isolate the agent from his environment, and thus to attempt to sever certain causes from their due effects. For it must be clearly recognised that causation and law dominate the moral sphere to exactly the same degree that they control the material world. The fundamental difference between the two, underlying all the other marked contrasts,

once again arises from the incalculably higher intricacy of the causal interrelations in the former, which makes their discernment so intensely difficult as frequently to conceal their very existence. Both individually and socially, however, manifold causes cooperate upon a large scale and during long periods; whence it follows that the comparatively close and evident connections between causes and effects which pervade the physical realm must be extremely rare, and must remain therefore undetected or misunderstood. But to regard causation as non-existent here is radically fallacious.

All this plainly means that moral evil is ultimately concerned with the will—the converse of Kant's familiar principle. Nor, again, can volition be separated from the other aspects of personality; for its specific character in each individual instance is intimately affected by all the allied main elements in experience. Will is most accurately regarded, therefore, as the expression of the systematic activity of the entire self, which must (still further) always be recognised as rational in essence, even when reason appears to be at its minimum. But too often unfortunately, will, in the proper sense of the term, is confused with impulse or sheer obstinacy, or even so-called "instinct" or "intuition"; so that the typical "strong-willed" person is the one who attains his own ends, no matter how he obtains them nor what their consequences may be.

Psychologically, of course, all this is quite erroneous. For instinct, in its literal sense and apart from its popular misapplication, plays a relatively unimportant part in developed human experience. Typically it is a purely animal faculty, and it is its supersession and control by reason that differentiates man from all his lowlier kin.

Similarly, impulsive actions are such just because of the absence of that deliberation which—however meagre it may be—is the essence of choice and volition.¹ On the other hand, fully deliberate behaviour obviously springs from the detailed survey and valuation of all the conditions of any given situation ; and this, despite its too frequent failure or inadequacy, is fundamentally rational. In the mind of even the highest animals it is present in only the most rudimentary degree ;² whereas on the contrary (as I have just observed), its further evolution underlies the entire advance of human personality, which in this manner becomes ever increasingly self-controlling—self-determining—and therefore free.

Thus it is plain that our problem again becomes a question of degree—that is of the relative preponderance, in their connection with conduct, of the rational and the non-rational aspects of experience respectively. The more developed and effective the former become, the higher, from the strictly psychological standpoint, is the type of will. No longer despotically directed by instinct like the animal, the individual now surveys all the alternative courses of action open to him, although he always remains susceptible to the influence of passions and desires. His final choice, obviously, must be materially affected by the extent of his knowledge ; but this in itself must not be taken to mean that his freedom is ever destroyed. For although its range of action is seriously limited by ignorance, it nevertheless remains freedom, just as a light confined within narrow boundaries remains light. The *nature* of freedom, in other words,

¹ It does not, however, follow that all impulsive conduct is bad ; honesty and generosity, *e.g.*, are often the outcome of impulse.

² Cf. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, and note, p. 38 *ante*.

must not be confused (as so frequently happens) with its possible sphere of manifestation ; " stone walls do not a prison make." ¹ Every choice then is made in relation to the actual knowledge at the command of the agent, and the distinctively moral quality of his character and action must be judged accordingly. It is true that in strict law ignorance is no defence ; but it is equally true that, owing to the gradual ethicising of the harsh legality of earlier times, every judge now gives due weight to the intellectual and other deficiencies of the criminal.

5. Evil therefore, considered in its essential relation to will and personality, always consists in the deliberate choice and pursuance of what the individual clearly knows to be the lowest of the alternative courses open to him, or (in other terms) of the narrowest and poorest ideal in preference to the highest that is possible under all the existing conditions. In the first instance then, and so far as the agent himself is concerned, the whole situation must be judged from *his* point of view—in the light of his knowledge, not solely in that of others' who may be much better instructed. Although this conclusion is subject to many important qualifications arising from the complexities of the issue, it nevertheless forms the initial principle governing our approach to the problem. As I have already maintained, the interests of society must also be considered ; and much that is evil from this further standpoint is yet excusable so far as the individual himself is concerned. If then, despite any injurious consequences, his action is the best that he could perform in the light of his entire knowledge and experience, it is to some degree praiseworthy, as we recognise in considering the conduct of children or any difficult circumstances

¹ Cf. *Personality and Reality*, p. 114.

which obscure judgment. At the same time the agent must be assumed to possess a reasonable acquaintance with his duties ; his ignorance, that is, must be somehow justifiable—a demand which frequently becomes very severe, as in the case of statesmen and public officials generally.

Thus pain has been seen to be inseparably connected with conscious sensitivity, which means that its abolition could be attained only at the cost of the non-existence of all feeling. In precisely the same way moral evil, as the essential type of all evil, is the natural correlate of personal freedom, its harmful results being simply the inevitable effects of specific causes. Just as the absence of pain means the cessation of all feeling, so the complete absence of wickedness would therefore imply the disappearance alike of individuality and of certain of the highest types of causation operating on the most extensive scale. But this, obviously, implies an entirely different universe, which would at the same time be a poorer universe, a universe of a much lower type. For there must at the same moment vanish every possibility of good and of the finest forms of experience—of knowledge, emotion and art, of heroism and religion ; and with this conclusion must be connected two further and equally obvious principles. For in the first place, just as suffering follows naturally upon evil, so true happiness is the inevitable concomitant of goodness ; though since neither happiness nor goodness can ever be secured by finite selves without strenuous effort and painful sacrifice, any cheap hedonism is at once excluded. But man is loath to recognise this, however often it is borne in upon him. He persists in trying to procure permanent satisfactions at his own low price and on his own inadequate

terms ; and when he finds this to be impossible he foolishly condemns the universe rather than himself :

Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire !

Is it not rather "the Heart's Desire" that should be re-moulded ?

Secondly, all evil is in the long run self-destructive ; which means, at bottom, that it has no permanent, and in that sense at least no real, place in the universe. The universe itself, that is to say, is not evil but good, though evil—and again (as I have endeavoured to show) from the very nature of things—has a certain inexpugnable status and function therein. As I have argued elsewhere, the essential nature of evil, as objective rather than subjective, consists in its being an opposition to, or an interference with, the evolutionary advance of reality or the upward movement of the universe. As such it is fore-doomed to ultimate defeat, slow though the process seems to human vision. In this manner therefore the divine purpose fulfils itself in the spiritual sphere, just as it does in the material world in virtue of "its eternity and its absolute automatism."¹ Only it is there manifested no longer by means of merely physical mechanisms, but in and through the activities of free individuality, which is thus capable within increasingly wide limits of determining its own course to such a degree, indeed, that it may seek to retard the eternal development of the universe. But it is precisely in this latter respect, paradoxical though it may seem, that the perfection of divine purpose becomes most clearly perceived. For the nature of the universe is plainly such that every attempt to oppose its

¹ *Ante*, p. 95.

course must ultimately defeat itself, without the necessity for any continuous and specific intervention on the part of the Supreme Self. Thus the order and law of the universe are seen to be self-sustaining throughout, equally in the realms of matter and of mind. Apart (once again) from the arguments for real contingency, the operation of this principle is becoming more and more patent in the physical sphere. For it is the ultimate basis of what are loosely called the "postulates of science"—the uniformity of nature, the reign of law and the universality of causation. But it is a radical error to exclude these from the immaterial world, because of the fear of destroying its value by reducing it to the level of the purely mechanical. Any such attitude is quite unjustified; and so long as it is perceived that in passing from matter to life and to mind, we advance to forms of being ever more intricately and delicately organised, we can realise in advance that this rapidly increasing complexity inevitably makes the application of the scientific "postulates" in question a matter of extreme difficulty. Actually, nevertheless, they always continue to operate; and this really implies that the purpose of Deity, when it is conceived as presented at the end of the previous chapter, is unceasingly realised, although in fundamentally contrasted ways, throughout the entire universe.

This conclusion is still further strengthened when we pass from the negative aspects of the problem to its positive. For not only is all evil self-destructive, but its annihilation is due always to the activity of good, while at the same time this continuous victory itself increases and heightens the good. This is true both individually and socially, subjectively and objectively. Neither good nor evil is ever passive but rather essentially active and

dynamic ; and it is rarely—only perhaps in its final stages—that the latter vanishes imperceptibly. The intimate connection, on the one hand between real happiness and the good, and on the other between wickedness and suffering, is of itself sufficient to maintain their unceasing hostility, although this point of view once again implies no mere hedonism. Nor is it ever a matter simply of the replacement of evil by good ; on the contrary, the highest forms of good always come into being and are constituted in and through conflict with the worst evils, which (as it were) arouse them into being and expression ; and this holds true, *mutatis mutandis*, of pain. If, then, the non-existence of suffering and evil implies (as I have maintained) a poorer or lower type of universe, while their actuality is the means towards the fullest possible realisation of good, the principle of the perfection of divine purpose seems to be amply confirmed.

THE METHOD OF DIVINE PURPOSE. CREATION

I. A SUMMARY of the foregoing argument will facilitate the further development of the subject. I have emphasised in the first place the fundamental distinction—which is essentially a self-distinction—between Deity and the rest of the Universe ; and have then maintained that a survey of the general characteristics of existence enables us to attribute to Deity both omniscience and omnipotence,¹ using these terms, however, in a sense which closely connects them with finite power and knowledge, not, as Spinoza and other thinkers have argued, with any absolutely transcendent significance which actually deprives them of all intelligible meaning.² These divine qualities have next been shown to express themselves in a purpose to whose perfection even pain and evil ultimately contribute ; while purpose, omnipotence and omniscience have alike been regarded as the associated aspects of an infinite experience, to which the corresponding features in human nature are only far-distant approximations, conditioned always by the limitations inseparable from their origin and evolution. Nevertheless this imperfection of man's capacities must not be allowed to conceal the deeper truth that their incessant expansion plainly indicates the supreme levels which alone really deserve to be called " knowledge " and " power " ; and this is equally true of " purpose." But this means that just as error is not characteristic of

¹ " Look around you," *ante*, p. 16. ² *Cf. ante*, p. 63.

knowledge *as* knowledge,¹ so ineffectiveness and failure do not pertain to purpose as such, but only to our necessarily inadequate attempts to realise it. In all these instances alike, therefore, it is the highest possible ideal which must be considered; and this, as I have already suggested, exists in the mind as the desired end towards whose attainment our efforts are directed. Most frequently such a subjective end is transcendent in two senses—first in going far beyond the utmost that we can actually achieve, and secondly in itself widely expanding as its more or less successful realisation proceeds. This however (as in so many previous instances) is most clearly perceived, not in the average individual, but in unusually talented persons—great statesmen or artistic geniuses, whose separate purposes, even when they are satisfactorily carried out, immediately lead on to others falling within the larger sphere of their total experience, and so prove themselves to be in a sense inexhaustible. Only from this point of view can we perceive the real nature of purpose as it unceasingly frees itself from the obstacles raised by the agent's own inability; so that it is sufficient to pursue this obvious tendency to its highest point to apprehend the perfection of the purpose of omnipotent Deity.

Thus we return to the position assumed at the end of the third chapter. Every aspect of the evolving universe is a moment in the realisation of divine purpose; and in this manner Deity is immanent throughout all existence, in spite of His inherent self-distinction from the rest of being; for if this distinction becomes unduly stressed it implies a transcendence altogether too absolute. Yet this description of the universe, within which omnipotent

¹ *Ante*, p. 48 note.

and omniscient Deity is supreme, expresses His relation thereto (which constitutes divine purpose) in somewhat too general terms; and it appears to me to be possible to attain still greater definiteness on these various points.

2. The principle that evolution is fundamentally "creative" or "emergent" has now become comparatively familiar; and it implies, in my own opinion, that the existents which successively arise are not only absolutely new, but are at the same time of a higher order, taken as a whole, than their predecessors. This is obviously the standpoint essential to Dr. Alexander's philosophy as presented in *Space Time and Deity*; although it is sufficiently clear, without further detailed argument, that my theory of the nature of Deity is completely different from his own. But this point is here immaterial; we need observe only his general agreement with other "emergent" or "creative" evolutionists when he maintains that reality advances by continuous stages from pure space-time to matter, life and mind. This unceasing advance is what is implied by the words "a higher order"; the latest formed reals—again regarded on the largest possible scale—are more complex, more diversified, and I should myself add more valuable than the earlier.¹ They not only exist, but they become conscious that they exist; and this (still further) not merely sensuously and instinctively, but rationally and morally—these two latter characteristics, as I have previously argued, being never separable, but rather the combined aspects of unitary personality which maintain its ever expanding dominance.²

¹ Cf. Professor Lloyd Morgan, "through emergence there is progress in continuity," *Emergent Evolution*, p. 5.

² *Ante*, p. 105.

In my *Theory of Direct Realism* I have summarised this well known position as follows :—" evolution obviously means far more than mere succession. The later in time is universally the higher in organisation—a principle which is established by its very exceptions." ¹ In view of the general acceptance of the principle of " emergence " I felt amply justified in adopting this point of view without advancing any detailed arguments, since these seemed to me under the circumstances to be superfluous; and I find it extremely difficult to understand why a standpoint previously advocated by so many able modern thinkers should be described as " incredibly naïve." ² It may of course be obscure or even totally unfounded, and in any case is open to effective criticism; but to regard a hypothesis supported by such voluminous and weighty evidence, contributed from many widely diverse and independent sources, as " incredibly naïve " appears to me to imply a serious misapprehension (to say the least) of one of the most important tendencies in current thought; one might just as well maintain that the theory of relativity is " naïve." The familiar objection that devolution frequently occurs—that great empires or even entire civilisations pass away—that stars burn themselves out and widespread species disappear—are too patent to merit discussion. For it ought to be obvious that the essential point concerns the *final* issue of universal change; and the truth surely is that in spite of all such instances, the ultimate result is that emphasised by emergent evolution—an uninterrupted advance, on the whole, to ever higher levels of being. The incessant destruction and elimination that admittedly occur are simply the necessary by-

¹ P. 292. ² Professor Laird, *Mind*, vol. xxxv, p. 108.

products or side issues of this progressive movement ; while at the same time the recent discoveries concerning the distribution and availability of physical energy cast the gravest doubt on the tenability of the doctrine of the " degradation of energy," at least in its older form.

If however specific evidence is still required it is, I believe, quite sufficient to cite once again Professor J. A. Thomson. " In many ways, from the first, inorganic Nature has been extraordinarily friendly to organisms ; broad organic foundations make lofty superstructures possible. . . . We admit the retrogressions of parasites and sedentary animals ; but these are by-ways. They should not blind us to persistent evolutionary trends. . . . Animate Nature is all for health . . . for beauty, and *the exceptions prove the rule.*"¹ Although Professor Thomson limits his own consideration to living organisms, it needs but little acquaintance with the allied sciences to perceive that his assertions have universal applicability, thus endorsing—indeed almost verbally—my own " incredibly naïve " contention.

3. We are fully justified therefore in accepting this unceasing advance in complexity—in organisation—in value—as a well established fact. But it is possible to go still farther, so as to perceive its deeper nature and significance ; and this enables us to add a positive character to those formal and negative aspects of divine purpose which have just been discussed. For it is plain that all the higher forms of being approach more closely to the character of the Supreme Self than do the lower ; or (in alternative terms) they share and manifest more of

¹ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, pp. 332, 333 ; I have italicised the passage which is almost literally identical with my own statement to which Professor Laird takes exception. Cf. further the conclusion of my Preface.

His own nature. It is easily possible, however, to express this principle in such a way as to deprive it of almost all its concrete meaning ; and this in three different ways, each of which therefore must be guarded against in advance. In the first place it may be maintained that Reality is throughout continuous,¹ while at the same time its more inclusive phases naturally approximate more and more to the Whole ; secondly, it may also be contended that the nature of the Whole must nevertheless remain incomprehensible, so that all that can ever be ascertained is this general fact of closer approximation ; and finally, the contrast between the infinite and even the highest forms of the finite may be stressed in the same sense and with the same result. This is obviously only a reversion to that standpoint of absolute transcendence which has already been excluded ; for, as with Spinoza, it is quite consistent with immanence or continuity. Taken at its best, all that it yields is the acceptance of the purely formal principle of continuity or common nature, in the sense that the Whole manifests itself in different degrees in all things, or that every real is in its own way a mode of the Absolute.

This general position plainly underlies all the arguments advanced not only in the present but also in my earlier volumes. Taken as it stands, however, it remains inadequate because it has not been made as definite as is possible. For it is equally true that in thus approximating to the highest level, the more complex forms of reality acquire attributes which, in being uniquely new or " emergent," are at the same time identical in character

¹ Cf. *Personality and Reality*, pp. 25, 26, 178, and the concluding chapters of *A Theory of Direct Realism* on this general Hegelian principle.

with the attributes of the Supreme Self; while this identity is not destroyed nor fatally vitiated by the extremely restricted range of all finite qualities without exception. This is true alike of conscious experience and of rationality, of selfhood as one form of individuality,¹ and finally of the advancing dominance of personality as akin to divine omnipotence. In all these respects the undeniable continuity implies an identity which is none the less actual because of its severe limitations; and as I have argued elsewhere, we find patent analogies to this within ordinary experience. The intellectual activity and content of the student's mind *e.g.* are one in their nature, although vastly different in their range, with that of the genius. Similarly with aesthetic experience; while, finally, the authority vested in the local official or the lieutenant is identical in character, though not in extent, with the power of sovereign or general. Still further, both the knowledge and the dominance of even the lowliest individuals are within their proper spheres in a certain sense absolute, since they are directly supported, whenever the occasion arises, by those of their superiors; and this again not in any merely passive manner, since it is of the essence of the situation that independent volition and decision must be exercised, as it always is, of course, by the best type of subordinates from whom the upper ranks are recruited. The essential point is that this independence, provided it pursues its proper course, can be overthrown by no higher constitutional authority whatever. It is on the contrary sustained by this, and so holds its own and enjoys a real absoluteness, most clearly seen

¹ Cf. my discussion of *Individuation, Personality and Reality*, pp. 104 *sqq.*

perhaps in the valid decisions of the lower courts of justice.¹

All this would be highly suggestive even if the world were static, like the suppositious "block universe" which mistaken criticism so often treats as the typical concept of Hegelianism. But its significance becomes much more profound when the highest existent reals are regarded, not only as the products of the long evolutionary process, but also as the basis of its future advance. For we have just seen that ultimate (as distinct from occasional) retrogression and degradation are, to say the least, far from being inevitable; the weight of the present evidence at our disposal is indeed distinctly to the contrary, since there is no reason to suppose that the advance is limited to the earth or even the solar system. The probability is that planetary groups similar to this are distributed throughout space,² so that intelligences analogous to the human may exist elsewhere; and if at the same time we regard these as immortal, their further uninterrupted evolution may quite justifiably be accepted as at least a basis for discussion.

4. For we are now enabled (as I have just suggested) to give a more positive aspect to the foregoing somewhat abstract description of divine purpose. The evolution of personality, itself the culmination of the physical and vital³ advance, and estimated always in the light of its highest types, is thus seen to constitute the production of beings whose distinctive qualities are in principle

¹ It may be instructive to cite once again other familiar uses of "absolute," as in absolute zero—purity—certainty—monarchy—alcohol. It is, in short, equivalent to "plenipotentiary"; cf. *ante*, p. 25, note 2.

² Cf. Dr. Jeans, *Nature*, vol. 114, p. 829, and in *Evolution*, p. 29.

³ *I.e.*, including mind as the highest form of life.

identical with some of the attributes of Deity—rationality, freedom, dominance. This, of course, does not prevent us following Spinoza in associating these characteristics with others it may be inconceivable to ourselves ; although it must here be remembered that the most developed human capacities, such as thought and art, are in themselves incomprehensible to extremely primitive minds, so that it is easily possible to over-emphasise this suggestion unduly. But this interpretation of evolution means in effect that the purpose of Deity is the existence of reals capable of becoming more and more akin to Himself, since (as I have already maintained) the development of each of the qualities in question here—and therefore the development of personality as a unified whole—is inexhaustible. But their continued expansion, still further, is never a merely passive process ; even stability, in the sense of the maintenance of any given level unchanged, is impossible for long. The consequence of disuse is atrophy, and even prolonged relaxation results in underdevelopment. Personality, in other words, is essentially dynamic throughout ; its vigorous existence, and much more its progressive evolution, are impossible apart from strenuous activity. Subjectively, this implies more or less systematic self-discipline ; objectively, the equally systematic reaction to the environment in two directions simultaneously, first by the due subordination of lower and instrumental forms of being, and secondly by co-operation with those of an equal or higher type—that is with other selves and social groups.

In certain directions this necessity for discipline is sufficiently familiar—in sport and business, in politics and war. But these are after all the lowest forms of action ; and it is unfortunate that the highest activities

are popularly supposed to require no such definite organisation whatever—to be able to look after themselves as it were. Every able thinker or artist, of course, is keenly conscious of the precise contrary. He knows full well that his success, exactly like that of the athlete or the financier, depends on the rigid observance of the laws of thought or of aesthetics as the case may be; and this is equally true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the great saint or mystic. Herein, once more, lies part of the significance of pain, first as the inevitable accompaniment of the continuous recasting of personality, especially of course when this has taken the wrong direction, and secondly as the natural consequence of ignoring or wilfully defying the drastic conditions which govern the particular sphere wherein the individual works. Both internally and externally therefore—subjectively and objectively—the entire development of personality is most severely conditioned; and thus it is easy to understand why the finite self, like a child resentful of the discipline which alone can make him a man, radically misconceives the entire situation and regards himself as the helpless victim of blind or cruel fate. Hardy's use of Shakespeare's lines—

As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods;
They kill us for their sport—

is, I suppose, serious; and humanity's response to this belief finds definite expression in the well-known lines of Omar already quoted. All the stress is laid on suffering and wrong, so that the highest virtue lies in enduring what in itself must remain inexplicable. But all this is simply the negative aspect of the universal causal principle which operates still more clearly in the direction of good

and of its allied happiness ; and we find here nothing more than the continuance of that eliminative and selective method which is sufficiently familiar throughout Nature, only now on a higher plane and within a more intricate situation, resulting always (as I have repeatedly argued) in unbroken advance. It is true that in Nature there exists no reflective consciousness of this process, and therefore there can be no perplexity nor despair. But again these elements could be wholly absent from man's experience only at the cost of all his intellectual powers, since they are plainly the outcome of his survey of life ; and we must learn to perceive that the means whereby the mammal was produced from the ascidian, or the bird from the reptile, is in its essential character identical with that which transforms the lower self into the higher. The severity of every stage of this progress, in fact, is in itself a patent indication of its vital importance. It means that the higher levels of selfhood must, as it were, be achieved at no matter what cost ; and this may be taken as the real criterion of its status and value in the universe. Such an attitude is indeed frequently inevitable in everyday practice ; in education, in war, in fact in every form of training, the greater ends are often quite unattainable without the most drastic discipline and the heaviest cost. But, simply because of this, they are unquestioningly held to justify such extremes of sacrifice ; and it is surely illogical to refuse to extend this principle to man's relations with the Whole.

5. The preceding reference to " Emergent Evolution " suggests a brief discussion of Creation, though I can add little to my previous remarks on this subject.¹ I may repeat that its application to the *primary* origin of all

¹ *Personality and Reality*, p. 182.

existents, though quite legitimate, can be of little value, simply because none of our ideas, from the very conditions of the case, is adequate to this problem. We can do no more than employ our profoundest concept in the vain attempt to explain itself; and Creation, in this specific connection, can be defined only in the formal sense as "the primal action of the Supreme Self upon the material universe." But it is distinctly helpful to extend the meaning of the term to the highest forms of artistic activity, whose truly unique productions yield the closest analogies to the successive "emergents" of Nature. Whether all the conditions governing every stage in emergence are pre-existent—whether, in other terms, the future is exhaustively implied in the past—is irrelevant to the patent fact that reals come into existence which have never been anticipated and often will never be repeated. If this is true of the great artist's works, it is still more true of the artist himself; and thus we return to personality, with its "relative independence and separateness," on which Professor Pringle-Pattison has insisted, as being the most typical of all emergents, and therefore as the final end of divine creation in the existence of selves more and more closely akin to the Supreme Self; for what has just been said of art is equally, though perhaps not so clearly, true of knowledge and conduct, since they likewise generate their inexhaustible store of unique values.

In this way creation appears as the uppermost level of dynamic action towards which purpose, will and dominance continuously advance. For although volition, as I have already observed, begins by being mainly responsive,¹ it rapidly transcends this primitive stage,

¹ *Ante*, pp. 105, 106.

and by its own constant activity becomes self-transformed into that independent initiative which is the highest possible type of dominance, subordinating the entire environment to the most effective realisation of the purposes of the self. Divine creation, then, differs from its lower modes of manifestation in the complete absence of limitations—of all restriction, weakness and failure ; like the allied attributes of Deity, it is in essence perfect, even though it seems to be retarded and sometimes defeated by evil.

Finally, while all that Deity creates must plainly fall below Himself in the scale of being, it must nevertheless all be worthy of Himself—be in its own way an adequate expression of His nature, just as a single sonnet may rank with the more lengthy works of a fine poet. This explains, it may be, the baffling complexity of the structure of the atom and the living cell, the wide diversity of even the simplest types of life, the hidden beauties of so many natural objects, and the fineness of character of countless obscure men and women ; for in all such instances alike we are brought into direct contact with the immanence of Deity. “Common fancy ” says Hegel, “ puts the Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly before us ” ;¹ but “ before us,” of course, much more fully in some things than in others, and most clearly revealed therefore to the insight of the higher types of mind alike in knowledge and in art, in goodness and in religion.

From this it must follow, still further, that as the self becomes more fully developed it comes to perceive the Universe more and more as this presents itself to Deity—that is, as a creation perfect and complete. In this

¹ *Logic* (Wallace), p. 50.

respect again we find close analogies in aesthetic experience. For probably no one can ever appreciate a great work of art as adequately as does its own creator. It is much more intimately a part of his own being than it can ever become of any one else's; its intention, its significance, and the influence which these have continuously exerted at every stage of its arduous development, must be far more vividly apprehended by himself than by any others, even although he may be, as so many artists are, unable to translate his subjective attitude into articulate terms. But to expect him to do so is plainly to demand a practical impossibility—that is, to express himself with equal fullness and distinctiveness in two profoundly contrasted ways—aesthetically and intellectually—at one and the same time. Certainly this is sometimes possible, but only on very rare occasions; and we do not, conversely, require every great critic to be also a poet or painter or sculptor. We recognise that his developed capacity is of a totally different order; and even when he reveals aspects in a work of which its originator himself, it may be, is not clearly aware, still the minds of critic and creator, despite the singleness of their subject-matter, operate in the two widely different spheres of production and interpretation. But the essential point with which we are here concerned is that the completer understanding of any great reality, whatever its specific type may be, means that we perceive it more and more with the eyes of its own creator. Thus we discover that our first impressions were inadequate, if not positively wrong; and then it becomes plain, I think, that we cannot truly apprehend man's relation to the universe unless we employ the same principle on the widest conceivable scale. Until we do so, life and the

world must be viewed from a false standpoint and in a distorted perspective; nor can the finite mind ever achieve the unclouded illumination of the infinite. But just as His creation is a perfect manifestaton of Deity, so, in great things as in small, the attainment of this profounder insight is identical with the progressive advance of personality.

6. It is possible, in conclusion, that the creative relation between the Supreme Self and the physical universe explains, so far, that is, as explanation is at all possible, the bafflingly mysterious connection between mind and matter as we find it existing in animal and human consciousness. This is a problem presenting many highly technical aspects, apart from whose consideration it is impossible to do it full justice. Here however this cannot be undertaken, and it must be sufficient to refer to the analysis of the subject already advanced in my *Theory of Direct Realism* which may be briefly summarised as follows. We must insist, in the first place, on the absoluteness of the difference in character and attributes between matter and consciousness—between the physical and the psychical. It is hardly necessary to add that many thinkers endeavour to describe one of these classes of existents in terms of the other, or to reduce one to the level of the other. Philosophic materialists, often in an extremely crude way, maintain that mental phenomena are completely explicable in terms of matter and motion, although it is at the same time admitted that no detailed explanation of this relation is as yet attainable. In the opposite direction, it is contended either that every form of matter possesses its relevant type of mind, or that all matter is, at bottom, nothing more than a mode of consciousness or of experience. The first of these

alternatives constituted Professor W. K. Clifford's extremely interesting "mind dust" theory, and has more recently been adopted (though on a more restricted scale) by Professor Lloyd Morgan. "We may conceive," he says, "*all* physiological events, even those in the fertilised ovum or the acorn, as having mental concomitants which only the entity itself can experience or enjoy. I use the word 'mental' in its widest and most comprehensive sense. On this view there is no 'boundary' that separates events which just *are* physical and physiological in one regard and mental in the other regard."¹ Still more extreme is the standpoint of Professor Durant Drake, who regards the actual substance of matter as psychic, thus advancing a doctrine of psycho-physical identity. "I suggest that the mind is the brain . . . that the *substance* of existence, everywhere, is psychic stuff, sentience."²

Every student of philosophy will be aware that these instances can be paralleled repeatedly in the history of speculation. I have cited them, however, merely to emphasise my own rejection of both standpoints alike in favour of the view that neither can matter be regarded as a form of mind nor mind a form nor product of matter; nor again (with Mr. Bertrand Russell and some of the American neo-realists) is each one aspect of a still more fundamental existent which is neutral—itself neither matter nor mind. Matter, as Descartes maintained, is spatial or extended and resistant; consciousness is neither, though it is equally real, if not indeed more real.

¹ *Evolution* (Blackie), p. 116; slightly abridged.

² *Mind*, vol. xxxv, pp. 234, 235; cf. also his volume *Mind and its Place in Nature*.

This position, however, does not commit us to an insurmountable dualism. For despite their insuppressible contrasts, both mind and matter not only coexist, but still further cooperate in the most intimate manner, within one single universe. As I have pointed out repeatedly, protoplasm—itsself an extremely intricate form of matter—constitutes the basis of life and also, in nervous and cerebral organs, of feeling and thought ; or with more specific reference to the present problem, human personality is a unity of body and mind in almost incessant interaction.

Since, then, the Supreme Self is akin to the immaterial element of human selfhood, and is also dominant throughout the universe, it seems to me to be plain that the body-mind connection which is essential to our own experience must be regarded as representing or reproducing, on an infinitesimal scale which is none the less actual, the relation between Deity and the material world ; the one is a microcosm just as the other is the macrocosm. If it is objected anew that this is nothing more than a crudely anthropomorphic description of Deity, it is sufficient to reply that it may be interpreted, with equal justice, as a theomorphic account of man. For it is a perfectly obvious fact that as selfhood attains higher and higher levels the mind becomes increasingly dominant over the body, and in this way over the physical environment in general ; or, in converse terms, the bodily organism acts as the instrument whereby the immaterial self achieves its rational and deliberate purposes. This, of course, does not explain in detail how consciousness and brain are related to each other. It may be that further investigation will some day solve even this problem ; on the other hand, their absolute contrast may render this

always impossible. But if this should be the case, our failure will be due, ultimately, to the parallel impossibility of understanding the nature of the relation between Deity and the remainder of the universe ; and since this relation is itself the outcome of divine power, it would seem most logical to regard it as wholly beyond man's comprehension. But this cannot prevent our becoming aware of it as an actual fact ; and in that case, as I have just suggested, the familiar yet insoluble connection between the brain and consciousness becomes intelligible, at least, as the reproduction, on the smallest of scales, of the infinite dominance of Deity.

Our speculation may, indeed, be carried a little further. For from the general evolutionary standpoint it may be that it is only in and through the union of body and mind that finite selfhood can arise and function, while animal consciousness then becomes a preliminary stage in the entire advance. Thus it is that man comes upon the scene burdened with the heritage of animal passions and desires ; and just as the medieval knight won his spurs on the field of battle, so it is only in conflict with these that the race gains its inherent freedom and moral strength.

VI

CREATION AND DIVINE LOVE

1. WE must now endeavour to bring the foregoing considerations to a single focus. To regard this at the outset as being impossible, or to suppose that it can be done only on so restricted a scale as to be practically valueless, is really to imply that the universe, in the end, transcends all human concepts, not (as I have already admitted) in some directions and to some degree, but absolutely ; and this is obviously only a variant of the philosophic transcendence of Spinoza which has already been rejected.¹ Nor, again, can it be argued that even the fullest solution of the problems must after all be fundamentally inadequate ; whether this is so or not depends on the position adopted and the purpose in view. Once more it is a question of proportion, so that what is inadequate from one standpoint may still be quite sufficient from another. The poisoned arrows of the bushman, *e.g.*, are useless in modern warfare ; in his own hands and for his own ends, nevertheless, they are extremely effective ; and similarly for the products of human thought.

The present issues must be treated throughout, therefore, with direct reference to the necessities of the *human* mind, not from some position altogether foreign to this ; and they are best approached, as before, by means of analogies drawn from familiar experience. If these finally lead to conclusions which satisfy the demands

¹ *Ante*, p. 64.

both of man's intellect and his emotional nature, they must be accepted as fully adequate, since any other criterion would be unnatural and therefore illogical.

Personality, then, has been described as not only essentially dynamic, but—still more specifically—as in its highest types creative; and creation, like personality itself, has been found to be extremely diverse in its character. For it is always the objective expression—the outward manifestation—of the capacities of selfhood. It is the supreme culmination of that dominance over its environment which is inherent in the very nature of selfhood, and which operates by converting as wide and as varied a range of existents as possible into the means, first of all for its own subsistence, but still more for the incessant production of objects in which it can find positive satisfaction. The characteristic uniqueness of creation, again, is the natural outcome of the freedom of the self; it forms its own ever-new ideas, and then employs its environment for their realisation. All this is most clearly observed, as so often before, at the highest levels of aesthetic experience. But it must also be recognised that these are closely paralleled by the intellectual achievements of every able thinker and the social organisations brought into being by the greatest leaders of the race—by schools of thought and practice, parties and churches and nations. But this large-scale “emergence” must not be allowed to blind us to the equally real creativeness which operates universally, although within much more restricted spheres. For every invention, no matter how trivial it may be, is a creation so far as its constitutive principle is concerned; and its unimportance springs solely from the narrowness of its purpose and of the originating mind. Even the earliest discoveries of

semi-human and savage intelligence—of fire and raft and poison—were thus essentially creative, just as are the simple devices of the child with his mechanical toys, since into every instance alike, either great or small, there enters some degree of absolute uniqueness.

It is not, however, until the finest products of creation are considered that its really essential feature can be clearly discerned. This consists neither in complexity and ingenuity nor, again, in practical value nor even beauty. Certainly all these qualities must be present on an ever-increasing scale ; but so far as our present problem is concerned, the outstanding fact is that each new achievement alike manifests the *expanding freedom* of creative personality. For its earliest efforts are inevitably absorbed in the satisfaction of commonplace material necessities ; but as soon as this is adequately achieved the self is released from such menial service to produce whatever it pleases, provided always, of course, that it conforms to the imperious laws of the sphere within which it works—of thought or art or goodness as the case may be. Granting this, however, personality always dictates its own course and its own methods. But this fact is too often wrongly expressed in the familiar assertion that genius recognises no rules whatever, or—somewhat less inaccurately—no rules but its own. The actual truth has already been sufficiently emphasised—that all the activities of the self without exception, like every movement of a great liner, are influenced throughout by invariable law, while at the same time it selects and pursues its own course just as the liner's captain does ; and we cannot understand the nature of personality until we learn to view it as both ship and captain in one, and as possessing, therefore, the

characteristics of both fused together into a single combination ; the apparent paradox here is quite superficial. In more technical terms personal action, and especially all creative action, is *self*-determined and therefore free ; and we do not invalidate this principle by appealing to inspiration if this means that the self is degraded (once again) to the status of a psychical automaton.

2. Nevertheless, the phrase "to produce whatever it pleases" yields the clue to a further and equally fundamental aspect of creativeness—that is, to its primary motive—to the force which sustains it and drives it on. How deeply seated this motive and how powerful this force must be can be adequately realised only in the light of the almost insuperable difficulties which nothing less than genius can overcome, and which attend not merely the specific task but also the extremely unfavourable conditions of the individual's life. The work of Dante and Milton, of Beethoven and Keats and Francis Thompson, as of countless others of their peers, must be estimated not simply on its own merits, but still further in relation to that hostility of their social and artistic environment and their generally unpropitious circumstances which would be more than sufficient to prevent many people pursuing their daily duties. Associated with this is the exalted standard of perfection which alone "pleases" these creators, demanding for its attainment their most prolonged and strenuous efforts. In some isolated instances it may be sufficient to cite ambition or the desire for fame as the impelling motive ; but this is true only of the lower ranks, and never of the highest order of genius. There we must discern the still profounder motive of a love not merely indestructible but also indomitable, capable not only of sustaining the spirit

passively in the face of opposition, but still more of overcoming this and even making it the instrument of ultimate triumph. The particular objects of this all-conquering emotion may vary widely. Religion, the State, humanity at large, or it may be just their own work in itself—it matters little what ; the important factor is that which operates in all such cases alike as the indispensable dynamic element, apart from which neither intellectual nor artistic activity can maintain itself for long.

There is, of course, nothing unusual in this. It is only the clearest instance of the general psychological principle that the emotions constitute the driving force of all mental processes, while—so far as the human mind is concerned—the intellectual powers taken alone may be termed its mechanism. But the most efficient mechanism is in itself powerless, like the machinery of a great liner from which the steam pressure has been shut off ; and in the animal world it is plain that the innumerable types of passion and impulse, of appetite and desire, are the animating factors whose intense force is rigorously controlled and directed by instinct. But precisely the same is true of humanity, except for the vital qualification that the dominating functions of instinct are gradually transferred to developing rationality. This, however, does not imply that emotion either can or should be totally suppressed ; to do this is simply to destroy the motive force of the whole mind and so to dehumanise personality ; for not even the will, purely of itself, can achieve its aims. But although emotion can never be eliminated it must, once again like the energy of a great machine, always remain under effective control ; and this (still further) in no merely passive sense, but rather

by attaining the successive stages which mark the progressive evolution of human nature. This constitutes the refining—the elevation or purification—of the emotions which form the hall-mark of the really civilised mind, but which at the same time can be properly understood only in the light of the unimpaired unity of selfhood. This means that reason and emotion continuously exert a reciprocal influence, so that the refinement or heightening of feeling consists at bottom in its rationalisation—in its becoming directed more and more towards the most perfect ideals that can be conceived.

So much then for the general underlying principle, whose application to ordinary experience is easily discerned by a little careful introspection. But as I have already pointed out, it is most clearly perceived when personality has attained that highest level of development, and therefore of dominance, which constitutes creative genius. For here the emotions are not only most intense, but they are also of the purest and finest type, concerned with the noblest ends, and penetrated by the passion and intimacy which animate the infinite diversity of love ; and it is worth repeating that such an intricate combination is always a matter of the utmost difficulty. It is, in other words, comparatively easy to love devotedly for a short time or on a restricted scale—our own family or friends or occupation ; even the lowest of mankind are capable at least of this. But it actually means that we are after all but little removed from the level of the animals, which in their own way do very much the same thing ; and as soon as any worthier object presents itself our attachment becomes at best feeble and intermittent, while a little difficulty or opposition suffices to destroy it completely.

It is then only in this nobility of attitude, and above all in this indispensable depth of feeling, that the actual dynamic of creation can be discerned; and since its increased intensity has been seen to be identical with the advance of selfhood, it is quite logical to attribute to the Supreme Self that quality which the highest types of religion have always stressed—a love which, like His knowledge and power, is infinite in the sense of being perfect. In all the products of genius it is certainly the two latter characteristics which are most obvious and impressive; but this is simply because they are to some degree common to everyone, so that their objective expression is readily apprehended. Each of us, that is to say, has his own special sphere of knowledge which is at the same time the basis of our peculiar abilities, while cooperation depends on the sharing and merging of our own knowledge with that of others; and thus it is comparatively easy to appreciate its presence in the work of genius, even though its perfection far transcends the ordinary level. Hence it is that the most primitive religions ascribe little else than power to their gods; while at a later stage, as human intelligence evolves and acquires a certain independence, might becomes associated with wisdom, although both qualities may still be highly malevolent. But the development of love, on anything beyond the narrow scale already referred to, proceeds under totally contrasted conditions. Enmity and hatred are unfortunately much more natural, and therefore more readily intelligible, to the great majority of mankind, so that this attitude has repeatedly reflected itself in the concepts of Deity, vanishing only very gradually as religion attains its purest forms. Possessing so meagre a degree of love ourselves we inevitably fail,

therefore, to discern and appreciate its completest expression; and the real driving force of genius which sustains it against

The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune

remains unsuspected or misunderstood—attributed, too often, to unintelligible caprice. Even in social activities the willing sacrifices of national heroes and great reformers perplex us in spite of our sincere admiration; much more must this be the case in the unfamiliar realms of great art and pure knowledge.

3. It is quite logical, therefore, to conclude that all these aspects of the present problem must become almost immeasurably intensified when the Supreme Self is regarded as creative—when the term is applied not solely to His “primal action upon the material universe,” which in itself is a quite legitimate usage, but equally to His eternal activity within the universe in its entirety,¹ in accordance once again with the philosophic principle of Emergent Evolution. So far, then, as knowledge and power are concerned the resultant difficulties may be dealt with somewhat on the lines of my earlier consideration of omniscience and omnipotence. But it is these very attributes that constitute the crucial obstacle to the recognition of the equally inherent attribute of divine love, the objection here being almost too familiar to need citation—how can they be reconciled to the patent existence of evil and pain?

The only satisfactory solution, because it is the only rational solution, has already been suggested. Pain and evil, in the first place, are the inevitable consequences

¹ P. 123 *ante*; and on “universe,” p. 20.

of the conditions of all actual being. Their absence (in other words) would imply not merely a completely different world, but also a much poorer world in the sense that reality would have reached its highest development at a much lower level from which consciousness, together with all the richly varied content that it involves, would have been entirely absent. But the plain logic of the situation compels us to go much farther than this ; and then suffering and wrong are seen to be not merely the passive outcome of existence as it were, but the very instruments whereby creative evolution, impelled always by divine love, achieves its highest purposes. For in the sphere of selfhood they operate just as natural selection does in the lower realm of life, ensuring in the long run the "survival of the fittest" in the sense always of the noblest and most heroic, of personalities strengthened by their stern contest with evil, purified by the endurance of persecution and perfected it may be by martyrdom.

Fortunately for my present argument this contention is no abstract philosophic principle nor biassed theological dogma, but an accepted canon of aesthetic theory which cannot be better expressed than in the following passages from Professor Abercrombie's discussion of "The Poetry of Interpretation," as being the essence of tragedy, in his recent volume *The Idea of Great Poetry*. In tragedy, then, "painful things occur in a world which, as a whole, including them and all the distress they carry, is somehow profoundly satisfactory ; more satisfactory, perhaps, than any world can possibly be from which sorrowful things are excluded. . . . This is the poetry which accepts the evils of life because it can interpret them. . . . When we ask whence tragic poetry is to provide itself with good to match its evil, the answer can only be,

that the good must arise out of the evil. This is what the peculiarity of tragedy comes to: out of things evil it must elicit good";¹ and this ultimate good, he proceeds, centres always in the personality whom the blows of fate seem to have overwhelmed and destroyed. Such undoubtedly is the verdict of all the greatest tragic poets without exception; and it must be noticed that it is always expressed unhesitatingly or even dogmatically, if by this we mean without explicit argument or defence. Now this can be so only because they feel such a standpoint to be finally satisfactory, paradoxical though it must at first sight appear; and this agreement upon one of the most baffling of life's problems, among thinkers—for "no man," said Coleridge, "was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher"—who are endowed with a unique independence of mind and who (still further) cannot be described as "religious" nor "moral" in the usual narrow sense of these terms, is extremely significant, even if we choose to discount it as merely "intuitive" or emotional.² What we actually have here, once again, is that rationalisation of deep feeling which springs from its intimate unity with thought and carries it to its highest possible level; while the resultant attitude towards life and the universe finds its ample confirmation in the unvarying response which it arouses, as soon as the issue is presented to the human mind with that vividness which only tragic poetry can confer.

4. Thus the black clouds obscuring life and thought disappear in the light of that supreme attribute of

¹ Pp. 79, 170.

² But cf. Arnold's dictum in his *Essay on de Guérin*: "Poetry is interpretative both by having natural magic in it, and by having moral profundity."

Deity whose revelation crowned the vision of Dante—the Love

That moves the sun in Heaven and all the stars.

It is this that explains the infinite perfection and beauty which seem so superfluous in many things, but which find their parallel in the care lavished by genius on the slightest details of its work, knowing full well that only thus can it adequately express itself. So must every atom and cell, the treasures of "unfathom'd caves of ocean," the flower "born to blush unseen" be worthy of Himself.¹ Approaching the situation, as I suggested in beginning the present chapter, from the standpoint of human experience, its psychology proves to be quite simple. For the object of love, in general, must yield its proper satisfaction; and this principle always operates even when full satisfaction cannot actually be attained, since the demand for it persists if only as the ground of hope or faith. Satisfaction, again, arises solely from the completeness or wholeness of experience which is relevant to the ruling conditions;² and in this way love is traced to its root in the eternal desire for perfection. In practice, of course, these various factors work subconsciously (or even unconsciously) as happens in so many other directions; but they are none the less actual, so that the aim of all theory, alike in aesthetics, ethics and logic, is to render their activity and interconnections explicit. The finite mind, obviously, can obtain only finite perfection; while the term "finite perfection," taken literally, is self-contradictory, since

¹ *Ante*, p. 124.

² *Cf.* p. 40, *ante*, on intellectual unity as one of its aspects.

we have seen that "perfect" is identical with "infinite."¹ But this paradox means no more than that everything which is regarded as complete may be transcended, so that its wholeness is never more than an approximation to ideal perfection; but this, fortunately, does not prevent it affording its due measure of satisfaction to a mind which is on its own finite level. This explains, once more, the perplexing indifference of some types of mind to ordinary everyday interests; their triviality and fragmentariness have made them negligible or even irritating, and satisfaction must be sought within some larger sphere. Always where the treasure is, there will the heart be also; and when satisfaction altogether disappears love ceases, or is transferred elsewhere.

It now requires only an obvious extension of this argument to repeat my earlier conclusion that "the purpose of Deity is the existence of reals capable of becoming more and more akin to Himself";² this purpose being sustained by the same motive, in principle, as that which impels the artist to create—that is the insuppressible desire for objects which can yield him more or less permanent satisfaction and so be worthy of his love. It is true that this attitude, like every other, may easily be distorted or vitiated by becoming selfish, everything then being subordinated to individual happiness. But it is quite obvious that this is the lowest possible plane of creative activity, hardly removed from the level of child or savage. Here, as always, it is to the highest types of mind that we must turn; and then it is equally clear that the great artist is so completely absorbed in his work that he seems to have become little more than the unconscious means whereby it *brings itself* into existence;

¹ *Ante*, p. 39.

² *Ante*, p. 120.

or in technical terms, all unhealthy subjectivity has now vanished and given place to objectivity. The prolonged self-discipline, the strenuous effort, the pain and sacrifice which are the inevitable accompaniments of all great achievements, still more plainly prove that selflessness, and no longer selfishness, is here the dominant characteristic, although this description of the situation may seem to involve another paradox.

For in being concerned first and foremost with itself and its own immediate interests—which is what “selfishness” really means—the self is actually stultifying, or even in the end destroying, itself, whereas in “selflessness,” on the contrary, it is pursuing its highest possible development.¹ The paradox however is wholly superficial, since this conclusion follows logically as soon as the true nature of selfhood is properly understood. For while, as I have already suggested in another connection, the first activities of every organism must be directed towards its own welfare, this is simply in order to maintain its efficiency so that its functions within the entire realm of life may be properly performed; and throughout the plant and animal kingdoms this indispensable result is ensured by the cooperation of natural selection and instinct. The evolution of personality, on the other hand, consists in the substitution of rational control for the rigid bonds of instinct. Now reason is at first inevitably feeble, its own proper sphere being extremely restricted while, in spite of this, it must struggle to dominate the violence of the inherited non-rational elements of dawning selfhood. Such are the earliest, but at the same time the lowest and poorest, types of self from which, unfortunately, we usually derive our

¹ Cf. p. 28, *ante*, with note.

concept of its real character. But this is plainly just as illogical as it would be to regard the fungus as the ideal form of plant life, or *Amphioxus* as the highest of the vertebrates; and not until we learn to reverse this attitude and to interpret personality in terms of its fullest potentialities, can we properly apprehend its real nature. From this wider standpoint the self is seen to be, like its humbler allies in the world of life only on a much more exalted plane, the instrument or minister of Deity; no longer, of course, passively, nor mechanically so as they are but rather ever more consciously, and increasingly capable therefore of deliberate self-direction; and thus it becomes the means whereby reality advances to its higher levels. In other words selfhood is essentially subordinate to the eternal development of the dynamic Whole; and our difficulty lies in realising that, although this must always be its status, still its ultimate purpose is best attained through its becoming more and more independent, assertive and dominant, provided always that its activities are concerned first and foremost with the interests of the Whole, and with its own immediate ends only as subservient to these. But here it is sufficient to consider what is demanded of the superior officials of any great organisation—of a business firm, the civil and military services, and especially of states—to perceive that while each remains the agent of something far more important and valuable than himself, he is at the same time always its more efficient agent in proportion to his native ability and independent initiative. Now it is in precisely the same way that every personality realises its essential nature most fully only in and through this “selflessness,” as we choose to call it, simply because we fail to realise wherein the real character of the self

consists. It is scarcely sufficient, indeed, to contrast the "lower" with the "higher" self, if in so doing we intend to oppose these to each other as having little or nothing in common; we must employ instead the analogy of the fungus as, once again, the natural forerunner of the rose. The ordinary meaning of "self," in short, must be deepened and so in the end transformed.

To this it is necessary to add only the patent fact that those who are universally regarded as the noblest of mankind accept this position, and so express the principle here involved, unhesitatingly and deliberately, counting no cost nor sacrifice too great. In the sphere of great art its results are plainly visible: the immortal picture or poem or building; and similarly, though to a less degree, in thought and knowledge; but our painfully limited vision prevents our discerning its most typical products in that equally real creation of nations and smaller social groups which constitutes the advance of humanity as a whole. That the Supreme Self must therefore be supremely selfless is thus either logical or paradoxical, according to whether our interpretation of "self" retains its ordinary narrowness or becomes expanded as it demands to be. Only, if the first of these alternatives is adopted, it must be observed that not merely the nature of Deity, but also that of all human genius, becomes quite unintelligible. On the other hand the divine selflessness clearly manifests itself objectively and creatively throughout the entire universe exactly as does that of the artist in all his work; while in both cases alike, although in infinitely different degrees, this manifestation can never be properly understood except as being the expression, not only of knowledge and power, but still more fundamentally of love.

5. But love presents a further and equally important aspect. For it is not merely the sustaining and impelling force of all the highest activities, and therefore the most productive of all causes, but it also constitutes the strongest unifying agency, capable of holding within its embrace the most diverse forms and degrees of existence. It is not of course unique in this respect ; still it is peculiar both in the universality of its influence and in its ability to overcome those formidable barriers that are frequently raised by the allied factors of personality—even by knowledge and will, much more by narrow self-interests which cannot fail to become mutually hostile. But while knowledge certainly unites widely different personalities, its range is nevertheless inevitably limited since, just like material wealth, it too often isolates its possessors from their fellows ; and this is also true of man's participation in some common purpose. It is quite unnecessary here to cite envy or covetousness, rivalry and competition ; the point is that wide knowledge, taken in itself, forms a natural obstacle to any profitable intercourse between the educated and the ignorant comparable to that which severs rich from poor. In both cases alike the best intentioned effort cannot overcome the far-reaching differences in mental training and attitude ; and the resultant alienation is immeasurably intensified in the contact between civilisation and savagery, between man and animals, or even between the adult and the child. Exactly the same is true, because of their diversity and restrictedness, of the various ends which each type of personality naturally pursues. In all these cases alike the essential fact is that qualities which in themselves are excellent nevertheless constitute insurmountable impediments between mind and mind ;

and the most typical instance of this is that which has already been discussed—the transcendence of Deity arising from the very perfection of His wisdom and might. When these attributes are considered in themselves His transcendence becomes virtually actual, if not indeed (as so many thinkers have insisted) absolute ; it is, for instance, incalculably higher in its degree than the superiority of Shakespeare's mind over that of a child. Only the ablest human intellects can form some dim conception of the nature of divine knowledge and power ; once again their infinity results in so profound a gulf between man and Deity that it becomes exceedingly difficult to describe them both, in one and the same sense of the term, as selves.

With many of the emotions, on the contrary, the conditions are fundamentally different. Their capacity for closely uniting highly contrasted types of mind is much higher than is that of either will or knowledge. This is true of even the lowest and worst types of emotion ; and here again we have simply the natural consequence of the evolution of consciousness. For (as I have repeatedly observed) reason and volition emerge only as its higher levels are attained—only as semi-human intelligence slowly assumes the functions previously fulfilled by animal instincts. Nevertheless the emotions, already powerfully developed by the tense struggle for existence, can never be eliminated but only rationalised ; and this change, in principle, renders them not weaker but rather all the more effective. Inevitably, therefore, the emotional aspects of human nature are far more deeply rooted—if only because they are more primitive and ancient—than are thought and volition ; while, in virtue of their origin, they constitute an element that

is common to animal, savage and civilised man. Provided, then, that they continue to be properly developed, they provide a basis of intercourse which must be very far-reaching ; and it is almost superfluous to add that all this is truest of love and its allies—of sympathy and compassion. For although love, like every other emotion, reaches its finest and at the same time its most intense forms in humanity, inspiring alike the artist and the hero, it is, although in a different way—as instinctive, that is, rather than as rationalised¹—one of the strongest factors throughout the individual and social life of the highest animals. Thus it constitutes an inseverable bond between types of mind which are not merely widely diverse in themselves, but which tend to fall farther and farther apart as their intellectual and volitional characters continue to evolve. Only, provided this development pursues its proper course, the sphere of love's influence is thereby unceasingly expanded, so that in the end it unites the greatest genius to his little child, reconciles the fiercest enemies and enables man to transcend the barrier separating him not merely from the animal, but also from the material world.

Again, therefore, and without appealing to mystical experience, or revelation or theological dogma, it is

¹ This word may still cause some difficulty, in spite of what I have already said. What I mean is this. If we take Browning's

“ O lyric love, half angel and half bird
And all a wonder and a wild desire— ”

it is obvious that this (like all similar utterances) expresses the purest type of emotion ; and the point is that this becomes possible only as mind becomes capable first of conceptualising its feeling-experience, and secondly of giving the resultant ideas articulate yet at the same time beautiful form. All this is due to the influence of reason and so constitutes rationalisation.

quite sufficient to give these principles their due logical expansion to perceive that the creative activity of the Supreme Self must be sustained by a love which, though as being divine it must infinitely transcend all human passion, still remains one with this in its essential nature. And just as it is his love which unites the ablest thinker to the infant child, the great artist to his work, the noblest of men to their fellows, no matter how ignorant or poor or even wicked they may be, so the love of Deity binds His whole creation to Himself. Therefore it is that everything is in its purpose and intention worthy of Him, and that the ultimate end of the creative process lies in beings whose nature becomes more and more closely akin to His own.

VII

DIVINE HOLINESS

1. IN the preceding chapters the divine attributes have been considered in their distinctiveness from each other. As the attributes of a single Self, however, they are at the same time unified, though once again such unity must not be regarded as abolishing their distinction. It therefore becomes necessary to indicate this unitary character specifically; and for this purpose the most suitable term appears to be holiness. It is true, of course, that since unity pertains to personality as such, no further category seems to be required. Personality itself, however, presents almost infinite variations; even a satanic personality, I suppose, is logically conceivable just as it is imaginatively possible. Thus we require a concept which absolutely excludes all suggestions of this type; and this appears to be the underlying meaning of the word "holy," although, like many other highly significant terms, it unfortunately tends to become restricted or emasculated in popular usage.

In the present connection its etymology proves to be of interest, since it is closely connected with health, healing and haleness; more remotely with the Greek adjective for "beautiful," and finally with wholeness, which is indeed an obvious variant; early English identified these different features, as in the passage "they that be whole need not a physician." Thus we return to the ideas of completeness and perfection, which it is illustrative to find subconsciously combined in "perfect health."

Similarly, then, "holiness" denotes the intimate union of the highest of all conceivable qualities to form a single whole. But this is the meaning already assigned to "absolute"¹ so that we again arrive at the same final position. In assigning "absolute" to philosophy, however, we appear at first sight to give the term a predominantly logical or intellectual sense.² Holiness, on the other hand, has now acquired a fundamental moral or ethical significance, although its original implications, in common with those of all divine attributes, were connected with sheer power and so with fear and awe. The holy must at first be safeguarded or even avoided as "taboo"; to approach the sacred building or grove is dangerous, and may be fatal to any but the initiated. This attitude persists almost unchanged even when wisdom and love supervene upon mere power, as can readily be discerned in many current religious observances. This characteristic feature of the higher types of religion, however, is too easily misunderstood. It is true that similar emotions may be aroused in the modern worshipper as in his savage predecessors; but it is at the same time essential to observe that the ground or cause, the object or motive, has been fundamentally altered by becoming ethicised—by being placed, no longer on the basis of power alone, but still more on the distinctively moral basis of supreme goodness—that is again, in its usual sense, holiness.

It is extremely curious that this divine goodness, in spite of being so closely associated with wisdom or love, still remains forbidding and hostile. Much of the ancient taboo still lingers about it, so that its demands must too

¹ Cf. *ante*, pp. 25, 119, notes.

² This is further confirmed by its frequent employment in law and science; *e.g.* absolute decree, absolute zero.

often be minimised and its resentment placated somewhat as the savage pacifies his angry deities. Surprising as this cannot but seem in its connection with modern religions, we shall find that—like other self-contradictions—it finds its natural explanation in the ruling conditions of the moral situation.

Deferring this point for the moment,¹ it must now be observed that “absolute,” though first and foremost a philosophic term, must not on that account be restricted to a purely intellectual—much less intellectualist—significance. For in signifying completeness and perfection it should be taken literally, so as to mean complete in every possible respect—perfect in every conceivable mode. Thus we attain Spinoza’s conception of Deity possessing infinite attributes; but this position, most unfortunately, repeatedly tends to become vitiated by too great an insistence upon divine transcendence. In Spinoza’s system this aspect is explicitly emphasised; God is essentially incomprehensible to the human mind.² Similarly in some of the later developments of Hegelianism “Absolute” means “Whole” or “Reality” in a predominantly formal sense, since no concept whatever is adequate to express its essential nature. Thus the idea, although never explicitly noumenal as it was for Kant, undoubtedly tends to become practically noumenal by becoming elevated to an inaccessible height, or refined away to an unintelligible limit. Against any such tendency I have maintained that our conception of the transcendence of divine attributes must be obtained by intensifying to the utmost the content and significance of the highest ideas we can actually form—of power, knowledge, love, purpose and goodness; and in this

¹ Cf. further, p. 243 below.

² Cf. *ante*, p. 63.

manner Deity becomes not transcendent *of* all knowledge *etc.*, but rather transcendent *in* these attributes—a totally different conclusion.¹ The same consideration applies to Mr. Bradley's use of "experience" as expressive of the nature of Reality; and hence there arise two principles of fundamental importance.

2. In the first place, the qualities assigned to Deity, while undeniably transcendent in the sense just explained, are not therefore wholly incomprehensible, although it is equally true, on the other hand, that no finite concepts whatever can interpret them *exhaustively*. Once again it is a question of degree, of approximation, of continuous expansion and increasing profundity. Every attribute alike, in being thus transcendent, does not pass utterly beyond and away from the finite forms which we actually experience, but remains allied with these in its essential nature. This has been insisted upon in another form by Mr. Bradley, who maintained that all appearances without exception are real—real that is so far as they go; and I have already pointed out that this principle is not invalidated by his further contention that appearances are "absorbed" or "transformed" in the Absolute. "Everything which appears must be real. Appearance must belong to reality . . . it cannot be elsewhere than in reality, and reality excludes discord." Similarly with Hegel: "common fancy," he observes, "puts the Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly before us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without express consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it." ² We are

¹ Cf. *Personality and Reality*, p. 116.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 140. *Logic* (Wallace), p. 50. Cf. p. 56 *ante*.

fully justified, therefore, in employing our highest concepts—provided we recognise that this of itself elevates them still further—to enable us to apprehend the divine nature, even though we can never attain more than “broken lights,” but must always “see in a glass darkly.”

It is still more important, indeed, to apply this principle conversely. For we find that as each of the capacities just referred to advances, its complete character can be adequately understood only in the light of its as yet undeveloped possibilities. At first, and during its initial stages, its nature seems to be fully disclosed by its actual content, severely limited though this is. If, for instance, we desire to describe knowledge or emotion we indicate its patent manifestations within ordinary experience; and this of course is quite legitimate, being in fact the only method we can pursue. But the most remarkable feature of the situation is that, as these activities continue to develop, such descriptions, obvious though they seem to be, soon prove to be seriously inadequate. This is true throughout all the most valuable spheres of experience; it applies equally to life and art, to selfhood and religion; and the reason is in every case the same. Their earliest forms are but immature germs or unopened buds which point beyond themselves and indicate the more fully developed forms in whose terms their own properties must ultimately be explained. This is plainly true of the young flower and the animal embryo; but in all such cases as these there exists an uppermost level which is not surpassed. When, however, we turn from the organic to the spiritual realm this final stage tends more and more to recede, although in any given instance—in the individual artist or thinker—the development is at last arrested; in nations or churches

on the other hand, or in cultures like science and history, it becomes very difficult or even impossible to discern any absolute barrier whatever. In more technical terms, all such immaterial systems are self-transcendent, and sometimes infinitely or inexhaustibly so ; from which it results that the true nature of art or knowledge (for example) can be fully disclosed only by their hitherto unrealised achievements. Every advance in knowledge carries it nearer towards, and at the same time gradually transforms it into, that all-comprehensive intuition already discussed in an earlier chapter.¹ In the same way all its specific contents are seen to be aspects of the real whole, so that only when viewed from this unfamiliar standpoint can cognition and its objects be properly understood. Similarly primitive superstition proves to be the forerunner of the highest types of religion, while these (it may be) are approximations to yet more intimate communion with the universe or Deity. Other parallels readily suggest themselves ; and we need therefore only give this general principle its due expansion to perceive that finite selfhood and its essential qualities must all be interpreted, so far as this is possible, in the light of the divine attributes, despite their infinity and transcendence. Their mutual relation, in other words, is not exclusive as the earlier applications of "transcendent" and "infinite" imply, but on the contrary reciprocal ; quite logically, therefore, each level may be employed to illuminate the nature of the other.

3. The second consideration (alluded to at the end of the first section of this chapter) arises naturally from what has just been observed. For if "holy" is at bottom equivalent to "absolute" it follows that the latter term

¹ P. 60 *ante*.

should be given much more than a predominantly intellectual significance. It undeniably carries this wider implication; in view of what has already been said upon the unity of divine omniscience and omnipotence this is indeed inevitable. But the widely current impression that the word denotes either the incomprehensible or the purely logical is due to the wholly perverse criticism that has for so long been accorded to Hegelian idealism. Fortunately for philosophy, the justice of Lord Haldane's protest is slowly being recognised: "No philosophical doctrine," he observes, "has been more misrepresented, or given to the world in a more distorted form than has been Hegelianism in current literature."¹

It is quite sufficient to recall my previous statement that "Absolute" denotes the whole of reality to perceive that it must include far more than thought and knowledge alone, fundamental though these always remain; although (as I have already observed) this principle must be qualified by the formality of the meaning that the term has gradually acquired, and which, taken purely in itself, goes far to justify the familiar attacks on the "block universe." In this respect, however, the essential point is quite simple. For however varied and intricate the nature of reality may be, it is only by means of thought—only as the content of knowledge—that it can be *explicitly* apprehended by finite mind. Neither Hegel himself nor any of his great British expositors has ever denied that the universe can also be intimately responded to in widely diverse ways—in art and emotion, in mysticism, morality and religion; on the contrary, few thinkers have placed more emphasis on these forms of experience

¹ *The Reign of Relativity*, p. 344.

or done more to elucidate their true value. We need think only of Hegel's work in aesthetics and the philosophy of religion, of Dr. Bosanquet's analysis of ethical, constitutional and political principles, and of Mr. Bradley's, Dr. McTaggart's, and Caird's labours in the same field, to perceive the injustice of accusing them of being academic and formal. It is true that they all stressed the importance of logic ; but this was always in its deepest and most concrete sense ; and if other writers would do the same much of the reigning confusion would speedily vanish. " Bad taste is bad logic, and bad logic is bad taste. Logical exactitude in the full and true sense is not a deadening but a vitalising quality " ;¹ these assertions, which can readily be paralleled in the other writers just named, indicate the wide influence exerted by a vigorous logic ; whence it follows further that " the things which are most important in man's experience are also the things which are most certain to his thought." ² For invaluable though the non-cognitive aspects of experience undoubtedly are, still it remains true that their contents can neither be adequately understood nor even clearly presented to the mind until they have become elucidated by thought and systematised within knowledge. That is why, as the general level of mind rises, all forms of artistic production become supplemented by able criticism,³ the springs of conduct formulated in ethics and religious mysticism expounded in theology ; while (as I have repeatedly argued) the character of thought itself also changes as its work proceeds,

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (Bosanquet), pp. 7, 59.

² *Ibid.*, Preface.

³ But again in its deepest sense, not in any merely narrow and hostile spirit ; rather always as sympathetic interpretation.

so that instead of remaining analytic and discursive it becomes more and more synthetic and intuitional. This must not be taken to mean, however, that every artist or mystic must also be a formal thinker. Here as elsewhere specialisation must be the rule, provided always that as intimate a *liaison* as possible is maintained between the various departments of spiritual activity.

We are thus reminded of the Platonic "Good," not in the modern restricted moral sense of the term, but as at once the most fundamental and comprehensive idea and the supreme real within which all other reals are subsumed. In the same way Deity, as omnipotent, omniscient and creative love, is supremely good. It is then this conjunction or interfusion of perfect attributes that is implied by holiness, being also foreshadowed during the long evolution of the concept from its often repellent primitive stages; while its significance ever remains capable of further unlimited expansion. Like Plato's "Good," therefore, "holy" possesses a meaning much wider than that of "moral" in its ordinary usage; and although it presents the formal aspect of unity, this formality—which attends all important terms without exception—must always be associated with the concreteness of the divine attributes.

4. But while the term must always be given the fullest possible significance, it appears to me that Professor Otto, in his widely read volume *The Idea of the Holy*, has developed this position in the wrong direction. It will already be clear that with much of what he says I am in complete accord—so far, that is, as the vital importance and value of the non-rational elements of experience are concerned; and this with reference not only to religion, but equally to art and practice.

I have insisted throughout that unless these factors continue to evolve, thought and knowledge must themselves cease to expand. At the same time this does not justify us in affirming any such fundamental contrast or antithesis as Professor Otto maintains between "the mysterious" (as a cardinal element in the nature of Deity) and "the absolute": "the absolute exceeds our power to comprehend; the mysterious wholly eludes it. The absolute is that which surpasses the limits of our understanding, not through its actual qualitative character, for that is familiar to us, but through its formal character. The mysterious, on the other hand, is that which lies altogether outside what can be thought, and is, alike in form, quality, and essence, the utterly and wholly other."¹

This standpoint, in my opinion, at once commits us to that conception of transcendence which I have repeatedly criticised as erroneous. It is, of course, possible that my disagreement here arises from Professor Otto's use of the terms "rational," "thought" and "conception" in consonance with the long-standing traditions of German philosophy; in this connection the contrasted significance assigned by Kant to "understanding" and "reason" is well known to every student of the subject. But I believe that the source of our difference lies much deeper than this, so that it would persist no matter how these terms were interpreted; while to pursue these points specifically would involve a long technical discussion of epistemology which is here quite impossible. It must be sufficient to consider the function of reason within human experience, and its relation to the inseparably allied emotional or feeling elements.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 145, 146.

So far, then, as the foundation of man's attitude to Deity is concerned, we are compelled to exclude that transcendence *of* all human capacities which, at the end of the first section of this chapter, I have contrasted with transcendence *in* these capacities. I have already admitted that Deity possesses other attributes of which we can form no conception, simply, however, because they do not in any way whatever fall within the sphere of human experience; they cannot therefore affect us—cannot arouse any emotion except that arising from the consciousness of our ignorance. In this sense, of course, Deity may be quite rightly described as “mysterious.” But this does not justify us in regarding this aspect of the divine nature as alone being essentially and predominantly, must less exclusively, holy. This, however, is what Professor Otto appears to do: “the non-rational mystery is experienced as supra-rational, as of profoundest *value*, and as holiness in its own right.”¹ Waiving the obvious objection that to be aware of anything as of “profoundest value” is in itself to apply one of the most familiar of all categories, his standpoint raises a far more serious difficulty. For it really erects an impassable barrier between Deity and man and thus relegates the former to a completely inaccessible region; Deity becomes, in short, exactly what Professor Otto calls it—the “wholly other.” But if this is literally the case there can arise no response whatever on the part of man to Deity, or at least to the “wholly other” aspect of Deity; each is cut off from the other beyond any possibility of contact and influence.

It may be replied that, as an actual fact, this is precisely the manner in which primitive religion always envisages

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 157; *cf.* p. 28, on “mystery.”

the divine—as the utterly unknown that is none the less vividly encountered throughout all experience. But while this is obviously true, again it does not justify the contention that the non-rational (or supra-rational) as “wholly other,” is exclusively the characteristic of the holy. For quite apart from the abject terror which is the perfectly natural consequence of this attitude, its real explanation is to be found, not in the nature of Deity, but simply in the character of human experience at these its lowest levels, little removed as they plainly are from the animal plane. At this point it again becomes necessary to apply the evolutionary point of view, without, however, insisting here that the human mind has itself developed from that of animals. It is quite sufficient for my present purpose to point to the undeniable evolution that has occurred in man’s own experience, and to compare its different stages with the character of animal consciousness. In this respect the essential point is the one already alluded to, no matter how we may choose to explain the contrast—that is the total absence of developed rationality below the human level, together with the immense preponderance of the emotional factors, as compared with the intellective, during all the earliest phases of man’s existence; the inevitable result being the close resemblance, during this period, between the human and the animal mind.¹

Now the intense emotions of animals are aroused by objects and agencies whose actual character, from the very nature of the case, lies quite beyond their comprehension, since “comprehension” in its proper sense

¹ It must be observed that the term “mind” is here employed in its widest psychological sense to denote not intellect only, but the totality of experience or of consciousness.

does not yet exist. The forces of Nature most intimately affect the animal's life therefore quite apart from its cognisance of them as what they really are ; and the experience of primitive man is plainly very much of the same order. So far as he is concerned, then, there occurs nothing more than a blind and almost automatic reaction whose sole value is biological, except in so far as it contains the germ of his higher capacities. Yet man, even under these conditions, is undeniably religious ;¹ as I have already observed, his sense of the holy—of mystery and taboo—is more powerful than perhaps in any other instance except that of great mystics. Despite its intensity, however, his religious experience—like the entirety of his experience—is as yet in only its primary stages ; and this inevitably affects his moral sense. His idea of what is good (using this term once again in a very general sense) remains crude and perverted, although at the same time remarkably rigid and strict ; and it is essential to observe that this is largely due to the sheer mystery which he feels to attach both to his gods and his world ; the good, for him, is simply what pleases or placates these spiritual powers. The savage is thus no longer the subject of almost pure emotions² like the brutes, who are aware of neither mystery nor Deity ; yet his dawning capacity of thought reveals to him only what he can never understand. Here then we find all the fundamental elements, as Professor Otto presents them, of the holy, the mysterious, the “ wholly other ” ; and although they are present in their least developed form, still the crucial question is

¹ I have emphasised this principle throughout *The Development of Religion*.

² “ Pure ” of course in the psychological sense of the word, not the moral—not yet allied, that is, with intellect and will.

whether, as mind and religion together attain their higher levels, the holy must always retain, as its distinctive criterion, a character that "wholly eludes our power to comprehend . . . lies altogether outside what can be thought and is the utterly other." ¹

To this question Professor Otto seems to give an unqualified affirmative; the holy must be freed not only from "its moral factor or moment" but likewise from "its rational aspect"; ² and while I myself regard this point of view as radically mistaken, still there is much in the history of man's spiritual development that appears to support it. For the most obvious outcome of his expanding intellectual abilities is that crudely anthropomorphic polytheism which almost indelibly taints even the highest monotheism and tends to reduce Deity to the status of a "magnified, non-natural man"; and if we are compelled to choose between any such result as this on the one hand, and the utterly elusive, supra-rational and supra-moral holy on the other, there can of course be no hesitation in selecting the latter. But it is the fundamental contention of the present and its companion volume that we are by no means committed to these absolutely antithetic alternatives. Undeniably the former, inevitable though it is as a natural stage in the advance of mind—somewhat as embryonic gills mark the development of the body—must be, and is in fact being, transcended. But the second, taken with the absoluteness given it by Professor Otto, is in reality nothing more than the unqualified acceptance of the familiar principle, *omne ignotum pro magnifico*; it is upon this that primitive man always unconsciously acts.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 145, 146.

² P. 6.

Unfortunately, the gradual reduction of the sphere of the *ignotum* always brings with it a parallel disappearance of the *magnifico*. Familiarity breeds contempt; and man comes to believe that he understands the universe completely, in terms either of the medieval heaven and hell or the modern matter and motion. But this is really quite illogical; and just as the second of these two attitudes is a reaction against the first, so the still wider expansion of knowledge is gradually revealing the highest possible form of the transcendence of the universe. Thus the *ignotum* disappears, but *magnifico* remains. Transcendence of our profoundest concepts (to repeat) gives place more and more to transcendence *in* these. The holy ceases to be obscure save in the sense that it is

dark with excessive bright.

It is not (in other words) severed from, but one and continuous with, the comprehensible. Not of course that the divine attributes are in themselves purely rational or intellective, nor again can they ever be exhaustively apprehended by any finite mind. I have already definitely excluded both these suggestions; and in exactly the same way neither will nor feeling is *identical* with thought, although at the same time their natures can undoubtedly be investigated and ever more fully understood. Similarly all the divine attributes are in principle comprehensible, but in their completeness only by divine reason. Deity, in other words, can be fully understood only by Deity.

Once again no adequate analogy is available here; still a somewhat commonplace illustration may make my argument a little clearer. The ordinary individual

can under no circumstances understand the activities and contents of the intellect of a Newton, whose ideas and logical processes utterly transcend his powers of conception. The terms and symbols, arguments and conclusions, all alike remain devoid of definite meaning ; they are in fact literally mysterious.¹ But this does not imply that such exceptional capacities are "utterly other" ; rather is the contrary true in two important respects. In the first place the general principles and the broad outlines of the discoveries of a Newton or an Einstein can be quite clearly apprehended by persons who can never grasp the necessary technicalities ; and the application of this fact to "divine revelation" is obvious. But (secondly) it is plain that even such a transcendent mind must possess its own definite constitution, or structure or organisation. It is not, that is to say, unordered, much less chaotic ; it is, in fact, incomprehensible to lower orders of intelligence just because its nature or constitution is in this way both so far ranging and so intricate. So far, then, is it from being "utterly other" than the everyday mind that it constitutes the highest stage of development which the average mind can achieve, and is therefore continuous therewith.

I have elaborated this analogy in its bearing on reason ; but it is equally applicable to feeling and will—to the transcendent level of the emotions of a great artist or the practical genius of a Caesar or Napoleon. And although I have already admitted the profound inadequacy of any analogy whatever, still the extension of the one here suggested enables us, I believe, to interpret divine holiness in a manner fundamentally different from that adopted by Professor Otto.

¹ Contrast Professor Otto's treatment of mechanism, p. 28.

5. These conclusions must now be interpreted in accordance with the principle of the supremacy of Deity as being the Supreme Self within the universe. This implies that His immanence is never merely passive nor (again) formal, but rather dynamic—incessantly creative and effective. The universal process, in other words, is the expression or manifestation of His nature ; alike in its structure, its order, its purpose and beauty, it bears the imprint of His wisdom, power and love—that is (since these must now be conjoined) of His holiness. I do not mean of course that all this is patent to casual observation. Not thus can the infinite reveal itself to finite mind ; on the contrary, our first impressions must necessarily be far from the actual truth, if not positively erroneous. This is the reason—the perfectly natural reason—why we misinterpret the existence of pain and death, and regard so many aspects of the world as inherently evil. I have already explained the sense in which evil is undeniably real and not a mere illusion. “ Evil, from the very nature of things, has a certain inexpugnable status and function ” ; it is nevertheless “ in the long run self-destructive,” so that “ the universe itself is not evil but good.”¹ But this, as the experience of the individual and of the race plainly shows, can be perceived only after strenuous intellectual, aesthetic and moral effort. Exactly in the same way the actual structure of the physical world can be discovered only through extremely difficult scientific investigation, which even yet is very far from finality ; and just as this intricate structure plainly indicates what the infinity of divine knowledge really consists in, so we must be prepared to interpret divine holiness as far transcending all our own highest ideals.

¹ *Ante*, p. 109. Cf. *The Development of Religion*.

This attribute, once again, must be regarded as manifesting itself throughout the character of the universe ; and in this respect two serious errors should be guarded against. It is a mistake, in the first place, to seek to restrict holiness to the Supreme Self exclusively. To do so is obviously to overstress transcendence at the expense of immanence ; and as a consequence He tends, as so frequently in primitive religion, to become severed from or even hostile to the world. But it is just as impossible to limit holiness entirely to Deity in this way as it is to confine artistic ability to poet or painter if they are considered wholly apart from their creations, since it is in these that their genius expresses itself necessarily and inevitably, so that if this does not occur genius cannot be said to exist. This analogy however, though quite legitimate so far as it goes, is somewhat defective in being concerned with products that are in the main unchanging or static ; and this, again, is due to their having attained the highest possible degree of perfection, so that to alter them is to impair or even destroy them. The universe however, as I have repeatedly insisted, is of a totally different character. For while it certainly exhibits static characters—while it everywhere possesses fixed structure and definite organisation—these are always subordinate and instrumental to its dynamic evolutionary advance. The second error to which I have just referred consists, then, in ignoring this unceasing development ; for it is in this that divine holiness becomes most fully and specifically expressed, although at the same time it is also immanent throughout all the static phases of existence.

This principle may be expressed in other terms by saying that holiness is manifested in every stage of the evolution

of the universe, provided always that stage is taken in its entirety.¹ At first sight, as we have seen already, such a standpoint appears to overlook or deny the existence of evil—to regard evil either as unreal or as itself a distorted form of the good. Here I can only appeal anew to my earlier insistence on the positive nature of evil and to my argument that, when viewed in its relation to the whole, its unceasing elimination is seen to become subservient to further advance. Only in this sense then does every stage of universal evolution express divine holiness; while, as being the basis or foundation of higher development, each stage alike is the instrument of its yet fuller realisation.

6. But since the holiness thus manifested throughout the universe is that of the Supreme Self, it follows that it must characterise the divine purpose and will which have already been shown to be His essential attributes and therefore perfect. This is only another aspect of the principle that His creation is worthy of Himself, its ultimate end being the formation of selves that possess, to the greatest possible degree, the perfection of His own nature. The majority of the current presentations of this conclusion, both ethical and theological, unfortunately give it much too narrow an interpretation resulting from the restricted meaning of "moral" and "conduct." These terms are almost universally confined to the practical affairs of everyday life—to social intercourse in its commercial and political aspects—and to individual character mainly as it bears upon these mutual relations. Their importance plainly cannot be overestimated, since they sustain the entire structure of

¹ Cf. further, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, p. 298, on "Duration," with footnote references.

society, so that any defectiveness here must inevitably be serious or even fatal. But in thus constituting the indispensable basis of civilisation, they are obviously instrumental (as is universally the case) to what is of much higher value than themselves. Once again we must give the terms "good" and "self" their fullest possible meaning, much wider than is implied by the ordinary significance of "morality," simply because (as I have already argued) their highest forms and therefore their actual nature are divine. The ideal development of personality thus demands its expansion in all directions, so far as possible, simultaneously—in art and knowledge equally with "practice" in its usual sense. This of course is not to abandon the sphere of "conduct," but rather to expand it until it becomes—as it should be—all-inclusive; nor again is it to substitute aesthetic or intellectual criteria for ethical. It is, on the contrary, to ethicise no longer a mere part but the whole of life, while at the same time its boundaries are expanded and its content enriched so that (as its etymology implies) "wholeness" becomes identical with "holiness"—a "wholeness" that is always self-transcending because it is inexhaustible.

This standpoint, however, must remain unattainable so long as the divine nature continues to be inadequately apprehended, and identified therefore, as in primitive religions, with power alone or with power allied with wisdom yet devoid of love. This ancient and pernicious tradition, as we have seen already, is still extremely influential,¹ seriously distorting ethical concepts by directing conduct towards practices which, while largely formal, are yet supposed to placate a hostile Deity,

¹ *Ante*, p. 150.

thereby tending to divorce "morality" from all spontaneous expressions of personality, as well as from art and knowledge. These are in reality its natural allies, despite the ease with which they become vitiated whenever they are isolated from the entirety of experience. Only when infinite knowledge is perceived to be one of the divine attributes, and the beauty of the universe regarded as the manifestation of the divine nature, can their pursuit be brought within the sphere of the widened concept of duty; while if merely utilitarian standards are still accepted as predominant, it should be obvious that their culture refines and elevates "practical" life if only by diminishing its ugliness and crudity. These considerations, however, introduce the important subject of the relation between man and Deity, which will be developed in the next chapter.

VIII

MAN AND DEITY

(I) DIVINE SUPREMACY

I. FROM the purely intellectual standpoint it is natural that any detailed consideration of the relation between man and Deity must to-day seem either useless or presumptuous. At first sight the only possible attitude would appear to be either that of absolute agnosticism, which founds itself on the intrinsic unknowableness of the divine nature or (what is in practice the same thing) the insurmountable limitations of the human mind, or (secondly) that of the theological variant of agnosticism which stresses the incompetence of the unaided reason alone to comprehend Deity, even while it supplements this by admitting the logical validity of revealed truths or of mystic experience.¹

Both points of view have much to say in self-defence and express aspects of the situation which must not be ignored. But I have already, I believe, made the most ample concessions to these methods of treating our problems by insisting throughout, first on the inexhaustibility of truth and secondly on the principle of divine transcendence. Even the weightiest emphasis on these features, however, does not condemn us to either variety of agnosticism. In the first place the weakness of human

¹ "Although faith is above reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason . . . not only can faith and reason never contradict one another, but they mutually aid one another." *Roman Catholicism* (Coxon), pp. 27, 28.

reason by no means debars it absolutely from this province, any more than the limitations of the child's mind exclude it completely from mathematics. For the logical principles underlying its elementary processes are identical in their essential nature with those which govern the intuitions of a Newton or an Einstein; so that if the former are invalid so are the latter. Or, to employ a simpler if cruder illustration, the fact that I shall never possess all the wealth in the world does not prevent my limited means providing for my needs; while (secondly) divine transcendence itself implies an equally real immanence.¹ If then we interpret "immanence" literally, we must conclude that so far as it is open to our investigation—and in this respect it is plainly impossible to limit the possibilities in advance—the real universe is itself an adequate manifestation of the nature of Deity.² As I have argued previously, His creation is worthy of Himself; once more therefore, "if you seek his monument, look around you."

But despite the significance of these conclusions, the paramount consideration at this stage lies in the selfhood of Deity. For this at once implies that, whatever may be the detailed features of His relation to man, they are governed throughout by the fact that it is a relation between selves. Personality is face to face with personality, even though one is finite and the other infinite. For the infinite is at the same time immanent; "the Absolute" (as we have found Hegel maintaining), "is directly before us," inescapable even while transcendent.³ Now there are two fundamental characteristics of personality—it is dynamic, and it is free. It enjoys, that is to

¹ Cf. *Personality and Reality*, chap. x, sect. 1.

² On "Universe," cf. p. 20 *ante*. ³ *Ante*, p. 124.

say, a certain degree of real freedom of choice or will or action ; it matters little which term is adopted, since each describes one aspect of the entire complex situation ; action, will and choice being inseparable from one another. We may further expand this assertion by adding (first) that the dynamic self is also in some measure dominant, and (secondly) that its freedom is based upon its rationality. But this obviously leaves the general principle unaffected ; and it should be superfluous to add, in view of all that has already been maintained, that as selfhood evolves its rationality, its freedom and its dominance likewise increase simultaneously. Thus the philosophic foundation of the relation between man and Deity consists in the truth that the Self whose dominance is supreme and universal, whose wisdom is perfect and whose freedom is absolute, confronts a finite self possessing the same attributes, although in a limited degree. This contrast however, incalculable though it is, does not destroy the underlying kinship in their nature. This kinship remains fundamental ; and here again we may employ the analogy, remote though it is, of the difference between infancy and genius.

2. Accepting this as our basis then, it is clear that from the philosophical point of view the interrelation of Deity to man must be extremely complex. This however need not prevent its religious aspects being described as simple, in the sense that it may be initiated and sustained by spontaneous effort, and that its conditions may be appreciated by any and every level of mind no matter how primitive. But this again does not mean that religion itself is absolutely simple ; it is, on the contrary, one of the most intricate types of experience, alike in its original and in its developed forms. This is true whatever

definition of religion is accepted, but particularly so if it is regarded as "the response or attitude of humanity, when this response is taken as a real *whole* or explicit *unity*, to the Universe, likewise taken as a whole. In both respects the emphasis must be laid upon *wholeness*."¹ The simplicity which it undeniably presents must thus be compared with the parallel simplicity of the aesthetic response, wherein it results from the thorough unification of the multitudinous factors involved. Many and varied though these always are, still they become so intimately fused together that they operate as an indivisible artistic whole, thus producing the familiar impression of absolute immediacy; but this, like the closely allied immediacy of religion, clearly exhibits its intricacy to psychological analysis.

What then are the further implications of the governing principle of the selfhood of Deity? The first and most important is the absolute *supremacy* of divine personality—a supremacy that I have already maintained to be literal and not formal, autocratic and not limited, and so universal and eternal. With regard to His relation to the material universe this absolute dominance is clearly manifested in the invariable necessity of natural laws—in the definite structure of matter, highly intricate and plastic though this is, and in the fixity of physical processes or "the uniformity of Nature."² Such a standpoint inevitably raises a number of highly debatable questions, whose detailed discussion however would involve too great a digression. It must therefore be sufficient to say that there are, in my own opinion, no

¹ *The Development of Religion.*

² Cf. *Personality and Reality*, chap. ix, "Mechanism and the Supreme Self."

grounds whatever for regarding the changes in the physical universe as in any degree contingent or fortuitous, and therefore as unpredictable except, of course, as the result of our inevitable ignorance. Every increase in knowledge, on the contrary, appears to me to establish more and more firmly the absolute necessity of structure and process throughout the realm of matter and energy—the unvarying connection between causes and effects when these occur under the same conditions. If we choose to describe this standpoint as one of the chief postulates of science, then it is a perfectly justified postulate which gains further support from every addition to knowledge.

It follows from this that the laws of Nature, provided of course that they are valid, express this actual necessity of real existence. These laws are also, obviously, the products of human thought and therefore conceptual. But this must not be taken to mean that they are all merely abstract nor artificial, nor again nothing more than working formulae or summaries of phenomena which themselves are contingent. Undeniably many laws are of this character—those (namely) which are just on the point of formulation or which are admittedly hypothetical and suggestive, arising as these do on the outer confines of investigation as this incessantly expands. The advance of scientific knowledge, however, itself consists in the systematic modification of this body of indefinite laws or concepts—in their rejection or retention in accord with their coherence both with already established principles and with the ever-widening content of experience; and the ultimate result is that they become what I have just called them—the articulate and valid expression of the “actual necessity of real existence.”

So far as knowledge itself is concerned this real necessity reflects itself most unmistakably in what is commonly termed "mathematical necessity"; and this in its turn is only one type of "logical necessity" in general—of that necessity which plainly governs the more abstract regions of thought. It need scarcely be added that within this wide province it is everywhere inescapable, so that unless it is implicitly obeyed validity or truth-value is destroyed. But since even logic and mathematics—much more, therefore, their allied sciences—are at bottom concerned with some forms and aspects of the real universe, it follows that their characteristic necessity is closely akin to, or even identical with, the necessity which rules the processes of Nature; while to return to our own problem, this real necessity is the manifestation within Nature of the absolute dominance of Deity.

But we must go much farther than this, since we cannot limit this conclusion to the physical sphere alone. For as soon as the organisation of matter attains the requisite level of complexity it constitutes the medium or basis of life; and in this further respect the principle of the necessity of all natural processes must equally be maintained. In the realm of living matter therefore, just as in the non-living, there exists no pure contingency, no fortuitousness, accident nor indetermination. On the contrary, the far higher degree of delicate intricacy possessed by all vital organisation itself demands a much greater precision of structure and adjustment, exactly as in the case of a complex machine like a good motor engine or accurate timepiece; and this contention again, despite the arguments of both old and new vitalists, appears to myself to gain fresh support from the spread of

investigation.¹ Even if we choose to regard life as being an entity quite distinct from protoplasm, still the processes occurring within living matter itself are, in my own opinion, interconnected by causal sequences that, although they are much more complicated, are nevertheless just as invariable as those of non-living matter. Nowhere in the gradual transition from one to the other is there any absolute break nor cessation of unvarying causation, although the resultant increase in the complexity of structure and function inevitably makes it much more difficult, and in countless instances, indeed, impossible for these exact causal relations to be discovered. But here again there is a quite familiar mechanical analogy. For current science is in the same position as an apprentice who does not yet understand the structure of machines which to the capable inventor present no difficulty ; and biological investigation is gradually revealing the marvellous mechanisms which underlie respiration and nutrition, heredity and sex.

3. The entire material universe therefore, both living and non-living, is subject to that absolute necessity which characterises all its structures and governs all its processes ; and thus it unmistakably expresses the literal supremacy of Deity. But this principle must now be carried still farther and applied equally to the immaterial or spiritual universe, *i.e.*, to the realm of consciousness and reason, of ethics and personality. In general terms, obviously, this has been done already in maintaining that Deity is always and everywhere supreme ; and while there is, I believe, little difficulty in

¹ Cf. an excellent summary of the situation in Mr. Needham's "Mechanistic Biology," in *Science Religion and Reality*, pp. 219 sqq.

perceiving that this is true of the physical world, we have still to consider in more detail the much more difficult question of its bearing upon morality and selfhood. For here the problem at once arises of reconciling this literal supremacy with that real freedom which I have throughout maintained to be essential to human personality. Both of these principles must be conserved in unimpaired integrity. On the one hand, mankind must not be reduced to the level of material things helplessly in the grip of physical necessity, nor again must his sense of freedom be regarded as merely illusory—as a beneficent self-deception which blinds him to his actual bondage. Not only does man feel and believe that he is free, but he really is so. From the psychological point of view, his consciousness of this capacity possesses a firm basis in his constitution, although it must at once be added that his freedom is always limited, never infinite nor absolute as is that of the Supreme Self. But on the other hand, man's freedom, though real, must not be taken to restrict nor impair the supremacy of Deity ; we cannot therefore accept in this connection the familiar conception of a " limited God." The divine supremacy, on the contrary, is *always* an absolute supremacy, just as we have found it to be in the world of matter and energy. But throughout the spiritual sphere this absoluteness manifests itself in a different way. It will be recalled that evil has been described as essentially self-destructive, simply because it consists in the end in opposition to the irresistible tendencies of universal evolution. Similarly the evil or wicked self is such because it deliberately—that is to say, freely and from its own volition—chooses in some way or other thus to oppose the advance of the good ; precisely how does not matter, since it may obviously be attempted in

innumerable ways. Any complete discussion of this subject would demand an analysis of the nature of good and evil such as I have outlined in *The Development of Religion*. Here it must be sufficient to add that the distinctions involved are always distinctions of degree, though this must not be taken to mean that the contrast between evil and good becomes unreal and finally disappears ; it is, on the contrary, one of the most fundamental contrasts in the universe. But—as is indeed patent—a bad action may be committed without its real character being clearly realised ; and in such a case the evil nature of the agent is to some extent minimised. This, however, in no way affects the truth that man is free to oppose the upward tendencies of the universe, if for any reason he chooses to do so ; free to select the lower good instead of the higher, or to place purely personal interests above those of the Whole as these are expressed *e.g.* in the well-being of his fellows and the organisation of society. Under these conditions, whatever specific form they may assume, personality is evil and therefore in the end self-destructive, because it is opposing itself to the irresistible tendency of the Whole.

Here then we find the essence alike of the moral situation and of ethical theory : (a) in an actual personal freedom, (b) in the manner in which this freedom is employed, and finally (c) in the ultimate consequences of such choice and action—consequences which are just as inevitable as are those of any physical process. For there is no difference whatever *in principle* between the material world and the moral world ; all their profound contrasts arise simply from the differences in the governing conditions—between unconscious physical objects on the one hand and rational beings on the other. It is therefore

a fatal mistake to isolate the sphere of morality and ethics from all other types of phenomena and regard it as *sui generis*, or as entirely immune from analysis and criticism because its constitutive elements, such as selfhood and will, cannot be fully comprehended by the rational intelligence. It is undeniable that this apprehension is a matter of the utmost difficulty ; but this is not because the self is spiritual nor mystical nor noumenal, nor again because the nature of its freedom (as Kant and James maintained) is unintelligible, but only because every factor with which we are concerned is both extremely complex and extremely delicate.

The entire realm of moral experience, far from being unique, is on the contrary most intimately connected with aesthetic and intellective experience. I have already referred to that irresistible pressure upon the mind of rational or logical necessity, which literally forces us to pursue definite lines of thought and accept their conclusions because (as is often said) these are "mathematically certain." ¹ But it is of course impossible to confine this principle to mathematics and its developments. Exactly the same is true of the necessity of legal arguments which compel a judge or a jury to adopt decisions frequently repugnant to their feelings or even their moral convictions ; and the further application of this principle to still more practical aspects of individual and social life needs no detailed illustration. Legislation, education, and in fact all rational intercourse must in the long run conform to this severe yet at the same time flexible logic.

4. Here then we discover an *immaterial*—or if the term is preferred, a spiritual—necessity, which is nevertheless

¹ Chap. iii, sect. 3, beginning.

fully as irresistible as any natural necessity whatever ; while just because it is so, to oppose it leads always to more or less complete self-stultification. To accept invalid premises and illogical conclusions is plainly suicidal ; and this not only in pure theory but equally in practice, since systematic disregard of the laws of health or violation of economic principles leads to precisely the same result simply because it is the extension of the same method, by applying false theory to practical affairs. Occasionally, of course, this is done with full deliberation, as when a person wilfully indulges in harmful pleasure, or a statesman pursues an uneconomic policy for partisan reasons ; while just as in pure thought, persistence in such courses is inevitably disastrous.

Similarly again in the aesthetic sphere ; so far indeed as this is itself intimately connected with the relevant types of knowledge, we are plainly dealing with the same conditions under a different aspect. But even if we choose to separate the realm of art from that of thought it still continues to be governed by the same principle, since the artist, like the mathematician, can defy the laws of his own domain only at the risk of failure and oblivion ; which means that these laws are just as rigorous as those of logic on the one hand and of duty on the other. At this point, therefore, we pass into the sphere of moral experience proper wherein, again, reason and knowledge play an indispensable part which is, however, unfortunately too often underestimated, while on the other hand, it is almost universally regarded as ruled by the unquestionable imperatives of duty. The strictly theoretical validity of these dictates may of course be questioned ; they have, as is well known, frequently been referred to mere instincts, habits or customs which,

despite their irresistible force, possess no rational bases whatever.¹ But this in no way affects the patent fact that to violate certain principles of conduct is still more fatal, alike to the individual and to society, than the defiance of the canons either of thought or of art. The penalties follow more swiftly and on a far wider scale, so that the fall of empires and the decline of nations are the outcome of a "moral selection" which acts just as ruthlessly as does natural selection in the world of life. But since its influence affects beings that are incomparably more complex than even the highest animal species its results are inevitably more difficult to observe. Hence arises the too prevalent impression that there are no principles whatever at work here, but that (apart from religious beliefs) all is fortuitous and inexplicable—a standpoint that is really on the same intellectual level as the attitude of a savage towards eclipses and natural catastrophes in general.

The plain truth is that throughout the *whole* of man's experience—which means wherever he comes into contact with the environing universe, either on its physical or psychical levels—in its material or spiritual aspects—he is faced with one and the same absolute necessity which operates with equal rigour, though under widely different forms in the realms of Nature, of thought, of feeling and of conduct. Thus it is that Deity manifests His supremacy over His entire creation. Unconscious objects and unreasoning animals, swayed in the one case by physical forces and in the other by non-rational instincts, remain directly subject to this supremacy, whose purposes they all fulfil, each in its own way, without being able to

¹ My own detailed position has been expressed in *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*.

recognise its nature. Man alone, in virtue of the developed rational powers inherent in his selfhood, becomes able more and more clearly to apprehend the universe that has originated and fashioned him. But inseparably united with the evolution of his knowledge is the expansion of his freedom, since it is in the light of this knowledge that he increasingly determines his own actions, thus differing fundamentally from the blind and passive instruments of instinct or energy. As it stands, of course, this is a most inadequate summary of that age-long process of evolution whose intricacy demands a detailed description here quite impossible. Merely to call it an "evolution" however means (first) that reason and its associated freedom have developed gradually—and indeed still continue to do so—from the more primitive animal level, and (secondly) that they are as yet extremely imperfect, since they still remain subject to the powerful distorting influence of the non-rational attributes—of unreasoning emotions and desires. So far as this is the case, human freedom (as I have already observed) is inevitably limited; it is only as reason acquires an increasing dominance that these limitations can be overcome and freedom more fully attained. Everyone is to some degree the victim of passions and appetites inherited from our animal ancestry.¹ Occasionally again, these become uncontrollable, it may be permanently so. But the essential point is that, so far as this is the case, the individual has sunk below the distinctively human level and approached the lower condition from which mankind is slowly emerging. Every outburst of bad temper suffices to show the truth of this,

¹ It is, of course, a serious error to regard these as all harmful or bad. On the contrary they furnish the raw material for some of man's highest qualities, *e.g.* courage and love.

alike in body and in mind, in action and expression. It is plain that for the time being reason has abdicated and the civilised self has succumbed to the savage or even the tiger ; so that to describe his impulses as uncontrollable means precisely that he has become their slave and has therefore ceased to be free. Only as rationality returns—as he becomes calmer and more self-controlled—can he be regarded as civilised or even as human, since apart from this recovery he remains imbecile or insane. But this “self-control,” in essence, constitutes the ability to apprehend the conditions ruling any given situation, to appreciate its possibilities of action, to weigh their various consequences and, finally and most fundamentally, to choose, deliberately and freely, what line of conduct will be followed, always of course in the light of the knowledge available at the moment. This last consideration is essential, though it is often forgotten in discussing these problems. But the range of the agent’s freedom, obviously, must vary in proportion to the knowledge possessed ; if he knew more (or less) he would plainly act differently. But while this is always an important factor, it does not affect the principle that actions arising from the knowledge that actually exists are *free* actions. An ignorant person is inevitably blind to the possibilities that are open to one of wider insight. Within the narrow limits of his own knowledge, nevertheless, he is undeniably free ; he can reflect and deliberate to some extent no matter how restricted this may be ; and the resultant actions express the outcome of *his* deliberations exactly as do those of the ablest statesman.

5. Thus we discern (on the one hand) the absolute supremacy of Deity, expressed in the eternal evolution of the universe, and (on the other) the real freedom of

human will and action, which may therefore become directed either in accordance with, or in opposition to this evolution. In the first case action and the self are good, in the second evil ; and at this point the invariability of causation must be taken into account precisely as in the world of matter and energy. For every moral act,¹ good and evil alike, produces its due effects exactly as does every physical change ; again, as before, there is no difference whatever in principle between the material world and the immaterial or spiritual. There is always, however, the far-reaching difference in the relative complexity of these two spheres. For as I have previously observed, it is the comparative simplicity of the physical realm that makes it possible to trace out the definite interconnections of specific causes to specific effects with that marvellous accuracy which characterises the modern physical sciences. Contrasted with this is the much greater intricacy of the psychical world, wherein causes and effects, while equally real and operative, are so inextricably interwoven that it is practically impossible to isolate and distinguish them. Hence the almost universal impression that causation has altogether ceased to function ; hence, still further, that radically mistaken idea of personal freedom as being equivalent to pure contingency, which has already been discussed. The truth is quite otherwise ; the " cause " is now the incalculably complex self, and its " effects " the imperceptibly delicate influences which it exerts both externally throughout its entire environment, and internally upon its own

¹ " Moral act " is really a redundancy, since every deliberate action without exception is moral—is either evil or good. Similarly with " free will " ; the will is always free just as a circle is always round.

plastic constitution, which is definitely modified either for good or for evil, for better or worse, by every action, and indeed by every thought and emotion.

It must be observed that on a broad scale, and in general terms, this position is unhesitatingly adopted. All education *e.g.* is based upon it ; certain causes are systematically brought to bear upon the child's mind in order that, many years later, certain known effects may be produced ; and similarly throughout legislative and other types of social amelioration, or in the complicated fields of finance and economics. The individual, again, recognises that effort and habit modify his personality definitely and profoundly ; so that in every case alike we are just as convinced as the engineer or the physician that exact causal connections exist if only they can be discovered. This is, unfortunately, seldom possible on any scale that is at once extensive and precise. When therefore we are investigating a large range of phenomena we must rest content (like the ancient astronomers) with vague approximations and defective theories ; and in those rare instances when a cause can be discovered and indisputably linked to its effects the limits of our success remain as yet extremely narrow.

In principle then the connection between cause and effect is everywhere invariable and necessary ; and at this point a further important aspect of the situation must be considered. For when these effects are viewed in their relation to the agent himself—that is in the light of their influence upon his own character and circumstances—they assume the form of penalties and rewards.¹ They still plainly continue to be causative ; if *e.g.* I infringe the

¹ The agent may of course be a social group instead of an individual.

law the effect is a fine which is also a penalty, just as the effect—and likewise the reward—of thrift is financial security. Both in ethical theory and in actual conduct it is certainly inexpedient to lay undue emphasis upon these factors; but it is at the same time impossible to exclude them entirely as some moral purists endeavour to do. The question of their due importance forms a large problem¹; here we need only generalise our present conclusion to perceive that we are once again concerned with the unceasing reaction of the universe upon the moral agent. The effects of his actions not only radiate throughout his environment but also rebound upon himself in the form of “penalties and rewards.” Whether these are material or spiritual, external or internal, immediate or deferred, natural or legal, in no degree affects the truth that in the one case they tend to destroy the self,² in the other to expand and develop it, in endlessly different ways that need not be specified. All alike exemplify that “moral selection” which has already been identified, in principle, with natural selection in its characteristic inevitability.

In this way, then, divine supremacy maintains itself in the moral or spiritual realm precisely as it does in the natural or physical. Their differences, profound though they plainly are, are only differences in methods and in detail, not in essentials. The moral and the aesthetic spheres, like the intellectual and the material, all fall within one universe and under one Deity. “Morality” therefore (as Butler said), like physics or chemistry, “is the nature of things”; only, since Deity is the Supreme Self, His being must plainly be more completely manifested in the immaterial world than in the physical. It is just

¹ Cf. *The Development of Religion*.

² Again, either individual or social.

as impossible for Him to express Himself adequately in the latter as for an artist to do so in the mere marble or colours that are nevertheless the indispensable instruments of his triumphs ; and this implies that the term "moral" must be freed from its conventional narrowness, and accorded the same elevated significance as "aesthetic" in its highest sense.

6. The present problem in its entirety then, as I observed at the outset, is so extremely complex that the foregoing analysis is far from being adequate to all its intricacies. Yet a simple illustration is sufficient to exhibit its essentials. When an ordinary player engages in a match with a chess champion he enjoys, to begin with, undeniable freedom in the choice of his moves. His freedom is, of course, restricted throughout by the rules of the game which when duly observed are extremely rigorous. Similarly human freedom is always subjected to the "laws of nature"—that is of the environing universe ; these are the rules of the game of life, and in both cases alike any infringement incurs an inevitable and often severe penalty. Here then there exists an actual, though always limited or conditioned, freedom. But just as, if these drastic rules did not exist, there could be no game of any kind higher than childish amusements, so, unless inviolable physical and spiritual laws incessantly operated, there could be no universe such as we know this to be ; there could be no system, no order, and therefore no reliability nor possibility of foreseeing the future. The familiar protests against the invariability of Nature's laws—the demands to

Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire—

are thus exactly as unreasonable as a request to

alter the rules of chess from a player who is losing the game. In both instances alike there exists an absolute necessity which must be unquestioningly accepted from the outset ; the only possible alternative is to refuse either to play or to live, as the case may be.

This "absolute necessity," then, is equivalent to a literal supremacy which is however clearly not inconsistent with a real freedom. But still further, in such a game as is here supposed the final issue would be practically a foregone conclusion, since apart from something resembling a miracle the master would win. To challenge him with any hope of victory is therefore futile ; and to challenge—to seek successfully to resist the tendency of universal development is infinitely more futile. But it is in this, as has been seen, that evil essentially consists ; so that the evil self is comparable to a player who, with no special abilities, challenges the present chess champion ; despite his freedom, his defeat is certain before he makes a single move, and the utmost he can do is to defer it for a little while.

It is highly instructive, again, to observe that as the game proceeds he himself contributes to this defeat, which thus becomes from one point of view a *self*-defeat ; similarly all evil, like all intellectual and aesthetic error, ultimately results in self-stultification. For the more skilful player, while all the time allowing his opponent perfect liberty of choice as to what he shall do, repeatedly takes advantage of his tactics in order to compel him to adopt a course that speedily brings the game to its conclusion ; so that in the end his very freedom becomes fatal. *Any* choice he may make—even to play no longer—leads to but one result ; in other words, to a very large extent he defeats himself. In the same way

all evil, as it continues, tends more and more to its own complete destruction ; it is merely a futile challenge to the universe, or rather to the Deity who is supreme within the universe.

We need only approach this situation from the reverse aspect to obtain a parallel illustration of the nature of good and of the good self. For exactly the same laws that inflict defeat upon a poor chess player enable the expert to achieve and maintain his secure position. He has mastered all the rules and tactics of the game ; none is ever infringed except—like his opponent—at the cost of a penalty. Nor again are his repeated victories easy, except to the eyes of persons blind to the realities of the case ; they are, as always, the result—that is once again the effect, or if we care so to regard them, the reward—of years of strenuous training and concentration. In all games, and similarly in all art, these are the indispensable conditions (first) of success, but (still more fundamentally) of that expansion of personality which marks every expert and every genius ; and again, the more rigorous the laws of any specific activity, the finer are both the qualities that are developed in observing them and the finished products. This is one reason why the greatest artists are immortals ; human selfhood, in their case, has attained its highest pinnacle.

Still pursuing my original illustration, the good self may thus be compared to the chess champion. By incessant effort it has mastered and endeavours to observe some of the drastic rules of the game of life or laws of the moral realm—that is (again) of the universe in one of its most important aspects ; and in so doing it maintains in some manner the onward advance of the Whole, just as the evil self seeks to retard it. It should be superfluous

to refer to the intense difficulty of such an attitude, not only in the accomplishment of its aim—that is in the struggle against all forms of evil—but equally in the severe discipline of selfhood that is demanded. For the greatest obstacles of all are not without but within ; they arise from those powerful non-rational elements of our personality which played so vital a part in the experience of man's semi-human and animal ancestry, and which require therefore an incessant control. Man's most insidious foes are thus elements of his own primal self—those tendencies which in animals themselves, rigorously governed as they always are by instinct, fulfil functions perfectly natural. Not until these have come under the dominance of reason is the self fitted to play its part in the world ; for apart from this (as I have already observed) it remains at that sub-human level to which every onslaught of passion reduces us ; and in all this there is nothing that is not already quite familiar and unquestioningly acted upon in the realm of sport. Not until a player has proved his capacity in a long series of minor games can he hope for inclusion in an international team, while only by continued self-discipline can he maintain his place there. So it always is, and so it always must be, in the great game of life which the race plays in the arena of the universe where continued decline in moral “ form,” like the loss of physical “ form,” incurs the penalty of elimination. But this raises a further problem which will be considered in the next chapter.

IX

MAN AND DEITY

(2) EVIL AND ATONEMENT

1. IN the preceding chapter the relation between Deity and man has been presented firstly as a relation between selves, and secondly as based upon the absolute supremacy of Deity. Hence arises the apparent contradiction between the freedom that is inherent in all developed selfhood on the one hand and the actuality of divine supremacy on the other. At first sight it seems impossible to maintain both principles in their literal sense ; either freedom becomes illusory and is therefore abolished by supremacy, or this is invalidated by any real freedom and so becomes limited instead of absolute. I have endeavoured to show, however, that human freedom is always a conditioned freedom, and conditioned in such a way that the due observance of its governing conditions invariably results in its illimitable expansion. In this however there is nothing whatever paradoxical, nor even unfamiliar ; for all life is conditioned in precisely the same manner, so that the ultimate outcome of these regulative conditions is the entire advance of organic evolution ; while the evolution of the inorganic world is another case of the same order, but on a relatively simpler level.

Still further, I have argued that these "governing conditions" are throughout their whole extent the manifestation of the divine supremacy. They constitute

causes and effects invariably connected as we know them to be, so that the moral realm, exactly like the vital and the material, is everywhere subject to causation. But it is causation of an extremely complex type ; and hence the baffling difficulty, which always exists in this field, of definitely relating given effects to their actual causes. These are at once so innumerable and so delicate, so intimately woven together and so sensitively balanced, so closely similar to one another and so gradual in their operation, that any adequate analysis is rarely possible. Thus there arises also the further important consequence that the course of events can frequently be delayed or even reversed, in striking contrast with that rapidity and directness of operation of physical causes which it is impossible to suspend, much less avert. We inevitably obtain therefore the erroneous impression that life and mind, conduct and social intercourse, escape the grasp of that necessary causation by which the lower material world is controlled, and exhibit instead "indetermination " or contingency.

The truth is the exact contrary. Causation (as I have argued throughout) is universal, but the contending factors in the immaterial sphere are so sensitive and so delicately opposed that they produce incessant variations which appear to yield no permanent effects whatever, but only transient and intermittent changes. Thus it is that national decline may be arrested and a new era of greatness begin, or the degradation of an individual be converted into higher achievement than ever before, or, as is more usual, efforts towards improvement alternate with indifference or evil ; and once again it is rarely possible to discern any definite and indubitable causes. But precisely similar types of phenomena abound in the

worlds of life and matter : *e.g.* the varying spread and restriction of species alike in time and in space, the loss and recovery of health, seasonal and tidal changes, or on a yet larger scale the transition from the ice age to modern climates. In all these cases, moral and non-moral alike, the basal conditions are the same—the interplay of highly intricate combinations of causes one against the other, so that now one group prevails and now another until finally, under the influence of the environment taken in its entirety, a definite and often unprecedented step is taken in the advance of the universe.¹

Thus the moral self is a microcosm which undergoes the same course of change as the macrocosm. However fluctuating its momentary variations may appear to be, the final result is unmistakable, expressed as it always is in what we call personality or character, which in the end becomes, for good or for evil, almost unalterable ; and we must now consider the further bearing of these principles upon the relation between Deity and man.

2. In this connection the divine attributes of immanence, holiness and love must be recalled—in addition of course to those of selfhood and supremacy which have just been referred to as foundational. I have maintained that divine immanence is both actual and universal—that is in no degree formal nor limited ; and this implies that every self, no matter how trivial it may seem, exists in an unbroken and direct relation to Deity. The issue here is, of course, an ancient one ; the concept of Deity as that “in Whom we live and move and have our being ” ever conflicts with the belief

¹ *E.g.* the division of stellar masses ; mutations ; conversion, either political or religious.

that man is only a negligible accident in the universe. The latter impression, alike to our ancestors and much more to ourselves, is extremely difficult to avoid. Yet that infinite delicacy and precision of structure, which we now know to characterise the material universe throughout its vast extent and incalculable history, unmistakably implies that every atom and every electron play their due parts—it may be indeed an eternal part—in the evolution of the Whole ; so that to modify the organisation of a single atom would be to alter the universe. That this is no exaggeration is clear from Dr. A. N. Whitehead's recent description of the influence exerted by these infinitesimal elements. " As long ago as 1847 Faraday remarked that his theory implies that in a sense an electric charge is everywhere. The modification of the electromagnetic field at every point of space at each instant owing to the past history of each electron is another way of stating the same fact." ¹ Nothing whatever then is negligible ; rather does every factor without exception fulfil its proper function in due cooperation with all others. It is perfectly logical therefore to apply Dr. Whitehead's principle to the self, subject to the vital qualifications that it enjoys a unique degree of freedom and partakes, no matter in how slight a degree, of the personal nature of Deity.

But this, plainly, must render their mutual relation much more intimate than in the case of even the entire physical world ; for, as I have argued in *Personality and Reality*, its perfect automatism implies divine transcendence ; it fulfils its rôle within the divine purpose mechanically and automatically. The self, then, exists

¹ *The Concept of Nature*, p. 146 ; cf. the more familiar examples given there.

in unceasing relation to divine immanence. But this, as has been seen in an earlier chapter, is always the immanence of divine love which sustains the eternal purpose of Deity, manifesting itself in that interplay of causes and effects from which selfhood can never escape ; for its every action must entail its due effect, good or evil as the case may be. Universal causation therefore, already described as the expression of divine supremacy, is at the same time the expression of supreme love tending always towards the production of beings worthy of itself. Hence it is that all evil, in operating as a cause, ultimately effects its own destruction ; while all good, on the contrary, results in its continuous expansion. Thus we are once more led, though by a different route, to the principle of divine holiness as underlying the nature of all reality and governing all its processes without exception. It is in this light therefore that the relation of man to the universe, or (what is the same thing) to Deity, must be interpreted.

We have just found that Dr. Whitehead traces the influence of every electron to its "past history" ; a fact of the utmost significance in its bearing upon our present problem. For if the history of the simple electron is thus important, much more so must be that of the incalculably more complex self, since its history—that is the totality of its earlier experience—in fact makes the self what it is at any given moment. But it must now be recognised that the past history of anything, together with all that this has involved, is absolutely unalterable ; and the general impression that effects may be cancelled or eradicated is true only when we take into account some extremely restricted portion of the entire effect which, in its *entirety*, is ineffaceable ; it

must ever remain indelibly engraved upon the universe. Just as every movement permanently alters the earth's centre of gravity, so every breath changes the constitution of the atmosphere; and to extend this principle to thoughts and actions is needless. It plainly means that the self must always carry with it the legacy of its own past. For by this it has been made, so that to seek to escape is to essay the impossible task of escaping from itself—of changing in a single moment the outcome of its entire history. This must not be taken however to mean any loss of selfhood's inherent freedom. To a vitally important degree the individual has *made himself*, and will continue to do so; the point is that this product, at any given moment, at once becomes a causal factor in determining its own future. Quite apart from philosophic theory, this is obvious in actual experience; what I now am is very largely the result of all my previous conduct, and it is this same "I" that will modify itself throughout my whole future. Even those apparently exceptional cases in which self-development has been rendered impossible are not real exceptions, but serve on the contrary to establish the principle. Serious disease or insanity, *e.g.*, so mutilate personality that it can no longer control its own development, and to this degree therefore its freedom has been destroyed. But this plainly means that the burden, which is again the effect of definite causes, profoundly influences the individual's future career; so that when he attempts to recover normality it is with the self, thus made (or unmade), that he must deal.

Of course such a recovery, both bodily and mental, often occurs, sometimes suddenly and (with our present knowledge) inexplicably. But this again does not

affect the situation here being considered; for the ultimate result is fundamentally different from what it would have been if the calamity had never happened. Its indelible traces persist, if only in memory; and whenever the individual has himself contributed to the disaster he is always the first to deplore it.

I have selected such extreme instances, and these as concerned with evil and its consequences, because they most clearly illustrate the issue. But it is, I think, equally obvious that exactly the same is true of goodness, while ordinary experience, although it never presents such outstanding features, is also ruled by this principle. In all cases without exception therefore the past determines the future, and leaves its indelible traces upon every personality—a truth expressed equally in the familiar proverb “as a tree falls . . .” and in Omar’s “The moving finger writes . . .”

3. To all this we need add only the undeniable fact that human personality, taken at its best, always includes some elements of imperfection and positive evil—of ignorance, error and illusion both intellectual and aesthetic, together with that deliberate choice of the lower good instead of the higher in which moral evil essentially consists. It is unnecessary to trace out the detailed manner in which this naturally results from the evolution of selfhood, with its inevitable heritage of animal tendencies; it will be sufficient to accept it as constituting the staple alike of actual moral experience and of ethical theory, and to pursue in this light the subject of the present chapter.

For it at once implies, in my opinion, that the self can never fulfil its ideal *rôle* in the universe, for two reasons. In the first place it cannot eradicate the

consequences of the evil that it has already wrought, whether wilfully or not ; and in the second, the internal or subjective effects of its own errors are (simply in being *effects*) likewise indestructible, and must therefore constitute an irremovable handicap telling heavily against all future efforts. Its nature, in short, is contaminated, partly as the result of conditions beyond its control and partly because of its own deliberate evil ; while the latter inevitably enfeebles the will to some degree, and so infects the very essence of personality. The self may thus be compared to a bodily constitution that has become permanently weakened by the effects of serious disease (such as malaria or sleepy sickness), and in this way prevented from ever attaining complete health by its own unaided efforts, which are in this connection as futile as the attempt to raise oneself by one's own waist-belt.

I take this conclusion to be a patent psychological fact which needs support neither from ethics nor theology ; nor do I wish to appeal to any extreme forms of the theory of the Unconscious. It is equally true that the individual's own efforts towards recovery count for a great deal, as is sufficiently evident from current psychotherapeutic methods ; but even if these could ever be completely successful, still the past would remain unchanged beyond any possibility of adequate retrieval. If any wider appeal is at all necessary, it is enough to observe two further well-known features of human experience. The first is the striking unanimity with which those who appear to their fellows to have attained what Aristotle called "excellence" deplore their own ignorance and weakness, alike intellectually (as in Newton's familiar saying) and morally ; while to claim

either type of such "excellence" is an unmistakable symptom of self-deception or—still worse—of priggishness or hypocrisy.¹ The second fact is the deeply seated desire to atone for evils that have been wrought and to refuse forgiveness on any other terms—that insuppressible instinct, lying at the root of honour, to render adequate compensation even when this has become impossible. So far as ethical theory is concerned, it is precisely with these outstanding factors of concrete experience that it is called upon to deal; to ignore or to discredit them is simply to mutilate our subject-matter beyond recognition and in defiance of all the canons of rational enquiry. They are indeed enshrined in the finest traditions of the race; the immutability of fate and the inadequacy of remorse are the fabric of all great tragedy.

If now we substitute "Deity" for "fate" we are compelled to accept this conclusion; the finite self (to repeat) "can never fulfil its ideal rôle in the universe" in the same way that the constituents of the material universe perform their due functions, although automatically and unconsciously. Here the question of responsibility calls for brief consideration; and it is sufficient to point out its inseparability from freedom; for that each logically involves the other is the basal principle alike of practical morals and of law. In so far then as man's actions are deliberate, their consequences are attributable to himself alone; while because such consequences are always effects they are unalterable. If it is further argued that man, like the atom, is but the product of conditions beyond his own control, again it

¹ Cf. the satiric characterisation of Marcus Aurelius—"a great and good man—and he knew it"; also the technical criticism of Mr. Bradley in *Appearance and Reality*, cc. ix, x.

must be emphasised that these very conditions have made him free to choose what he recognises to be the good. In other words, not to be free is not to be human, and so to fall outside the scope of the present problem ; to be deprived of freedom is to become either a chattel or an animal.

But in spite of all this the necessity to " fulfil its ideal rôle " remains ever inescapable, expressing itself (as has repeatedly been observed) not only morally but also aesthetically and intellectually. In the last two instances, again, its demands are very rarely repudiated, being on the contrary actually welcomed, so that to attain " excellence " in knowledge and art ceases to appear as duty simply because it has become a delight. Here however, as before, it is quite impossible to isolate the moral aspects of experience from its allies ; and precisely the same principle underlies the sense of honour and the tortures of remorse ; there is the keen consciousness that a possible ideal has been betrayed, a possible opportunity lost—*il gran rifiuto*. This is plainly of profound significance, since it proves that the ideal is recognised as an *attainable* ideal, not as an impossible one ; for while in that case failure may be regretted, still honour is maintained intact and remorse becomes unreasonable. The ideal, still further, is always relevant to the circumstances of each particular case ; we do not demand the same response from the child as from the adult, from the ignorant as from the wise. But this again makes no difference to the fact that we are concerned throughout with ideals, and with attainable ideals that have been *deliberately* forsaken.

It is therefore illogical to deny the " categorical imperative " of morals while accepting it without

hesitation in art and thought, recognising that in these spheres the consequences of its violation, however severe they may be, are nothing other than the natural effects of natural causes. Everywhere alike, therefore, causation and necessity are manifestations of divine supremacy; the moral realm is one with the aesthetic and the intellectual. Each is ruled by the same demand to pursue the highest good relevantly to the given conditions of any individual case; while at the same time no finite self, because of the inherent imperfection with which we have found it to be burdened, can either make an adequate response to this demand nor escape the consequences of its violation.

4. The obscure recognition of this truth—the indefinite yet poignant consciousness of this relation between man and his universe—has forcibly expressed itself at every stage of the long development of religion: in prayer and sacrifice, in prophecy and invocation, in all the countless forms of faith and hope and despair. But since the incessant conflict between thought and emotion too frequently results in the disparagement of the latter, our present over-intellectualised age regards with mingled wonder and scorn the ceremonies, rites and superstitions whereby our ancestors manifested their uncontrollable responses to the spiritual environment—as indeed many still continue to do. One might just as reasonably adopt this supercilious attitude to the tempestuous outbursts of a child; for in both cases equally the emotion, taken in itself *as* emotion, is quite well founded, however curious its outward forms may appear to the eyes of sophisticated moderns. It hardly requires the recent developments in psychology to emphasise the obvious fact that such irresistible emotions

are but the effects of powerful natural causes. Reverting then to primitive religion, the root cause of all these phenomena undoubtedly lies in man's vague but overpowering sense that he has failed to fulfil the imperative demands of his universe, no matter in what crude conceptions of offended and vindictive gods he may have expressed this belief; while the slow expansion of his intelligence and knowledge yielded the fuller realisation of the actual content of these demands, forcing upon him the conviction that they would always transcend his native powers. Hence the expiations and sacrifices, penances and communions, fastings and rhapsodies, that have marked his eternal search for spiritual peace.

It is plainly impossible then to disparage this combined emotional and practical attitude of mankind; to do so is simply to misread human nature; while the suggestion that it is merely the outcome of priestly artifice has become altogether too ridiculous. Priesthoods—being, like every other institution, intensely human—may have modified and even exploited the religious instinct to the full; but they certainly could neither generate it nor sustain it; they simply became the recognised organs of its expression, like the modern M.P. in relation to political convictions. The only question that remains, therefore, concerns the rational foundation of this almost universal moral and religious standpoint; and if my foregoing arguments—based, I may repeat, not on theology but on the psychology of human experience—are valid, then it unquestionably possesses a sound logical basis. We are driven to the conclusion that man “can make no adequate response to the demands by which he is confronted, nor escape the consequences of their violation.” “To seek to escape is to essay the impossible

task of escaping from himself—of changing the outcome of his entire history.”¹

It must here be observed, however, that any such position as this is almost wholly retrospective. For every established religious or moral system maintains its influence because it appears to achieve the desired end in its own distinctive way—to placate the injured Deity, to atone for the past evil, or otherwise to restore harmony within man’s experience; in what specific manner does not concern the present enquiry. On the other hand, the entire evolution of religion may be said to consist in the repeated discovery that the hitherto accepted methods directed towards this end were fatally inadequate. Again the details are superfluous; it is enough to point out that it is this incessantly repeated protest, assuming new form in each generation, that has sustained the long advance of religion, thereby continuously purifying, elevating and at the same time rationalising its primitive forms by giving increasingly systematic and articulate expression to the ever-present underlying emotions.² But throughout these protean changes, simply because it is the perennial origin and basis of them all, there persists the ineradicable conviction that man’s own power alone is wholly inadequate to its spiritual task. For the very heightening of his actual achievements of itself expands his ideals, which thus inspire and defeat him in one and the same moment; and again, although we are here discussing the moral situation, there is nothing in all this that is *exclusively* moral. For exactly the same holds true of art and knowledge; their ideals likewise show themselves to be

¹ *Ante*, pp. 201, 196.

² Cf. my *Development of Religion*.

infinite and therefore never exhaustively attainable. The only difference lies in the fact that there are after all subordinate aspects of experience which moral conduct, in being paramount and universal, must include within itself. This is the reason why thought and art can never be absolutely divorced from morality; why the maxim "art for art's sake" can never be exclusively maintained; and why our judgment of an individual as a man or a citizen must always claim precedence over his purely intellectual or aesthetic standing even if he is a genius.

5. These considerations bring into prominence a further well-marked characteristic of the development of religion. For man's increasingly firm conviction of his own spiritual helplessness gradually forced him to accept the alternative possibility that his Deity might do for him what he was unable to do for himself; and thus arose the widespread and multiform belief in divine expiation or sacrifice, in atonement wrought no longer by man's own deeds but by divine intervention, communion or incarnation. Once more the innumerable details would be superfluous; as with the allied aspects of the situation just dealt with, so here one and the same principle animates them all—the faith that divine power either assists or compensates for human weakness. Again we are concerned with only the rational basis for such an attitude; and just as we found that the associated belief in man's own feebleness rests on a sound psychological foundation, so there are, in my own opinion, ample philosophic grounds for the acceptance of the principle of divine compensation.

One of the essential attributes of Deity has been seen to be omnipotent love, while His creation is in its

ultimate purpose and intention worthy of His perfect nature. We have also found that all evil ultimately becomes the instrument of good, much in the same way, to employ anew a very inadequate analogy, that the mistakes of an indifferent chess player are utilised to his abler opponent's advantage, or a youth's recklessness turned to his own permanent benefit by a wise parent. So long therefore as nothing is done which impairs the highest good, or (to state this condition in more positive terms) so long as the highest good is conserved, if not indeed enhanced, then it is inevitable that an omnipotent love must do all that can be done to achieve its eternal purpose. For if it did not at least attempt this, it would not be love ; while if its attempt could not finally succeed it would not be omnipotent. To postulate the governing principle just referred to, again, (that is the conservation of good) in no sense implies any limitation of the divine nature—any laying down of arbitrary conditions to which it must conform ; it simply describes that nature as being itself identical with the highest good or with holiness.¹ We must conclude then, I believe, that as the slowly growing conviction of man's moral helplessness shows itself to be well grounded in the very conditions of his evolutionary origin and his consequent relation to the universe, so his faith in the actuality of a divine atonement for evil, however blind and crudely expressed it may have been, likewise possesses a valid basis in the nature of Deity.

It may be objected that this plainly contradicts the principle, already fully accepted, of the unchangeableness of the past. For it is in this immutability that the essence of man's failure lies ; he can neither undo the

¹ Cf. *ante*, chap. vii.

evil he has wrought nor arrest its consequences. But the question at once arises—can even divine power accomplish this? and the answer is, in the first instance, No. The past remains what it is, unalterable even by Deity; for it is the outcome of the immutable laws of the universe, and to regard it as modifiable is to abrogate the reality of universal and necessary causation. But this by no means invalidates my argument. For atonement is not concerned with the past solely and directly, but rather always with the future; and although nothing that has been done can ever be undone, nevertheless its consequences may be made the instrument of a good that might otherwise be unattainable. Instances of this often occur in ordinary experience; when *e.g.* an intellectual or aesthetic error is rectified it is not thereby abolished. Regarded as an event it is eternal; nevertheless one of its results, perhaps by way of reaction, may be increased knowledge, or even an important discovery that might otherwise have been unheeded. Similarly in the moral sphere, as when an act of cowardice, which in itself can never be obliterated nor forgotten, itself impels towards some splendid deed of bravery; and it is in precisely the same way that all evil is subordinated by divine atonement to an ever fuller good.

Regarded from the standpoint of humanity, again, it is equally essential that the inherent freedom of selfhood be here maintained. For otherwise, since freedom and personality are inseparable,¹ man would be reduced to the level of the physical world with its purely automatic processes. Huxley's well-known suggestion may here be recalled—that he might be wound up daily to perform only good actions; which would, of course, at once

¹ "Not to be free is not to be human," p. 200 *ante*.

preclude all possibility of a good *self*, yielding instead nothing more than an efficient psychical automaton. While therefore, in accordance with what has just been said, the atoning activity must be paramountly a divine activity involving the unified power, knowledge and love of Deity, this must not destroy the equal necessity for man's fully deliberate response alike in feeling and in conduct. What specific form this should assume is immaterial to the present enquiry; it is sufficient to postulate that it must be essentially the action and attitude of a *self*—that is at one and the same moment intellective, emotional and above all volitional. This means that to some degree, which varies with the general status of personality attained, man must (in the first place) realise as explicitly as is possible his actual relation to the universe or to Deity; and we have seen already that this consciousness, in spite of the crude modes of its articulate expression, forms one of the most prominent factors of all human experience which naturally arouses—and the facts themselves are again obvious—a profound emotional response passing over into action. To say that this extremely complex attitude varies “with the general status of personality” simply means that in its earlier types the non-rational elements predominate over the rational; while the later development of selfhood brings about a natural inversion of this relation which often goes so far that (as in many civilised mentalities) the feelings become weakened and almost eradicated. All this, however, does not affect the central principle that the self acts throughout *as a self*—that is with the fullest freedom possible under the given conditions.

6. So far then as the man himself is concerned, the further consequences are the most important of all.

For he thus becomes able to attain the final stage in that ancient quest which first began with his grim yet childish superstitions. Fear of cruel gods, apathy towards a wholly transcendent Deity, or hostility to a universe purely mechanical, the agnostic limitations of knowledge to the natural or phenomenal sphere, the self-centredness of conduct upon purely pragmatic or humanist concerns—all alike give place to an increasingly intimate union between himself and Deity which is animated by a love responsive to the infinity of divine love. For it is this attitude alone that can transform the consequences of evil and thus save him from moral and spiritual despair.

But even this is not all ; for his deepening consciousness of divine atonement completely rehabilitates his shattered *morale* by enabling him to perceive that his further failures, inevitable though they must be, are by no means fatal unless he himself deliberately chooses to make them so. The whole moral situation, in short, has in this manner been revolutionised. His actual performance, which can rarely be other than feeble, now becomes subordinated to his intention, like the efforts of a child struggling to master his first lessons. In both cases alike the essential question is not what is actually done (though this of course has its due importance) but the entire mental attitude which underlies this—the spirit in which it is attempted. In other words, and as with a ship that is making but little headway against a storm, the direction in which the individual is facing becomes of far greater importance than the distance he has actually traversed ; and in this way man's highest ideals, though they be as distant as the North Star, cease to mock his attainments and inspire

him, instead, to ceaseless effort. They still remain, it need hardly be added, infinite and inexhaustible, revealing new potentialities as they become more fully actualised. But with this feature we are already sufficiently familiar in art and thought, so that there is nothing whatever illogical in extending it to conduct and personality in their entirety.

Perhaps the closest analogy here is to be found in the status of a good citizen. For no one can ever conform to the law of his nation with absolute perfection ; either by omission or commission there is always some degree of shortcoming. Yet, in principle, penalties follow only intentional mis-doing although "intention" must be given a very wide meaning so far *e.g.* as knowledge of the law is assumed, and the individual held responsible for the acts of his agents as well as his own ; on the other hand "intention" may mitigate punishment. Both the scope of law and the spirit of its administration, again, unceasingly change as the social structure, which may in this connection be regarded as a compound or multiple personality, evolves. New rights always bring new duties, and these again new rights ; while the rigidity of primitive law is ameliorated, at the same time that it is made more authoritative, by the principles of equity and ethics. With all this there arises what is perhaps the most fundamental factor of all—that deepening emotional response which constitutes a sane and enlightened patriotism, without which no nation can long survive ; and this, in its historical development, presents curious analogies to religion. For it begins in extremely crude yet intense forms—in the unreasoning but passionate attachment of the savage to his tribe or the warrior to his country. Its

later types, again, arise from the gradual rationalisation of this instinctive reaction—from self-analysis and self-criticism that may too easily destroy its pristine vigour. Not until reason and emotion have become so unified that each strengthens the other, so that their combination leads to prudent action, does the ideal citizen begin to emerge ; and as I have just observed, it is his emotional attitude that provides the sole indestructible driving power. Like his primitive ancestors he, too, loves his country ; but it is with an enlightened love which, through self-criticism, finds ever fuller justification ; while at the same time the range of his resources and freedom is immeasurably expanded.

Exactly similar should be man's relation to the universe. He finds that he has a definite status therein, certainly onerous but at the same time honourable ; an obligation to fulfil which can never be adequately discharged, although his failures, paradoxically, may count for far more than his successes. Again he is a citizen, but now in a realm whose absolute sovereign is Deity.

X

MAN AND DEITY

(3) EMOTION AND REASON

1. IN the previous chapter the progressive rationalisation of the emotions was referred to as an all-important factor in spiritual development, both individual and social ;¹ and to this is due another indispensable feature in all high types of mentality—that is the *articulate* expression of feeling.

Emotion and reason are, of course, entirely different aspects of experience which can never be transformed one into the other. But this is unfortunately often misinterpreted in two directions ; either these faculties are regarded as essentially foreign and antagonistic to each other, or their mutual influence is taken to be an occasional and artificial instead of a perfectly natural influence. Hence arise the familiar protests against feeling on the one hand and against thought, logic and science on the other.² So far as these are directed against *over*-emotionalism and *over*-intellectualisation they are amply justified, since the tendencies towards these exaggerations always attend the development of mind ; and it may further be conceded that the present age is in some danger of becoming too intellectual at the expense of healthy sentiment. In reality however, neither feeling nor thought can achieve any marked advance apart from the other, while both alike must

¹ Cf. p. 203 *ante*, note 2. ² Cf. e.g., pp. 115, 138 *ante*.

maintain the closest contact with practice.¹ For experience is essentially a unity whose different elements, profoundly contrasted though they are, unceasingly modify one another just as the bodily organs do. This may be due to their possessing a common origin; Mr. Bradley has insisted on the primary importance of feeling as the basis of all consciousness, while Professor Ward has likewise emphasised the indispensable part played by continued differentiation. In any case their reciprocal influence is intimate and incessant, so that every extensive advance in thought results in a parallel elevation of emotion, which in its turn facilitates the further evolution both of reason and action. The mind may thus be compared to a great army, in which the victory of one corps ensures the success of the others.

Feeling, again, is inherently subjective; none the less it craves due expression in sound or gesture or other effective manner, which must be *objective*; and this is equally true, in its own way, of thinking. It is only during the primitive stages of experience that emotion remains predominantly internal, as in the consciousness of the lowest animals or the earliest days of infancy; and even here it finds some outlet which is, however, indefinite or not properly articulate. Similarly with the music and dancing, the song, poetry and decoration of savages and barbarians; here again there is intense passion whose expression can be given only the crudest forms, simply because the intellectual capacities have not yet developed to any appreciable degree. Only as the capacity for systematic thought slowly evolves can these rude phases give place to refined art, although the

¹ On the connection between reason and will, *cf.* pp. 105, 106, 123 *ante*.

transition is always accompanied by those risks of one-sided development which are familiar to every student of the history of culture—false sentimentalism on the one hand and arid abstraction on the other, both alike the penalty of divorcing reason from emotion.

This is most clearly perceived, perhaps, in poetry, since the material which must be moulded into expressive form is always subject to those drastic laws of grammatical and logical construction which rule ordinary communication and good prose. It is this refractory material which the poet, his soul aflame with passion, must at a single stroke infuse with pure beauty and inspire with deep meaning; and although the emotional fire may make his task less arduous, still it plainly is, in its own way, as intensely difficult as the manipulation of marble or bronze. Precisely the same principle holds true of painting and music; not only, therefore, must the great poet, as we have seen that Coleridge maintained, be also a profound thinker, but so must every artistic genius without exception.¹ It is thus no accident that the great age of Greek art synchronised with its finest thought, while the vivid splendour of its poetry is inseparable from the delicate intricacy of the language. In the opposite direction the often repellent crudity of the East is but the inevitable accompaniment of its less developed rationality; and we cannot escape this conclusion by appealing to imagination. For again the issue turns on the contrast between the riotous or undisciplined imagination of primitive peoples and the restrained but still more powerful imagination of the civilised mind—"civilised," of course, in the spiritual sense which is quite compatible with the absence of

¹ P. 139 *ante*.

material prosperity. The characteristic freedom of imagination, that is to say, must not be confused with unbridled licence ; for it attains its highest pitch in the mastery of Shakespeare or of Dante over his native tongue which transformed it into the flexible instrument of his subtlest moods ; just as, in quite a different sphere, social freedom finds its best medium only in the highest forms of national law.

2. These conclusions apply with special force to the diversified mass of emotions aroused by man's changing consciousness of his relation to the universe, ranging as it has done from the terror of the savage to the confidence of the mystic. Its typical forms, apart from negligible exceptions arising from abnormal conditions, reach a high degree of intensity, although the contrasts between these two extremes may be compared to that between a lightning flash and calm sunshine ; and such intensity irresistibly compels the expression that has been found alike in barbaric licence and in solemn rapture. But at the same time—again like a brilliant light—this intensity conceals the fact that not only expression in itself, but its most articulate form, is always being sought for, and progressively assumed as the intellectual faculties expand. The racial mind is thus engaged with the same task as that of a poet or composer who repeatedly modifies his creation so as to achieve always the fittest expression of his mood. It is however difficult to perceive this parallel, first of all because the effort of the race is eternal, and secondly because the higher levels of mind are by their very nature precluded from grasping the real significance of the methods which appeal to the lower. Not only then, as is quite natural, are these primitive methods discarded, but they are also misunder-

stood and described therefore as unmeaning or ridiculous—a standpoint that is just as irrational as it is to despise the early thought and speech of the child; and even the most sympathetic student of comparative religion must often fail to seize the inner content of primitive rites and mythologies. To do this adequately is indeed impossible; for it demands not merely the understanding of ceremonies and symbols but the adoption of the original mental standpoint in its entirety, while at the same moment retaining the critical attitude of the modern: like an adult not only playing a child's game but enjoying this exactly as the child himself does.

But although it will always be impossible to appreciate the delicate *nuances* of the primitive modes of expression, we can still regard them, like their most advanced successors, as the combination of intensity with articulate-ness. Each of these factors however, because of their contrasted natures, seriously impedes the development of the other, again like a child's speech broken by its excitement. Yet in both instances alike what seems at first to be a fatal obstacle proves in the end to possess incalculable value. For just as the child, urged by the very strength of his feeling, is compelled to employ what seem to him the most forcible terms possible, quaint and unexpected as these often are, so the human mind has ultimately been driven to adopt forms of expression far removed from those in ordinary use (though it may modify these for its purpose) simply because no others could give adequate utterance to the fast increasing complexity of its reactions.

Paradoxically, therefore, their artificiality is perfectly natural; for the same process occurs in every department of intellectual activity, provided this continues to be as

alert as it should be. Alike in science and in law, in art and practical pursuits, a high degree of technicality is in the end unconsciously attained, since apart from this the precision of description and intercommunication indispensable to continued advance is impossible ; and this precision, again, arises naturally from the range and intricacy of the subject-matter that is being dealt with. But while such exactitude is an " open sesame " to the experts in any particular field it at the same moment excludes all others, and so forms an effective barrier between different mentalities in exactly the same way as the enormous interval between the primitive and the civilised mind.

Thus we return to the definition of religion already adopted as " the response of humanity, taken as a real whole or explicit unity, to the universe, likewise taken as a whole." ¹ Each of the principal aspects of this totality exerts an incessant influence upon the others which results on the one hand in the refining, but not therefore the weakening, of the emotions due to the expanding control of reason, and on the other in the increasingly adequate intellectual expression of the emotional content and reactions themselves ; or, in other words, in the rationalisation of emotion fused with the emotionalisation of reason, equally closely allied of course with the moralising of action. Once again the first two parallel processes are discernible in all great poetry, where deep feeling can find its full manifestation only by using all the resources of thought and language, while in so doing every idea and every sentence are transformed by being infused at once with beauty and with passion ; even the most commonplace phrases may

¹ *Ante*, p. 173.

thus be dignified, as are the words "Too late" in Christina Rossetti's *The Prince's Progress*.

The final result of this complex development may be best described as the *clarifying* of emotion, as distinct, however, from what is usually meant by its refinement or elevation. "Clarifying" here means the removal of that obscurity which always attends emotion in itself and apart from some measure of rational justification. The latter is always present to a certain degree, since almost everyone can give some reason or other for their feeling being such as it is; still during the earlier phases of experience these explanations are crude and inadequate, so that the emotional attitude tends to exhibit the familiar finality of the child's "I like it." So far as it goes this is of course sufficient to those who enjoy it, although it provides no safeguard against the later contradictions of taste that inevitably arise in every experience; and these compel every alert mind to seek that definitely articulate expression here under consideration. For this constitutes in the end an invaluable means of self-criticism—of evaluating the conflicting sentiments so that they may be comprehended within a single harmonious whole, which maintains itself no longer (as at first) merely by its intensity, but by its self-consistency and coherence or (in negative terms) by its freedom from the clash of self-contradiction. Again, however, this does not imply any fall in intensity but rather the contrary, although the danger that self-criticism may be carried to such lengths as to become suicidal is always present. For allied with this "clarifying" of emotion is a deepened insight into the nature of the object upon which it is centred, which constitutes a further powerful defence against decline

from within and attack from without ; and thus the entire feeling content acquires the firmest possible basis by combining the certainty of reason with its own native necessity.

An illustration may make this contention somewhat clearer. Greek and Shakespearean tragedy can be fully appreciated only by the mature mind and makes scarcely any appeal to a shallow personality, not so much because this lacks the power of feeling, but rather because it has never acquired a reflective insight into the greater issues of life. These lie far beyond its grasp ; and since it cannot clearly envisage them it cannot respond to them. On the other hand it is easily possible for the reflective attitude to become stimulated so explicitly that the purely emotional reaction is thereby impeded and weakened. In my own opinion, which may however be quite mistaken, this is the final effect of Hardy's great poem *The Dynasts*, and to a less degree of *Paradise Lost* and much of Browning's work. In their own *genre* these are undeniably unique ; still the perfect balance between feeling and thought has not, I think, been here attained. Reason continues to maintain somewhat too great a measure of independence and so to dominate the situation somewhat unduly, thus preventing that perfect fusion of itself with emotion in which alone each can achieve its highest possible form and fullest expression.

3. The term "adequate expression," however, raises a further difficulty ; for we must ask—"adequate for what, and to whom ?" and this involves a brief discussion of the nature of personality. We have already seen that freedom is an inherent attribute of selfhood ; and this implies still further that every self must enjoy some measure of independence, since to the degree that

it is dependent on anything else it cannot be free. At the same time this personal independence must accommodate itself to that of other selves, but without forfeiting its character, in such a way as to serve the interests of society and the race. Personality (in other words) must be both individual and social at the same moment, or—stating this in reference to its activity—both independent and cooperative; and to this principle true genius always conforms, despite the outstanding contrasts with the general level which it presents; its distinctiveness never isolates it, but rather unites it most closely to mankind. For it is the very uniqueness of its powers that enables it to do this—to express, not any narrow individual but some universal need, to achieve an equally universal satisfaction, and so to gain universal acceptance and homage; and it is because these tasks are so difficult that its capacities must be so highly developed. Thus we discover another paradox in the *selflessness* of genius, although this constitutes the self's highest level of development; so that personality, as it evolves, becomes less and less self-centred and more universal by means of that very expansion of the independence and freedom which seem, at first sight, to sever it from all else.

Humanity, then, is never a mere number nor collection of selves, but always a literal *community* of selves; and this character must plainly exhibit itself (first) in the emotions aroused by man's relation to the universe, but also—as is however too rarely recognised—in all the intellectual forms whereby this reaction finds its “adequate” expression. The emotional response has been from the beginning in fact almost exclusively a social response; whether it was pleasurable or the

reverse its intensity naturally caused it to be collective, so that even the priest or king officiated not on his own behalf alone, but rather as the representative of the community. Once again it was only as man's intellectual capacity reached its higher levels, thus marking off certain gifted individuals from their fellows, that feeling could be given any isolated expression ; and even to-day the hermit and mystic are as exceptional as the solitary child.

But at the same time (as I have just observed), the articulate expression that has always been assumed by man's emotions,¹ inevitably came more and more under the influence of the slowly developing reason, one of whose principal, and also most difficult, tasks has always been to find terms suitable to the formulation not only, as is too often supposed, of abstract thought but still more of experience taken in its entirety. Throughout aesthetics and ethics *e.g.* this is obvious ; for while theory may here become as "abstract" as we please, it must always remain in close touch with actual life. Theory again is almost completely devoid of emotional elements ; but when we turn, as before, to poetry we find that apart from highly developed thought the fullest expression of feeling is altogether impossible. It still remains intense, but crude and massive, its delicacy undiscerned, its *nuances* unrevealed ; yet in spite of this the greatest geniuses evolve forms whose appeal continues to be essentially and primarily *social*, not solely individual as might be anticipated from the uniqueness of their own individuality. Homer, Dante, Shakespeare are perhaps the outstanding instances of

¹ It must be recognised that this is equally true, in its degree, of the higher animals.

this ; while Milton and Browning, in lacking this absolute universality, fall slightly below the highest level ; and exactly the same holds true, *mutatis mutandis*, of music. In all great art, indeed, the fundamental difficulty is to conserve both the original intensity and universality of emotion while at the same time rationalising its content and modes of expression—a task which transcends the powers of all but the rarest genius.

The converse of this principle is of equal importance—that is what I have just called the “ emotionalisation of reason ” as the reciprocal influence of deep feeling upon thought and knowledge. For this is always much more penetrating than we over-intellectualised moderns realise, even though the truth that we can fully understand only what we love is almost a commonplace. Too intense an emotion must, of course, seriously interfere with the impartiality of reason ; and hence arises the necessity for dispassionate theory. But such an opposition does not constitute their typical relationship ; it is on the contrary simply the outcome of imperfect rationalisation—of the undue prominence of hasty temperament. Perhaps the familiar proverb “ to understand all is to forgive all ” best elucidates the actual situation, since it is plain that the “ understanding ” is here much more than purely intellectual ; it must always be sympathetic and compassionate.

“ Abstract theory ” therefore—the *bête noir* of anti-intellectualism—is never anything more than the half-way house on the path of intellect. It must, as it continues to develop, become more and more intimately fused with experience in its totality ; so that man’s clearest insight into the nature both of himself and of the universe springs only from the fusion of reason and

emotion, though even in their closest union each must retain its distinctive character. Knowledge and understanding, therefore, can attain their highest levels only when they are inspired by love, which thus becomes what has previously been described as the dynamic of all creative activity both human and divine—the outcome always of insight or “intuition” of the supreme order. “The true sculptor” a great Hegelian has told us, “must begin with a thorough study of anatomy”; a principle which holds equally true of all his fellow craftsmen;¹ but the anatomist who ends where he begins, with knowledge and nothing more, no matter how detailed it may become, will never carve a statue.

4. These considerations bear most closely on our present problem—man’s consciousness of his relation to Deity and his articulate expression of this consciousness. For as this continues to evolve it becomes increasingly complex, so that the task of maintaining the due proportion between its contrasted and often contending elements is ever more difficult. Unless its emotional intensity is maintained it loses its dynamic quality; and yet the independent expansion of thought in itself tends to reduce this, quite apart from the adversely critical results of expanding knowledge with regard to primitive beliefs. For we have already found that these must incessantly be modified, if not in substance then at least in their formal expression; and this raises the recurrent problem of transferring the original emotional response to new and frequently contradictory contents—too often an impossible undertaking which

¹ Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel; Prolegomena*, p. 286; cf. the preceding passage on music.

only generates apathy or despair. Nor is this the only obstacle ; for since, as I observed in the preceding section, this " emotional response is almost exclusively a social response," the intellectual forms of expression successively adopted must always be such as to appeal to the largest possible number, and this in the face of the outstanding contrasts in knowledge and reflective capacity characterising modern societies whose diversity tends to increase as the general level of mind advances. But that this is after all not impossible is proved by the fact just alluded to—that all the highest products of artistic genius make precisely that universal appeal which is here indispensable. This parallel may indeed be carried farther ; for since great poetry must utilise words and grammatical forms, it follows that these are equally applicable to the expression of religious emotion on the widest collective scale. Not only therefore may ancient and simple beliefs find utterance in this way, but every type may be given systematic expression intelligible to the ordinary reflective mind without, however, ceasing to arouse profound feeling just as music and poetry do. It is throughout a question of deepening and enriching the central ideas generated by experience in its entirety, more especially of course in its sincerest moods and most significant moments ; and from this point of view I shall discuss what appear to be the most expressive concepts of the relation between Deity and man.

With the objection that these must always remain open to the charge of being anthropomorphic I have dealt already, so that it need only be recalled that all our categories without exception, as being " the outcome of man's interaction with the universe whence his own

mind has itself originated, emanate from and express the nature of reality"; and this the more fully as they continue harmoniously to develop.¹ If therefore, to be the product of man's mind in itself renders our categories fallacious, then all the laws of science and the principles of aesthetics are unreliable; while if, on the other hand, their highest forms "express the nature of reality," anthropomorphism itself, as distinct from the limitations of the human mind arising from the conditions of its development, ceases to be a defect and becomes instead an index of man's oneness with the universe. In this way all truth, alike as scientific, aesthetic and moral, is seen to be not divorced from reality but rather the manifestation of its nature in and through the activity of man's reason; so that from this standpoint it is quite permissible to regard truth and reality as identical in the sense that they share a common nature, and this so intimately that to separate them is to destroy truth itself. The more technical aspect of this principle has been expressed as follows by Dr. Bosanquet:—"Truth is reality as it makes itself known through particular minds in the form of ideas. Ideas belong to the nature of reality; and this character of thought, which claims the title of truth, is a mode in which reality, the nature of the universe, manifests itself, and is present and living."²

It must of course be noticed that this refers to truth, and not to any and every combination of ideas which arises in the mind. For many of these—it may be indeed the majority—must be rejected as false simply

¹ *Ante*, p. 81; cf. also p. 136.

² *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 150; somewhat abridged.

because they fail to do what they are intended to do—that is reveal or express the real character of being. This is the ultimate test of all that claims to be true ; but unless we are prepared to deny outright that truth can be attained—prepared to adopt, that is to say, an attitude of absolute scepticism—we must admit that some of the concepts which the human intellect acquires can justify their claim, and this to an increasing degree as knowledge expands. Once again therefore, not anthropomorphism as such, but internal disharmony or self-contradiction, is always the criterion of falsity ; and scepticism cannot be confined to ethical nor philosophical principles while scientific or aesthetic conclusions escape. For to be self-consistent it must be applied to *all* knowledge, whatever form it assumes ; and thus it becomes self-destructive, since we cannot be certain even that all ideas are false ; for certainty is truth while truth, *ex hypothesi*, is unattainable.

Provided therefore that our logical concepts do not become self-contradictory nor distort the experience with which they deal, we are compelled to adopt them exactly as the scientist is forced by fresh observations and experiments to add to his knowledge. With the ideas of selfhood and creation I have already dealt sufficiently ; and so far as the specific problem of this chapter is concerned, the most adequate attribute to be further assigned to Deity is fatherhood, whose logical implications will here be discussed rather than its more familiar aspects. For I have already maintained that such fundamental ideas must at one and the same moment make a direct appeal to emotion and possess definite intellectual value. In the case of fatherhood the first of these two conditions has almost invariably

been fulfilled, even under those earlier forms of paternal authority most repellent to modern feeling. The second condition involves a brief discussion of divine transcendence and immanence which will be undertaken in the succeeding chapter.

XI

MAN AND DEITY

(4) DIVINE FATHERHOOD

1. As I have repeatedly observed, the selfhood of Deity implies a resemblance to, or kinship with human nature (however slight in degree we may take this to be) that is exemplified in the patent relationship between infancy and genius ; since despite the almost incalculable contrast an unbroken transition can be traced from one to the other. This analogy is indeed weightier than is generally believed. For while the infant is devoid of almost every capacity that is characteristic of genius (although their potentiality is undoubtedly present), man actually possesses in some slight measure those qualities which in Deity are infinite—knowledge, will, freedom, love, dominance—and these to an ever advancing level so far at least as the race is concerned. Now with regard to the physical universe I have argued that the divine transcendence is absolute. The perfection of its automatic mechanism eternally maintains all its intricate processes, without any intervention or guidance whatever being necessary other than that implied by its evolution ; while its materiality precludes any participation in the divine nature as such. This absolute transcendence, however, itself involves a certain type of immanence with which I have already dealt in *Personality and Reality* ;¹ and here I shall consider the contrast with

¹ Chap. x, "The Supreme Self and the Absolute"; cf. also chap. ii *ante*.

the relations which these two attributes present to finite selfhood.

For while the perfection and supremacy of Deity still constitute transcendence of such selfhood, this assumes a different character in accordance with the difference in the ruling conditions ; so that in a certain sense, which must not, however, be pressed too far, transcendence may be said to become less absolute. This means that Deity cannot transcend selfhood in the same way, nor quite to the same degree, that it transcends the physical universe. For there now exists that kinship or participation in nature which is allied with the continuous transition of personality to ever higher levels, in exactly the same manner, though of course never to the same degree that the infant develops into a genius. Usually it is the moral aspect of this advance that is emphasised—the transformation from evil to goodness together with the subsequent expansion of the good itself. But this is only one phase—though doubtless the most important—of the entire evolution of selfhood. Precisely the same principle is involved in the increase of knowledge and the elevation of art, since each alike is a further approximation, no matter how infinitesimal it may seem to be, to the perfection of the divine nature. Thus Deity is not *absolutely* transcendent of all the essential qualities of finite selfhood as it is of the properties of matter ; and this conclusion is best expressed (once again) by saying that Deity is not transcendent *of* these qualities but transcendent *in* them—in goodness, wisdom and love.

A further qualification of this absoluteness arises from the inherent self-distinction and freedom of personality. For “ the advance of personality implies the intensifying of the sense of its distinction from or within the

environment";¹ and this is necessarily allied with the expansion of its dominance and freedom, limited though these must always be. In this way action may at any moment be deliberately directed to oppose the divine purpose, while even the furtherance of this purpose, to be an act of the self, must be voluntary and not automatically necessary as in the case of material phenomena.² On the other hand, this free choice and pursuit of good form a manifestation of divine immanence, inseparably associated with transcendence as I have already shown this to be;³ but again of an immanence different in kind from that operative in the physical realm. For despite its limitation the freedom of the finite self is in its nature identical with the infinite freedom of Deity, even when it becomes antagonistic to Deity in the evil self; much more so therefore in the good self; and this conclusion now carries us to that unceasing influence of Deity upon humanity which constitutes divine fatherhood.

For we have seen that evil is ultimately self-destructive; and this is equally true of evil personality, though whether it necessitates the *complete* cessation of individual existence is a subordinate issue which need not be further considered. It is sufficient to recognise the patent fact that persistence in evil, particularly when it is fully deliberate, inevitably involves the deterioration of the self as the necessary effect, or (if we choose so to regard it) the penalty, of its wrongdoing. But at the same time this degenerative change—like the contrasted advance in goodness—is in the great majority of cases an extremely

¹ *Ante*, p. 32.

² Cf. my earlier reference to Huxley's automatic goodness, p. 206.

³ P. 227, note.

gradual process. It is also one of which the self is always more or less conscious, and may on occasion become fully aware; while with this knowledge of its own experience there is allied, unless it has become suicidally obliterated, the power of freely altering its governing ideals and purposes, although this must be always a difficult task. Now this self-destruction of evil is obviously the natural consequence of the continuous advance of universal evolution—in other terms of that slow fulfilment of divine purpose which proceeds alike in the material and the moral spheres. But in the latter realm, as we have just seen, it forces itself as it were upon the consciousness both of the individual himself and of his fellows, frequently in an extremely drastic and painful way; and thus humanity is forced to realise that evil, to say the least, “does not pay”—that honesty, whatever else it implies, is at any rate the best policy. Of course only a low grade personality can rest content with such an attitude, which is nevertheless that of countless numbers. But taking this situation even at its lowest and poorest level, what we really find here is the unceasing operation of divine purpose, the irresistible pressure of divine immanence, drawing and even forcing the self ever nearer to the good in all its forms—in knowledge and beauty just as in conduct.

Again there is in all this nothing exceptional nor artificial. It is simply the extension within the spiritual realm of the evolutionary process characterising the lower spheres of life and matter, and thus constituting the incessant development of goodness under the form of selfhood or of the good will—terms which are really synonymous: ensuring in this manner the gradual fulfilment of the purpose of

Deity as the production of beings more and more akin to Himself.¹

A close analogy to this essential connection between divine immanence and divine transcendence exists in the familiar case of the physical energy operating in any magnetic or electrical field of force. For throughout this field it is plainly the energy of the entire universe that is active and therefore immanent, while it is at the same time infinitely transcendent of the restricted field itself; if indeed it were not thus transcendent it would not produce the effects which actually occur, so that in all such instances transcendence and immanence, as I have throughout maintained, logically imply one another. If now we suppose the energy field to contain a number of iron filings, we can extend this illustration to divine fatherhood. For the immanent universal energy incessantly tends to arrange the filings along certain definite curves which conform to the lines of force or tubes of energy, or any more recent method of expressing the situation. Each particle of iron thus represents a finite self which is being forced—or rather, since the self is conscious—drawn or attracted by the process of universal evolution into harmony with itself—that is into the sphere of the good in all its diverse aspects, intellectual, aesthetic and moral alike. If we further imagine a particle, under the influence of two opposed fields of force acting simultaneously, taking up an intermediate position which may constantly change as the two energy streams vary in their intensity, we obtain an analogy to the incessant conflict between good and evil influences; but again, of course, with the fundamental difference that the rational self is free to respond to either type as it itself decides;

¹ *Ante*, pp. 120, 167.

it is never, like the metal, merely passive and helpless. Conversely, if a particle suddenly acquired the power spontaneously to oppose itself to the universal energy it would represent the self which deliberately chooses evil rather than good, and in so doing effects its own ultimate degradation.¹

2. The relation between Deity and man therefore, and the incessant influences to which personality is subject, find close and significant analogies even in the material world. Just as the energy of the entire physical universe operates upon and within each tiny iron particle, so the divine power environs and penetrates every self, and is in this sense immanent ; while at the same time, exactly as the particle is irresistibly brought into a definite position, so immanent Deity seeks to raise the self nearer its own transcendent level ; once again therefore, immanence and transcendence imply each other. A further parallel may be found in the operation of natural selection in the realm of life, shaping or moulding living species as it does always towards higher organisation and efficiency.² As I have already contended, it is in the light of this unceasing advance that the proverbial ruthlessness of Nature must always be considered, so that what we are compassionately inclined to describe as " the weak " is in reality what fails to conform to Nature's highest ends ; and we plainly find the same relentlessness in the elimination of evil, whether we interpret this undeniable fact theistically or otherwise. If, however, we accept

¹ To be precise, even iron filings actually possess some influence on the situation, in so far as their mass and internal constitution determine their movements ; *cf.* reference to Dr. Whitehead p. 194 *ante*.

² With the apparent exceptions to this principle in degradation and parasitism I have dealt previously ; *cf.* pp. 115 *sqq.*

it as one of the forms of divine activity, it becomes the basis of those forbidding aspects of the nature of Deity which have been expressed in earlier concepts of divine fatherhood, or perhaps still better of divine sovereignty and justice, against which the modern mind so emphatically protests. I have myself, I trust, laid sufficient stress on divine love to prevent any misapprehension of my own standpoint. But this must not lead us to disregard what are really equally essential factors in the situation. For sovereignty is obviously associated with supremacy, and justice with that inflexibility of universal law which is manifested throughout nature and thought, aesthetics and ethics ; while they are also indispensable ingredients of the highest type of human fatherhood. It is almost superfluous to point out that if he were convinced that nothing else would serve the best interests of his children, no wise parent would hesitate to adopt the sternest of measures or to acquiesce, however regretfully, in the state pursuing the same course after his own authority had ceased. In spiritual as in bodily disease, in other words, the surgeon's knife is often indispensable ; and to criticise the unceasing excision of moral evil in the universe is just as illogical as to accuse the surgeon of heedless cruelty. In the first instance, as in the second, the very desperateness of the remedy itself becomes the proof of the love which resorts to it.

But just because it *is* evil, it is impossible for the evil self thus to interpret its painful experience. Not until it has been somehow transformed or "transmuted," recreated or reborn, if only through intense suffering, can it perceive the underlying purpose.¹ If we choose to call it the "hidden purpose," then we must add that it is

¹ Cf. p. 56 *ante* on "transformation," with note.

so concealed only by that blindness of moral vision which is at once the essence and the consequence of evil. And it is quite unnecessary to appeal to theology, or even to ethics, to see that such rebirth or recreation is simply a natural psychological process which none the less revolutionises the individual's reaction towards the universe or towards Deity, whichever term is preferred here. Thus purpose and will undergo a *volte face*, so that all that has hitherto been desired is repudiated if for no better motive than the avoidance of the pain which it invariably involves.

But, and again as a matter of elementary psychology, it is impossible for such a profound change to cease at this point, which is plainly no more than negative and exclusive. For all experience, even the experience and the nature of evil personality, must present some positive aspects. We have previously found, in fact, that evil itself always contains some distorted and fragmentary elements of good without which it could never become the object of desire. In the same way intellectual error is never absolute but includes some truth, however minimised this may have become. This means that since the total suppression of will and motive, of purpose and desire, would be the destruction of personality as such, these activities must find new objects. Aversion and love, in other words, still persist, only they take directions exactly opposite to those hitherto followed; and thus, so far as any individual self is concerned, and in a manner relevant to its perhaps unique conditions and history, the divine purpose is slowly fulfilled in the dawning love of any of the multitudinous forms of the good—of knowledge or beauty or noble ideals.

3. But while it is always possible to pursue these as they exist in themselves, it is still more essential to regard them as the manifestations of the nature of Deity. They always present, that is, a dual character—first what they are in themselves and as such, or (alternatively) as characters of reality or of the universe, but secondly and still more fundamentally, as being the creation of the Supreme Self. Now it is fatally easy to dissociate these two aspects from one another and so to sever, as has so often been done in the history of thought, goodness and beauty, or even the universe in its entirety, from Deity or God. Sometimes indeed, as we have seen already, this divorce is only another expression of the absolute transcendence of Deity, as being beyond all attributes whatever whose actual existence we can perceive; and this is especially the case when the actual character of selfhood is misapprehended by being confined to the low levels of man's own experience. Such a misinterpretation may take another direction leading, however, to the same result—the search for some “pure” Deity wholly different from all that exists, just as the supposedly “pure *ego*” is separate from all experience or (still further) independent of experience. In both cases alike the object sought is an empty abstraction whose very name becomes meaningless or indeed, as in some early religions, unknowable. For to conceive in this way of either “pure *ego*” or “pure” Deity is as illogical as to think of a “pure” artist wholly separated from his pictures or statues, a “pure” poet who has no relation whatever to his poems, or a “pure” statesman without any policy or influence on his country's destiny. In all such cases alike it is plain that, whatever the ultimate nature of the self may be, it can express itself,

and can therefore also be known, only in and through phenomena which are at first sight different from itself and yet, when properly understood, are seen to be essential to its very existence. It is logically necessary then to extend this conclusion to Deity; and thus that love of the good which it is the final purpose of human experience to create must find its still higher fulfilment in the love of the Supreme Self, of whose nature all good is the manifestation.¹

What this actually implies can be most clearly understood only by a fresh appeal to our own experience. For however intense the love of impersonal values may become—*i.e.* of truth or beauty or virtue—still it is always much more natural, and therefore much less difficult, to love a person. But here again the limitations of ordinary life are misleading. For the people who strongly attract us rarely possess any unusual capacities, and even when they do they are often apt to be somewhat forbidding and unapproachable. The inevitable result is that our affections become much more easily centred on everyday personalities than on those values which, while in themselves of a high order, are still impersonal; and thus there arises a perfectly natural, but none the less at bottom quite illogical, divorce between love as concerned with selfhood on the one hand and with value on the other. This, again, cannot but affect our attitude towards Deity, since we remain the victims of the irresistible tendency to conceive of His personality merely in terms of our own, and therefore to regard Him as likewise distinct from truth and goodness, it may be (once again) as “pure” Deity. But in every respect this standpoint is quite unreasonable. For as I have maintained throughout,

¹ Cf. pp. 157 *sqq.*, on the proper meaning of “good.”

the true development of personality consists in the attainment of the highest capacities for aesthetic, intellectual and moral goodness. Value and selfhood, in other words, are really inseparable and not (as we generally regard them) foreign to one another. Even in ordinary intercourse we subconsciously adopt this point of view by always endeavouring to expand these capacities; and it is only the intense difficulty of achieving any marked success that compels us to content ourselves with, and at the same time (fortunately) to love, people who are devoid of any unusual talents.

We must none the less recognise, I think, that the highest ideal would be an intensely lovable person who was at the same time supereminent either in knowledge or art or virtue, still more in all simultaneously. There are of course occasional approximations to this condition of things; but their rarity, as I have just observed, leads us to regard the ideal as an impossible one. If however we develop it as it demands to be—if we conceive of all possible values as being infinite, while remaining at the same time essentially concrete and actual, and also as being the attributes of the Supreme Self—then Deity is perceived to be the highest centre and object of human love.

4. But although selfhood and value are thus inseparable, still the love of wholly impersonal values is quite different from love between persons. This is because every self is a mass of diverse values so intimately fused together as to act no longer separately but *en bloc*, and therefore with all the greater force; so that even though each value taken alone may be relatively low, its deficiency is more than compensated by its union with others into one more or less permanent whole, just as infinitesimal

electrons combine into an indestructible and chemically powerful element. The supreme instance of this is found, of course, in Deity as the possessor of infinite values, and as dominant therefore within the universe ; but every finite self conforms to this principle in its own slight degree. The essentially dynamic nature of personality, still further, demands the closest communion between individuals ; and while this must always rest upon an emotional basis, at the same time the inherent rationality of selfhood necessitates its clearest articulate expression. Hence unfettered intercourse is possible only between personalities who have attained fairly similar levels of intellectual development. Apart from this there must always remain some degree of exclusion, as between members of different nations or between the expert in any department and the tiro. Even when the link of affection is at its strongest, as with parent and child, still its full expression is inevitably restricted by their difference in intellectual capacity ; and thus perfect communion becomes possible only through the elevation of the lower type of self to that of the higher. This is equally true, therefore, of that unceasing " approximation to the perfection of the divine nature " ¹ which constitutes the fullest evolution of finite personality ; while in so doing it provides the basis of an ever fuller communion between man and the Supreme Self which, to be at all adequate, must be at once emotional, intellectual and practical ; although it hardly ever happens that each of these capacities can attain its proper development in any one individual. The expansion of either, unfortunately, too often tends to suppress the others. Yet this plainly involves a serious mutilation of selfhood, whose

¹ *Ante*, p. 228.

essential unity demands the reciprocal influence of each factor on its allies. Thus the pursuit of the good, under any and all of its forms, is actually, and in its true character, a form of aspect of communion with Deity whose only limits are those set by the narrow range of human personality.

To many minds this cannot but seem an absurdly audacious assertion ; and yet it is merely the highest type of what we often desire in the case of a great poet or thinker with whom, after enjoying his poetry or absorbing his philosophy, we should like to share personal intimacy. Priggish though it too often becomes, such a desire is of course perfectly natural, since it forms the ideal of all human fellowship ; and again the situation presents the dual aspect of the artist as inseparable from his work—the self from its creations—even while they must be held distinct from one another. It is further obvious that the real obstacles to such intercourse (apart from social conventions) arise from the pettiness of everyday personality, which would inevitably exclude it from close contact with Shakespeare or Plato except in so far as they approached the ordinary level to which, perhaps, they themselves must often descend in order to remain human.

To press these analogies too far would be to reduce the divine selfhood to the level of our own. But though they are undeniably distant they are neither forced nor illogical ; on the contrary they indicate the only direction in which personality can continuously advance and the ideal to which it should ever more closely approach. For since it is characteristic of selfhood to be conscious both of its environment and itself, the issue becomes in the end a question of vision or insight ; in more technical

terms, of man's clearly understanding the nature of the universe and his own relation thereto—an apprehension including both knowledge and feeling at the same time that it governs conduct. Too commonly, as we have seen already, one of these faculties becomes over-emphasised at the expense of the others; and so philosophy becomes unduly abstract and cold, just as mysticism remains formless and indefinite. But this is never true of their highest types; the finest poets are also the profoundest thinkers, while the greatest mystics have influenced the world only by making their own experience as clear and articulate to their fellows as a difficult sonata becomes when played by some genius in music.

Everything turns therefore upon insight—vision—understanding, obscured though this must always remain by illusion and ignorance and evil. The word “vision” has of course a twofold significance, denoting both the act of seeing and the object revealed; and as throughout the evolution of the bodily eye, these develop simultaneously. So it must be with that deepening insight of the mind or spirit into the nature of reality which must always be regarded as constituting the growth of personality. That such a growth demands stern self-discipline hardly needs saying; but the truth does require to be stressed that personality is concerned in both sides of the relation, and not in its human aspect only. The most fundamental of all the factors in the situation is the Supreme Self of Whom reality is the revelation, and Whose purpose, because He loves all He creates, is the creation of beings capable of becoming more and more akin to Himself.

The greater ease with which this principle could be accepted in earlier days was very largely the consequence

of the undue simplification of the concept of Deity, naturally allied as this was with man's restricted knowledge of the universe. But the unparalleled expansion which knowledge has now attained inevitably tends to eliminate this concept completely. In the first place (as I have argued in *Personality and Reality*) the divine activity is concealed from our direct observation by the very perfection of the automatism of the material world. The diversity and complexity of the physical phenomena which investigation discerns naturally concentrate attention upon themselves, rather than upon the Supreme Self Whose existence they logically imply. The human intellect is in this respect in the same position as a critic concerned with the voluminous works of a great genius, the very number of which absorbs his mind to the exclusion of their creator as an individual. Yet it is only in and through these that their author's complete personality can express itself, so that but for him they would never have existed; just as, when considered wholly apart from them, he sinks to the low level of his obscure fellows. No really great man, of course, ever works simply to draw attention to himself; still there attaches to him a natural dignity which merits the regard, and sometimes even the reverence, of all.

Allied with this difficulty is the necessity for so deepening and enriching the concept of Deity as to make the suggestion of direct communion almost absurd. This obstacle, as I have just observed, was evaded by previous thinkers either by reducing divine selfhood to a level not far above the human, or by adopting the standpoint of more or less absolute transcendence. We are almost irresistibly inclined to interpret personality in terms of our own nature, so that it is extremely difficult to elevate

the highest attributes of which we can conceive to an infinite ¹ degree while at the same time regarding them as pertaining to a self, especially when we feel compelled to supplement them by others of which we can have no comprehension whatever. Yet if my combined arguments are at all valid, this becomes a logical necessity; and thus the situation is transformed in the sense that the human personality must be looked upon as nothing more than a fragmentary type, which can nevertheless always approximate a little more closely to the divine. From this point of view Mr. Bradley's familiar criticisms of selfhood find ample justification. Its contradictions can be removed only by its unceasing expansion; and this conclusion has already been anticipated in what I have said about the growth of knowledge and its allied capacities taken as separate attributes of the entire personality.

5. For every self, therefore, communion with what shares its own nature and occupies its own level is a necessity. This is proverbially true even of evil personalities; but their intercourse (that is while they remain evil) is self-defeating and finally self-destructive. They seek and pursue, again, not what seems to them to be evil, but always an apparent good, illusory and deceptive. All this applies therefore with incalculably greater force to normal personality in its search for the real good. But the "real good," as we have seen repeatedly, can be attained only partially, in the sense that all that is achieved immediately shows itself to be an element in something still greater than itself. All good, in other terms, is self-transcending, and this inexhaustibly; and although our limitations compel us to rest content with

¹ It must be remembered that infinity denotes perfection or completeness.

much that is far below our actual capacity, still to do this deliberately is the essence of evil ; it is the voluntary selection of a lower good in place of a higher. The choice of the higher, again, always demands our utmost powers ; but this of itself is the fittest, though it is also the severest, discipline for yet further striving.

In this connection the consideration of two points already referred to may be resumed. We have seen that "holiness has now acquired a fundamental moral significance," although at the same time, and in spite of this advance in its meaning, there still remains attached to it the sense of something "forbidding and hostile."¹ So far as the deliberately evil self is concerned, this hostility is readily comprehensible, since it is but the natural reaction to the power that is being defied, yet defied in vain. But even in the case of the good self there are always substantial grounds for a closely similar attitude. If, as so often happens, its goodness is the result of a revulsion from positive evil, there cannot but persist a deep sense of remorse for the past, once this is realised in its true nature as opposition to the divine purpose. Some element of fear inevitably continues to characterise the subjective attitude, although this should give place to the more elevated feeling of awe, especially when it is further realised that the entire transformation is sustained, not by the individual's own efforts, but by the atoning power of Deity. Nor can any advance in the development of the good self, no matter what heights of saintliness may be attained, diminish this sense of reverential fear. Rather must it become intensified as the new ideals gradually reveal their actual infinity, while at the same time they deepen the consciousness of the self's repeated

¹ *Ante*, p. 50.


failures and inability to satisfy their imperious demands. For as personality expands it becomes more and more sensitive. In the realms of art and knowledge it is always the genius, not the tiro, who most keenly realises both his own limitations and the magnitude of the work there still remains to do ; and similarly in moral experience it is the saint who most clearly sees his personality, not as it appears to his fellows, but in the fierce light emanating from the divine holiness.

None the less does all prolonged effort, in every department of experience alike, gain its most dynamic impetus from love, mingled though it must ever be with awe. And thus we love always what seems to us the best, or in the poet's words :

We needs must love the highest when we see it.

This is a matter, then, of necessity—" we *must* love " ; and also (once again) of vision or insight—" when we see it." If we see it we cannot but love it ; but to see the highest, clearly and fully, is never easy. Throughout the realm of knowledge and thought this is obvious, and almost equally plain in the appreciation of the finest art ; and simply because knowledge must always enter into the situation, and this the more extensively as modern life becomes more complex, it is preeminently true of all the practical ideals which determine conduct. In every instance alike the indispensable insight demands strenuous self-discipline ; like the perfection of the bodily eye, it is the outcome only of the long evolution of selfhood. To a very large degree this must be an eliminating process ; the suppression of the powerful tendencies inherited from man's savage and animal ancestry, together with the subordination of clamorous individual interests to

the well-being of the Whole. But these negative aspects of the development of personality rapidly provide the basis of its increasingly positive expansion, whereby the self attains its truest form and so becomes a self in the only real sense of the term. Naturally and inevitably, this brings with it that clearer and wider vision of its own nature and of its environing universe of which the poet speaks ; whence it follows that its desires centre more passionately upon objects ever higher. Such is the actual character of much human experience, while it is the governing ideal of all. Yet from beginning to end man remains a self, whose love can find its fullest satisfaction only in another self which must in some way be better than his own ; until, in the end, the pure in heart see God.



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
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